The feasibility of introducing a value-added tax in Pakistan by Khan, Muhammad Aslam
The Feasibility of Introducing a Value-Added Tax in
Pakistan
Muhammad Aslam Khan
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
at the Australian National University
July 1995
To the memory of my father Amir Ahmad 
who died during the writing of this thesis
Declaration
Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work
Muharpmad Aslam Khan 
July 1995
iii
Acknowledgments
I have accumulated a long list of debts over the years of my research; 
intellectual, institutional and personal. A number of people and agencies in New 
Zealand, the Philippines and Pakistan helped me in the completion of this study. I am 
grateful to all of them and, particularly to those who made themselves available for 
focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. My appreciation is also for the 
National Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan in nominating me for a Ph D. 
course, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) for financing 
my study in Australia and the Australian National University for offering me a place as 
a candidate in the Development Administration program.
At the Australian National University, National Centre for Development Studies 
I am especially indebted to my supervisor Professor Ron Duncan, and advisers Dr 
Peter Larmour, Dr Christine Fletcher, Mr Brian Brogan, Professor David Corbett and 
Dr Michael Hess. Their encouragement and perceptive criticism set this study on its 
proper course. The high degree of cooperation, I received from these people helped 
to make my research pleasurable. I owe my deepest gratitude to my supervisor 
Professor Ron Duncan for his keen interest in my research work. I am grateful for his 
interest, encouragement and guidance.
In New Zealand, I am indebted to the personnel of the Internal Revenue 
Department and Price Waterhouse. Substantial support was provided by the New 
Zealand Internal Revenue Department. I am particularly thankful to Internal Revenue 
Department Commissioner David Henry, Deputy Commissioners Graham Holland and 
Bob Maleny and their staff, and Mr Jeffrrey Toad, Senior Partner of Price 
Waterhouse.
In the Philippines, the Ministry of Finance, Bureau of Internal Revenue, 
Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Philippine Institute of 
Development Studies and the Asian Development Bank personnel were particularly
iv
helpful. Special gratitude must go to Mr Ernest Leung, Secretary Finance; Professor 
Angel Q. Yoingco and Ms Milwida M. Guevara of the Ministry of Finance; Ms 
Liwayway Vinzons, Commissioner Bureau of Internal Revenue and her staff; Dr 
Rosario Manasan at the Philippine Institute of Development Studies; Ms Florecita P. 
Flores, President, Philippines Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and Dr Satesh S. 
Jha, Chief Economist, Asian Development Bank.
In Pakistan, my research has substantially benefited from interaction with tax 
policy makers, legislators, civil servants, professionals, the business community and 
administrators. I am particularly indebted to Professor Kurshid Ahmad, Senator and 
Director of the Institute of Policy Studies; Mr Munawar Ahmad Khan, Ex-Sindh 
Government Provincial Minister and President of Sukkur Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry; Ms Sabhia Khanum, Ex-Provincial Member of the NWFP Legislative 
Assembly; Mr A. G. N. Kazi, Ex-Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission and Mr 
Saeed Qureshi, Deputy Chairman Planning Commission; Dr Akhtar Hassan Khan, 
Chairman, Tariff Commission; Professor Syed Nawab Hyder Naqvi, Director, Pakistan 
Institute of Development Economics; Mr Alvi Abdul Rahim, Member (Sales Tax), 
Central Board of Revenue; Dr Meekal Aziz Ahmad, International Monetary Fund, Dr 
Axshad Zaman, Ex-Chief Economist, Planning Commission; and Mr Asif Khan 
Wardak, Deputy Director General, Statistics Division.
In Australia, I am particularly indebted to the Commonwealth Treasury; the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission; the Australian Statistical Bureau; and academic 
members at the National Centre for Development Studies at the Australian National 
University. Mr C. R. Rye, Chairman and Mr R. J. Searle, Secretary Commonwealth 
Grants Commission; Mr Terry O’Brien, Assistant Secretary, Commonwealth Treasury; 
and Ms Dot Russell, Director, Australian Bureau of Statistics were particularly helpful 
in advising me on various issues of my study. In the process of collection of 
information, I also approached about forty countries’ Finance Ministries and Finance 
Departments with the value-added tax system, directly or through their High 
Commissions and Embassies, including the European Communities Commission and 
the Secretariat of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. In
almost all cases, these agencies provided me with relevant information. It is difficult 
to acknowledge each of them, but I am most thankful for their support.
Many other people were very supportive during my study at the Australian 
National University, especially Syed Shaukat Kazmi, Dr Ashfaq Ahmad Khan, Ms 
Lacanlalay Florinda, Mr Basilio Apolonio, Ms Padungcharoen Walailak, Mr Ghulam 
Muhammad Arif, Mr Arshad Mehmood, Syed Mazheruddin, Mr Muhammad Nazim 
Saleem, Mr Ali Raza Khan, Mr Moin Yousfi, Mr Muhammad Saleem, Mr Riaz Ahmad 
Khan, Mr Jaweed Amir and Syed Irtiqa Ahmed Zaidi. They have assisted me in many 
ways. I wish to thank all of them for their assistance and friendship.
I would also express my sincere gratitude to Ms Anne Bartlett for her efforts in 
whipping this manuscript into shape. My thanks also go to Ms Maree Tait, who 
helped me to edit the thesis. Finally, I would like to mention my wife Qaisar Aslam, 
and daughters Asma Aslam, Uzma Aslam, Ghazal Aslam, and Wajeeha Aslam who, in 
my long absence from Pakistan, have achieved excellence in their studies. A measure 
of their love and devotion to my study is reflected on every page. I am thankful for 
their patience and support.
vi
Abstract
The most notable feature of public finance in Pakistan has been the emergence of 
large fiscal deficits since the early 1980s. Government efforts to improve the fiscal 
situation have fallen prey to domestic political considerations, budgetary policies and 
their complex administration. Fiscal deficits have been primarily due to large increases 
in government non-development expenditure and the lack of comprehensive revenue 
generating efforts. Such fiscal deficits are not sustainable, have adverse, medium-term 
consequences for domestic financial stability and the balance of payments, and are 
likely to lead to a rapid accumulation of domestic and external debt stock and 
servicing liability. To sustain its growth and economic development, the Government 
o f Pakistan needs to make a strong commitment and concerted effort in the near and 
medium-term to initiate and maintain a consistent set of fiscal reforms to address the 
worsening fiscal situation.
This study, as a policy-oriented, applied research work on value-added tax 
(VAT), has empirically tested various policy options, including the feasibility of the 
introduction of a broad-based consumption-type VAT in Pakistan as a federal 
government tax. The three parts of the thesis have focused on most matters related to 
potential VAT implementation, operation and effects. The first part examines the 
influence of socio-political and economic developments on domestic resource 
mobilisation efforts; the effectiveness of the taxation structure; the organisation and 
processes of tax administration; and the need for fiscal reform. Part 2 evaluates policy 
options for improvement to the fiscal situation under the status quo scenario and the 
adjustment scenario. The feasibility of implementing a VAT in Pakistan has been
vii
investigated within the broad objectives of the study. The theoretical aspects of the 
VAT have been discussed and pertinent literature on VAT reviewed. VAT 
performance has been evaluated by surveying 23 countries using the VAT. The third 
part of the study evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the VAT by using 
descriptive, analytical and evaluative methods. Field research has been undertaken in 
Pakistan as well as in New Zealand and the Philippines. The study combines the 
responses of the major groups of Pakistan society and seeks to identify the problems 
and obstacles hampering the domestic resource mobilisation effort in Pakistan. Also, 
the administrative constraints on tax administration have been identified and solutions 
suggested. The study provides an outline of a potential blueprint for considering use 
o:' a VAT in Pakistan.
The study finds that a broad-based consumption type VAT is better on efficiency 
grounds than other alternatives investigated by the study. VAT implementation would 
reduce fiscal deficits substantially, and permit the Pakistan Government to maintain 
pablic sector development expenditure at a moderate level. The introduction of a 
VAT in Pakistan would be regressive, however, and even with exemptions and zero- 
riting of necessities, the regressive nature of the VAT would not change significantly. 
11 is recognised that a well-targeted compensation and public transfer mechanism 
vould be needed to protect the vulnerable groups of Pakistan society from an 
excessive VAT burden. Before VAT implementation, sufficient lead time should be 
gven to educate the general public about VAT. This study also recognises that a 
system of training and incentives would enhance the work climate of the tax agency, 
aid that the reform proposals discussed would have political and administrative
viii
implications, but in the present fiscal milieu, the Pakistan Government cannot avoid
recourse to comprehensive fiscal reform.
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1Introduction
Pakistan emerged as a sovereign nation on 14th August, 1947. In 1993, with a 
population of 120.8 million Pakistan was the ninth most populous country in the 
world. The development experience of this nation reveals a mixture of satisfactory 
economic growth and violent political disturbances (Nayak, 1988:3). The people have 
been forced to make the transition from one set of political parameters to another 
frequently and, in this process, normal legislative and political party practice has often 
been suspended (Noman, 1990:8; Lyon, 1993:218). Rivalry between politicians and 
the military has strengthened the role of the bureaucracy and their institutions in 
national policy-making and implementation (Nayak, 1988:7; Noman, 1990:9).
Despite its notable political environment, Pakistan has achieved remarkable 
economic progress in terms of both growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and 
structural changes in the composition of output. Real GDP has grown at an annual 
average rate of 6 per cent since the 1960s (Khan, A. H, 1992:843). Performance in 
the key sectors during this period has generally been satisfactory (Figure 1.1). 
Manufacturing value-added has grown at a more than respectable 8 per cent per 
annum. The service sector has achieved an annual average growth rate of 6.5 per 
cent; while the growth of agricultural value-added during this period averaged 4.2 per 
cent per annum (Government of Pakistan, 1992:2-3). Per capita income has increased 
from less than US$100 in 1956 to US$380 in 1990 (World Bank, 1992a:218).
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However, according to some estimates about 30 per cent of the population live below 
the subsistence level (UNDP, 1992:87).
Figure 1.1 Growth rates of GDP and key sectors
1970’s 1980’s1960’s
Years
uniiMllilil GDP (fc) Ö » !  Agriculture —■ — Manufacturing —&— Services
Sources: Government of Pakistan, 1976. Pakistan Economic Survey 1975-76, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, 1994. Pakistan Economic Survey 1993-94, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Notwithstanding this generally good performance, the economy has not done as 
well as it could have due to political and bureaucratic manipulation of fiscal policies 
(Haque and Montiel, 1992:101). Financial indiscipline and lack of coordination 
between fiscal and monetary policies led to the accumulation of large foreign and 
domestic debt, a high rate of inflation, and increased vulnerability of the balance of 
payments and government budget. The balance of payments situation and the budget 
position have become precarious. The current account deficit of the balance of 
payments stood at US$2.15 billion in 1991-92 -  5 per cent of gross national product 
(GNP) -  compared with US$1.56 billion (3.7 per cent of GNP) a year earlier. The
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fiscal deficit reached alarming proportions in 1990-91 at 8.7 per cent of GDP (Figure 
1.2). This situation emerged because the political leadership failed to take bold 
resource mobilisation measures. Much needed budgetary reform measures, such as 
reductions in defence expenditure and subsidies, and the imposition of taxes on 
agricultural incomes, were not implemented because of interest group pressures 
(Noman, 1990:186). Instead, the authorities opted for the easier option of relying 
heavily on domestic and foreign borrowing.
Figure 1.2 Budget and fiscal deficit (as a percentage of GDP)
25 - -
20 - -
1987-88 1992-931977-78 1982-831972-73
Years
i i Expenditure iiiiiiw Revenues —• — Overall Deficit
Sources: As in Figure 1.1.
Socio-cultural setting
Pakistan is not a homogenous society. Each province of the federation of 
Pakistan has its own separate language, culture, and life style, built-up over the 
centuries (Lyon, 1993:216). Pakistan, like Israel is an ideological state (Burki, 
1991:70). The majority of the population is Muslim. The Constitution of Pakistan
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provides that the principal of democracy, freedom, equality and social justice shall be 
observed as enunciated by Islam (Justice Division, 1985:1). Though religion provided 
a strong basis for an independent homeland for the majority of Muslims of the Indian 
Sub-Continent, it has had little influence on the cultural setting of the various 
provinces. Except on some special occasions, like wars with India, Pakistanis have 
lacked cohesiveness, a sense of belonging (Morris, 1993:198). Also, with each 
Province having such a rich cultural history, there has been little effort to integrate 
(Burki, 1991:29). Moreover, strong federal government control has overtime been 
manifest in a paternalistic attitude rather than promoting harmony between the various 
indigenous culture, and this has created socio-economic problems and social tensions 
(Burki, 1991:43).
Administrative set-up
Pakistan's administrative system is built around a federal structure. The 
federation includes the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province 
(NWFP), Baluchistan, Northern Areas (Gilgit Agency), the Federal Capital territory 
and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Map 1.1).
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Map 1.1 Map of Pakistan showing provinces and federally administered 
areas
P fO v m c *  b o u n d
. M W F fV jN T lC H
7 Province /
JAMMU & KASHMIR  
10-SOuiPd T p m io 'y )
AFGHANIS TAN
BALUCHISTAN
IR A N
SINO
) ----------------- *
Note: NW  Frontier Province^ North West Frontier Province.
F A T A - Federally administered tribal area.
Source: Directorate General of Films and Publications, 1991. Pakistan: An Official Handbook 
199f  Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Directorate General of Films and 
Publications, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Punjab is the most densely populated o f the four provinces (230 persons per 
square kilometre), followed by North West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan 
( fable 1.1). Bach o f the four main component entities o f the federation is distinctively 
different in strength and stage o f social and economic development (Lyon, 1993:216). 
The balance o f power is largely tilted in favour o f Punjab. Sindh with its large 
untapped agricultural resources has continuous problems o f coordination and
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Cooperation between its indigenous population and millions of migrants, especially 
those settled in urban areas. The Pathans in NWFP, as in Sindh, are divided into two 
groups -  settled districts and tribal areas living in small independent communities that 
are highly egalitarian. The Baluchis are divided into many tribes, each has its separate 
identity and socio-cultural setting (Burki, 1991: 70).
Table 1.1 D is t r ib u t io n  o f
(proportions)
la n d  a r e a  a n d p o p u la t io n b y  P r o v in c e
Area Population Density
(Sq.Km)
Sex ratio 
(Male/female)
Pakistan 100.0 100.0 106 111
Punjab 25.8 56.1 230 111
Sindh 17.7 22.6 135 111
NWFP2 9.4 13.1 148 109
Baluchistan 43.6 5.1 12 112
Federal Capital Territory 0.1 0.4 376 119
FATA3 3.4 2.6 81 108
Notes: 1Sq.Km= Square Kilometres.
2NWFP = North West Frontier Province. 
•^Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1991b. Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1991, Statistics 
Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan: 16.
For administrative purposes, each province is successively divided, into 
divisions, districts, tehsils/taluqas and villages. The villages are grouped into unions 
for the purpose of local government. Local government institutions also exist at the 
district level. In urban areas, there are municipal corporations, municipal committees, 
town committees and containment boards (Figure 1.3 below briefly gives the detail of 
the administrative structure).
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Figure 1.3 Administrative structure of Pakistan
Provincial Governments 
Headed by Chief Ministers
Divisions
Administered by Commissioners
Federal Government 
Headed by the Prime Minister
Sub-Divisions 
Administered by 
Assistant Commissioners
Tehsil or Taluqas 
Represented by 
Members of the Parliament
Town and Villages 
Represented by 
Local Councillors
Districts 
Administered by 
Deputy Commissioners
Note: Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners normally belong to federal government
service. They are responsible for the general administration, law and order, internal 
security and revenue collection.
Source: Directorate General of Films and Publications, 1991. Pakistan: An Official Handbook 
1991, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Directorate General of Films and 
Publications, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Economic developments
On the economic front the course o f development has not been without 
mistakes. During the long drive towards self-sustaining growth, many mistakes have
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been made and many opportunities missed. Within the mixed economic system, 
centralised economic planning has been used to enforce the political and social 
frameworks of the government in power. A review of past development efforts 
indicates a continuous shift in government policy and approach. Development efforts 
in the 1950s were characterised by the initial difficulty of breaking the age-long 
stagnation of the economy. After independence, the government was confronted with 
many socio-economic problems, especially dealing with the large influx of refugees 
from India. In this period emphasis was placed on industrialisation and reliance on the 
private sector.
The sixties -  industrialisation and aid dependent growth strategy
In the 1960s emphasis was placed on industrialisation and the setting up of a 
system of incentives to achieve this objective (Planning Commission, 1965:70). The 
government largely confined its role to providing social and physical infrastructure. 
Fiscal policies were designed to provide powerful incentives, along with paternalistic 
guidance (Gardezi and Rashid, 1983:7). These incentives included subsidies, tax 
concessions, import licences, a managed exchange rate and other salutary devices 
(Planning Commission, 1956:98; Andrus and Muhammad, 1958:150-151; Bhatia, 
1979:78). Such policies promoted capital formation by a few wealthy industrial 
families who owned the major share of industrial assets as well as banks and insurance 
companies. Because of their inter-linkages, these families were able to pre-empt 
substantial financial resources from financial institutions. An arbitrary system of credit 
rationing, covering 50 to 60 per cent of total bank lending, inhibited the process of 
broadening the base of ownership of industrial capital and more even distribution of 
incomes (Planning Commission, 1965:117; Nayak, 1988:54).
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During this period Pakistan adopted an aid-dependent growth strategy. The 
second (1960-65) and third (1965-70) five-year development plans were heavily 
dependent on foreign aid. It was argued that with the help of foreign aid the country 
would attain self-reliance rapidly (Planning Commission, 1965:8; Kemal, 1992:1101). 
Throughout the 1960s the economy maintained its growth momentum with the help of 
substantial inflows of foreign capital. In this period the rate of growth of investment 
followed the path of foreign aid (Amjad, 1979:298).
Within the framework of the import substitution strategy in the 1950s and the 
1960s economic growth was preferred over its more even distribution in the belief that 
in the initial stage of development, equity must be sacrificed for growth (Johnson, 
1962:153; Haq, 1966:30). This belief was based on the notion that the individual 
greed of the 'robber barons' of industry would lead to a larger national cake and 
eventually benefit the entire society (Papaneck, 1967:149; Noman, 1990:40). The 
second five year plan (1960-65) argued that "it will be necessary to tolerate some 
initial growth in income inequalities to reach a high level of savings and investment" 
(Planning Commission, 1960:49). Similarly, the fourth five year plan (1970-75) 
argued, "equitable distribution of incomes had to wait till the level of production had 
risen sufficiently to make such distribution possible" (Planning Commission, 1970:11).
The political acceptability of support measures, concessions and incentives for 
the private sector on a scale which could not be easily tolerated in any other country 
(Baqai, 1979:124) critically distorted the domestic resource base. The multiple 
exemptions diluted the revenue-generating capacity of the tax system and facilitated 
tax evasion through the transfer of taxable profits to non-taxable activities 
(Government of Pakistan, 1991 b:21). The concentration of income and wealth in the
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hands o f the few rich resulted in a decline in the standard of living for the majority of 
the population (Griffen and Khan, 1972:200-204).
The seventies -  strategy of nationalisation to achieve social balance
The 1970s development policy of widespread nationalisation of capital and 
intermediate goods industries was a major element in a development strategy, of which 
the primary objective was professedly a balance between social justice and economic 
growth (Baqai, 1979:136: Nayak, 1988:115-16; Noman, 1990:76). However, 
expansion of public enterprises without administrative capacity for managing the 
taken-over industrial units led to bottle-necks in production (Naik, 1993:3). 
Protection of the inexperienced public sector management inhibited the development 
of an internationally competitive industrial sector. Increased public sector 
consumption eroded the public savings base and had an adverse impact on domestic 
savings (State Bank of Pakistan, 1985:5). The large-scale nationalisation paralysed 
private investment initiatives. As a result, there was an overall decline in aggregate 
investment (Naqvi and Sarmad, 1984:61-62). Moreover, reforms introduced by the 
government added a major element of uncertainty to economic relations which could 
not be removed by subsequent assurances (Naik, 1993:18).
The eighties -  self-reliant growth strategy
In the 1980s, the military regime endeavoured to support the policies of the 
1970s. At the political level, substantial strides were made to orient, encourage and 
protect private capital. The major policy shift began with the financial and trade 
regime reforms. Regulations governing investment and imports were substantially 
liberalised. A comprehensive export promotion scheme was promulgated. The high
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tariff structure and other import controls were reduced and exchange rate reforms 
were made. Privatisation became one of the most important components of the 
economic reform program implemented by the government, with the help of 
international financial development institutions. The main objectives of this policy 
were to reduce the drain on government resources caused by the persistent losses of 
government-owned enterprises and to create greater opportunities for the private 
sector to expand and modernise these enterprises. The reduced role of the 
government in industrial and commercial activities was seen as beneficial as it would 
release sufficient public resources for nation building activities such as education, 
health and essential infrastructure such as power and transport. During this period, 
development strategies focused on self-reliant growth (Zainan, 1989:9; Kemal, 
1992:1101). However, little success has been achieved in the realisation of these 
objectives because of many internal as well as external factors, especially the world 
wide recession.
Budgetary developments
The most notable feature of public finance in Pakistan has been the emergence of 
large fiscal deficits. Since 1982-83 the government budget, its deficit and its financing, 
have been major topics of discussion. Initially, the budget deficits accelerated due 
primarily to large increases in government expenditure. In the later part of the 1980s, 
however, it was due to a manifestation of a rise in government outlays and shortfalls in 
government revenue. The sharp deterioration in the fiscal situation is not specifically 
attributable to the general economic climate, but rather to the turbulent domestic 
political climate and budgetary policies and their administration. Fiscal instruments (in 
the form of ‘tax expenditures and tax preferences’) were used for advancing wide-
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ranging but, often conflicting tax policy objectives. The poorly conceived tax 
preferences (also serving as ‘tax shelter’) have resulted in massive tax evasion and 
unfair tax burden. The high tax rates (due to the after-tax rate of return often below 
the opportunity cost of investment) have encouraged tax avoidance and adversely 
effected the fairness of the tax system. Further, poor tax compliance introduced 
considerable inequity and inefficiency in the tax system. Despite continuous real per 
capita GDP growth -  at an average annual rate of 3 per cent since the 1960s -  the 
Government has failed to mobilise adequate revenue to meet defence, development 
and other public expenditure requirements (Planning Commission, 1990:53). It 
appears that throughout the period, per capita government expenditure was higher 
than the per capita revenue yield to the government. Figure 1.3 below shows these 
trends.
Figure 1.4 Per capita GDP, revenues and expenditure 
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Sources: Government of Pakistan, 1976. Pakistan Economic Survey 1975-76, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Appendix 2.1 and Appendix 2.3.
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Pakistan's savings performance and its overall economic performance appear to 
be incongruous. While Pakistan's real GDP has grown at an average rate of 6 per cent 
per annum since 1960, its national savings rate since 1977-78 has fluctuated between 
13 and 16 per cent of the gross national product (GNP). Domestic savings (public 
and private, excluding net factor income from abroad) were only 12.4 per cent of GDP 
in 1992-93 (Table 1.2), compared to an average saving rate of 19 and 28 per cent 
respectively in low growth and high growth developing countries (World Bank, 
1989b:27; Naik, 1993: 2).
Table 1.2 Pakistan: consumption, investment and savings (as percentage of 
GNP)
1977-78 1982-83 1987-88 1992-93
Consumption 85.3 82.6 83.9 80.4
Private 75.2 72.3 69.1 68.1
Public 10.1 10.3 14.8 12.3
Investment 16.7 17.0 17.3 19.6
Private 5.4 6.6 7.4 9.5
Public 10.8 8.7 8.4 8.6
Change in stock 0.5 1.7 1.5 1.5
National savings 15.6 15.4 13.1 14.1
Private 13.2 14.2 11.8 12.2
Public 2.4 1.2 1.3 1.9
Of which:
General government 1.8 0.3 -0.4
Domestic savings ^ 9.8 8.4 10.6 12.4
Foreign savings 1.1 1.6 4.2 5.5
1977-78
Annual average growth rate (%) 
1982-83 1987-88 1992-93
Consumption 21.4 15.7 12.1 14.1
Investment 29.6 16.8 12.2 17.9
Private 22.5 21.3 14.1 21.1
Public 39.1 11.5 11.2 16.0
National savings 33.6 16.1 8.2 16.6
Domestic savings 22.0 12.1 18.5 22.3
Memorandum items:
GNP (current billion rupees) 188.5 403.8 704.5 1356.9
Notes: aA s percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
.Negligible.
Sources: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1991a. National Accounts o f Pakistan 1990-91, Statistics 
Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Karachi: Government of Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, 1994. Pakistan Economic Survey 1993-94, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
State Bank of Pakistan, 1993. Annual Report 1992-93, Karachi: State Bank of 
Pakistan.
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The low saving performance in Pakistan is mainly due to low public savings 
(Heller, 1975:429; Planning Commission, 1991:56). Studies by Abbot and DeRosa 
(1984:3); Jetha et al. (1984:2); Fry (1991:27); Khan, A. H (1992:843); Burney and 
Khan (1992:31) have found that the country's heavy dependence on foreign capital and 
its weak tax administration has promoted a high consumption culture in the country. 
Large foreign capital inflows, on soft terms, in the 1960s and 1970s distorted the 
composition of investment and increased investment in consumption oriented activities 
(Griffen and Enos, 1970:321; Naqvi, 1971:5). During this period public consumption 
has increased substantially without matching increases in public revenue. Ineffective 
tax policies and growing public sector consumption have resulted in a continuous 
decline in government savings which have been negative or negligible in the past 10 
years (Table 1.2). It appears that Pakistan's investment rate since the 1970s -  around 
17 per cent of GNP -  has largely been financed by foreign remittances from Pakistani 
workers and bilateral and multilateral foreign aid. In the absence of these two 
financing sources it would have been difficult for the government to support even the 
low investment level from domestic resources (Figure 1.5).
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Figure 1.5 Investment and savings (as percentage of GNP )
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Note: 'Domestic savings as percentage of GDP.
Sources: State Bank of Pakistan, 1991. Annual Report 1990-91, Karachi: State Bank of 
Pakistan.
State Bank of Pakistan, 1993. Annual Report 1992-93, Karachi: State Bank of 
Pakistan.
Appendix 2.1 and Appendix 2.3.
The deterioration in the government's budgetary position mainly emerged during 
the fifth plan period (1978-83). Against the Plan target of rupees 74 billion, the 
revenue surplus was rupees 27 billion (Planning Commission, 1988:58). During the 
sixth plan period (1983-88) the revenue budget went into deficit. Against the Plan's 
revenue surplus target of rupees 52 billion, a deficit of rupees 40 billion emerged, a 
swing of Rupees 92 billion (Planning Commission, 1990:220). This deterioration was 
accentuated in the seventh plan period (1988-93). The Plan implementation shows 
that government revenue fell substantially behind the growth of government 
expenditure (Table 1.3). Consequently, the fiscal deficit peaked in 1990-91 at rupees 
89 billion (8.7 per cent of GDP) -  up from 5.8 per cent of GDP in 1972-73 (Naik,
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1993:5). The preliminary assessment of fiscal deficit during the seventh plan period 
indicates that fiscal deficit at 7.7 per cent of GDP remained high (Table 1.3).
Table 1.3 Trends in government revenue, expenditure and fiscal deficits (as
a percentage of GDP)
Year
fiscal
Government expenditure 
Total Current Development
Government
revenue
Overall
deficit
1972-73 20.1 13.5 6.6 14.3 5.8
1982-83 23.9 15.8 8.1 16.9 7.0
Fifth Plan (1978-83) 23.7 14.8 8.9 17.1 6.6
1983-84 23.8 17.1 6.7 17.8 6.0
1984-85 24.8 17.8 7.0 17.0 7.8
1985-86 26.1 18.4 7.7 18.0 8.1
1986-87 26.7 20.4 6.3 18.5 8.2
1987-88 26.7 19.8 6.9 18.2 8.5
Sixth Plan (1983-88) 25.8 18.9 6.9 17.9 7.9
1988-89 26.1 19.9 6.3 18.7 7.4
1989-90 25.8 19.3 6.5 19.3 6.5
1990-91 25.6 19.2 6.4 16.9 8.7
1991-92 26.5 19.0 7.5 19.1 7.4
1992-93 26.2 19.8 6.4 18.2 8.0
Seventh Plan (1988-93) 26.1 19.4 6.7 18.4 7.7
Sources: Government of Pakistan, 1976. Pakistan Economic Survey 1975-76, Ministry of
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Appendix 2.1 and Appendix 2.3.
Revenue Division, 1993. CBR Yearbook 1991-92, Revenue Division, Central Board of 
Revenue,, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
The growing fiscal deficits are threatening price stability, weakening an already 
fragile balance of payments, constraining essential social infrastructure, and thereby 
undermining growth prospects (Bernheim, 1988:30; Lyon, 1993:222). If the fiscal 
deficits are not reduced to a sustainable level they will undermine Pakistan's credit- 
worthiness in the international market -  if they have not done so already. The 
increasing monetisation of fiscal deficits will have an adverse impact, via high inflation 
on resource allocation and income distribution, with consequent social distress (Gupta, 
1992:38). Upward inflation, devaluation, and rising interest rates could disrupt 
production and investment activities severely and also lead to large scale capital flight.
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The need for domestic resource mobilisation
Comprehensive tax reform is needed for several reasons. First, while the tax 
structure has undergone some changes over the years there are changes needed both in 
its revenue raising capacity and towards simplifying it. Bird (1991) observed that the 
key to successful tax reform is a tax structure that can be administered adequately with 
the available resources while at the same time making the best possible use of those 
resources from a long-term perspective. Second, the modifications which have been 
introduced during the last two decades, as discussed earlier, have been of an ad hoc 
nature and have, despite their usefulness, created a superstructure which lacks 
cohesion. The tax policy changes brought about in the wake of relatively increased 
economic activity, particularly during the 1980s were, however, not part of a well- 
considered tax reform program but ad hoc changes addressed to the specific issues. 
Therefore, changes in tax policy were not accompanied by appropriate improvements 
in the taxation structure. Third, present fiscal legislation is best viewed more as an 
historical growth than as a system in the sense of a deliberately conceived and 
integrated structure in which every part has a defined role to play. Finally, for 
sustainable growth in the long-run, Pakistan has to accelerate investment in physical 
and human capital, especially in the areas of rural development, power generation, 
irrigation, transportation, education and basic health facilities.
In the past, as a percentage of national expenditure, Pakistan has allocated 
insignificant funds for the nation building activities. The level of education, health 
facilities and other quality of life indices, such as access to drinking water and 
sanitation facilities places Pakistan in a low performance category (Table 1.4). 
Measured in terms of the Human Development Index (FCDI), Pakistan ranks 120th out
17
of 160 countries (UNDP, 1992:16). Neglect of social services has probably 
contributed towards the increase in the population rate and resulted in a decline in 
living standards of the majority of the population (Noman, 1990:41). There is a 
pressing need to increase means for the development of social sector programs, which 
given the existing weak resource position appears very unlikely.
Table 1.4 Quality of life indicators: international comparisons (recent years)
Pakistan South
Asia
Developing
countries
Developed
countries
Life expectancy (years) 57.7 58.4 62.8 74.5
Adult literacy (% 15+) 31.0 42.0 60.0 99.0
Year of schooling (25+) 0.7 2.2 3.5 9.1
Under-five mortality 162.0 151.0 116.0 1.0
GNP per capita (US$) 350 388 706 12508
Education expenditure 2.2 3.4 3.7 5.2
Health expenditure 2 0.2 1.0 1.4 4.7
Military expenditure 
Ratio military expenditure/
6.7 7.2 5.5 5.4
education and health 
Access to clean water
279 164 109 38
% of total population 41.0
% of rural population 31.0
% of urban population 
Access to sewerage facilities
65.0
% of total population 20.0
% of rural population 12.0
% of urban population 
Availability of electricity
48.0
% of population 35.0
Physician per hospital bed 5653
Physician per person 1815
People below poverty line (%) 
------rr:— -------------------
30.0
Notes: 'Per 1000.
2Percent of GNP.
..Information not available.
Sources: UNDP, 1992. Human Development Report 1991, New York: Oxford University Press: 
86-87.
Planning Commission, 1991. Mid-Term Evaluation o f Seventh Plan (1988-93), 
Planning Commission, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Planning Commission, 1992. Social Action Program 1992-95, Planning 
Commission, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan:Table 3.5:45.
The fiscal system, therefore, not only needs comprehensive reform of the 
taxation structure but also some new forms of tax which could generate additional 
revenues. This study is one step in this direction. The study aims to examine the
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revenue potential of the value added tax as a federal government tax and its 
administrative feasibility as an alternative tax in place of the sales tax. With respect to 
the implementation of the value-added tax in Pakistan the study aims to answer two 
questions:
(a) Why may the Pakistan Government find the value-added tax attractive?
(b) What difficulties would be encountered in implementation of the value- 
added tax?
Objectives of the study
The objective of this study, therefore, is to suggest measures for rebuilding the 
existing taxation structure to provide a buoyant new source of government revenue. 
The study aims to examine Pakistan's fiscal system under two options, i.e., status quu 
policy scenario and the adjustment policy scenario.
The premise of the status quo policy scenario is that major restructuring of the 
fiscal system, entailing increased taxation measures, would be politically unfeasible; 
therefore no change in the fiscal system is desirable. Government revenue and 
expenditure are simulated up to the year 1998 on the basis of current trends and 
unchanged policies.
The second option, the adjustment policy scenario, assumes that the status quo 
policy option is not appropriate in the present circumstances, because without a 
fundamental restructuring of the budgetary system, the economy would quickly run 
into serious difficulties and the budget deficits would reach unsustainable levels. The 
adjustment policy scenario, therefore addresses the restructuring of the fiscal system. 
Under this option the study aims to investigate various strategies for generating 
additional revenue to the government such as: (i) strengthening tax administration; (ii)
widening the tax base by reducing tax exemptions and incentives and imposing tax on 
agricultural incomes; (iii) containing the growth of non-development expenditure by 
reducing expenditure on defence, subsidies and imposing users' charges; and (iv) 
implementation of a consumption-type value added tax. The specific objectives of this 
study will be to:
1. Estimate the additional revenue gained through levying a broad-based 
value added tax on consumption in place of the existing sales tax and 
assess its impact on consolidated government finances.
2. Assess distributional consequences of the implementation of a value 
added tax on various income groups.
3. Assess taxpayer compliance and administrative feasibility of the 
implementation of a value added tax in Pakistan.
Outline of the study
The thesis contains ten chapters. Following the introduction of Pakistan's socio­
economic and budgetary developments in this chapter and a review of Pakistan’s fiscal 
system in chapter 2, chapter 3 reviews the policy options for domestic resource 
mobilisation. Chapter 4 discusses the value added tax -  its background, strength and 
weaknesses, and conceptual framework. Chapter 5 contains a review of the 
implementation and administration of the value-added tax in 23 countries. Chapter 6 
discusses an outline of the analytical framework. Chapters 7, 8, and 9 assess the 
revenue potential of the VAT, its distributional implications, and taxpayer compliance 
and administrative feasibility of a VAT system in Pakistan. Finally, chapter 10 
presents the summary and conclusions.
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2The Fiscal Structure of Pakistan
The fiscal structure of Pakistan is based on separate constitutional powers of 
revenue collection and expenditure between various level of governments. The areas 
of exclusive federal responsibility include: defence; external affairs; fuels (oil and 
natural gas); air, sea and rail transport; national highways and strategic roads; banking 
and currency. The provinces have major responsibilities in the areas of education, 
health, agricultural support services, maintenance of the irrigation system, provincial 
and rural roads, and internal law and order.
The federal government has powers to collect and make laws for duties of 
customs, taxes on personal incomes and corporate profits, taxes on domestic goods 
and services and taxes on capital value of assets. Its expenditure is mainly on defence, 
and debt servicing, foreign affairs, power generation and distribution, 
telecommunications, and aviation. Provincial government revenues are derived mainly 
from water rates, taxes on trades and professions, stamp duties, taxes on motor 
vehicles, and taxes on immovable property. As a constitutional obligation the federal 
government shares with the provinces proceeds of certain taxes. The provinces are 
responsible for managing and controlling about 60 per cent of essential economic and 
social infrastructure, including education (80 per cent), health (80 per cent), 
agriculture (90 per cent), public transport and water sewerage.
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The local government bodies' finances are outside the consolidated (federal and 
provincial) budgetary mechanism. These bodies, such as municipalities, and district 
and local councils, levy taxes, rates and fees as per the Local Government 
Ordinance/Acts with the approval of provincial government (Government of Pakistan, 
1989:3). The main sources of their income include local taxes and fees (Figure 2.1). 
Their expenditure is mainly for small local-level activities. Figure 2.1 gives details of 
the tax collection powers at the various levels of governments.
Figure 2 .1 Tax collection powers at various level of governments
Tax system
Federal government taxes Provincial government taxes Local government
taxes
Taxes on income Land revenue Octroi/toll tax
Import duties Stamp duties Local rates (tax on land)
Excise duties Motor vehicle Tax Export tax
Sales tax Registration tax Tax on. professional
Export Duties Property tax income
Other taxes Other taxes Hearth tax
Marriage and feast tax 
Market fees 
Property tax 
Licences’ fees and fines
rate/fees
Sources: Justice Division, 1985. The Constitution o f the Republic o f Pakistan 1973, Ministry of 
Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Justice Division, Islamabad: Government of 
Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, 1979. Local Government Ordinance 1979, Ministry of Local 
Government, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Direct and indirect taxes comprise approximately 80 per cent of total revenue of 
government. Non-tax revenue includes income from public sector property and
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enterprise, interest and dividends and the contribution of the public sector autonomous 
bodies. These proportions have been reasonably constant since 1977-78 (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2 Consolidated revenue, 1977-78 to 1991-92 (percentage share)
□  Direct Taxes ^  Indirect Taxes □  Non-Tax Revenues □  Con. by AB
100%
1991-921989-90 1990-911982-83 1987-88 1988-891977-78
Years
Note: Con. by AB = Contribution by public sector autonomous bodies.
Sources: Appendix 2.1 and Appendix 2.3.
Government revenue
As in many developing countries, the taxation structure of Pakistan is heavily 
dependent on indirect taxes, accounting for about 60 per cent of the total taxes -  
approximately 11 per cent of GDP (Figure 2.3). Major indirect taxes are customs 
duties, excise duties on domestically produced goods and services and sales tax on 
domestically produced goods and imports. In 1992-93, import duties comprised 35 
per cent of total taxes and 45 per cent of total indirect taxes (Appendix 2.3). Direct 
taxes are levied on both personal income and profits of companies and registered 
firms, and on wealth.
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Figure 2.3 Structure of direct and indirect taxes, 1977-78 to 1992-93
(percentage share)
Sources: Appendix 2.1 and Appendix 2.3.
Pakistan’s tax performance relative to other countries has been weak (Table 
2.1), especially in collection of direct taxes. Exemptions granted to achieve a 
multiplicity of objectives, such as industrialisation in less developed regions, increasing 
domestic savings, promoting exports, and supporting charities and welfare activities, 
has had an adverse impact on its growth (PIDE, 1992:25; Khan, A, 1992:1124). The 
cascading nature of existing commodity taxes has created many distortions in the 
economy. These taxes have an adverse impact on domestic production and the 
country’s international competitiveness.
Taxes on income
Income tax is the principle form of direct taxation accounting for approximately 
95 per cent of direct taxes. Its yield is low because of the inelastic and narrow base. 
Incomes in the agriculture sector, which generates about 26 per cent of the value
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added in the economy, and agricultural-related industries have long been exempted
from income tax (NTRC, 1986:134; Qureshi, 1987:157).
Table 2 .1 Tax revenue in selected countries (as a percentage of GDP)
Sample
1973
Tax revenue1 
1980 1991
Low-income countries
India 11 10 11
Kenya 14 20 22
Pakistan 10 13 13
Sri Lanka 13 19 18
Indonesia 14 21 18
Lower-middle income countries
Philippines 9 12 15
Papua New Guinea 17 19 18
Thailand 10 13 19
Upper-middle income economies
Mexico 9 15 152
Uruguay 19 21 27
High-income economies
Singapore 15 18 18
New Zealand 21 31 33
Belgium 30 41 42
United Kingdom 27 30 34
Australia 17 21 24
Germany 25 28 29
United States of America 17 19 18
Canada 22 16 182
Notes: Consolidated central government. 
21989.
Sources: IMF, 1993a. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1993, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
IMF, 1994. International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1994, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
The income tax structure, with many tax brackets and high marginal rates, has 
encouraged tax evasion (PIDE, 1992:22; Coopers & Lybrand, 1989:3-10). Only 
approximately 800,000 of Pakistan's 113 million (in 1990-91) people paid income tax. 
Much of the income earned is exempt from tax by the high threshold limit -  currently 
rupees 40,000 for salary income and rupees 30,000 for other personal income
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(Appendix 2.4). Because of these structural deficiencies, the tax share, as a proportion 
of GDP, has fallen from 2.4 per cent during 1978-83 to 2.1 per cent during 1988-93 
(Table 2.2).
Table 2.2 Growth pattern of tax and non-tax revenue (as a percentage of 
GDP)
Fifth plan period 
(1978-83)
Sixth plan period 
(1983-88)
Seventh plan period 
(1988-93)
Total revenue 17.1 17.9 18.4
Tax revenue 13.7 13.9 13.5
Direct taxes 2.6 2.0 2.3
Taxes on income 2.4 1.8 2.1
Indirect taxes 11.1 11.9 11.2
Import duties 4.9 5.3 4.9
Excise duties 3.9 3.0 2.6
Sales tax 1.0 1.1 1.8
Other taxes 1.3 2.5 1.9
Non-tax receipts 2.7 3.4 4.2
Contribution by 
autonomous bodies 0.6 0.6 0.7
Memorandum item:
GDP (current billion rupees) 1392.7 2654.4 5199.6
Sources: Appendix 2.1 and Appendix 2.3.
Import duties
Pakistan has followed a policy of import substitution through direct controls and 
tariffs (NTRC, 1986:168). Direct controls excluded import of certain goods, while 
high tariffs on permitted imports were used for the twin purposes of revenue 
generation and control. The tariff structure imposed high rates on luxury and non- 
essential goods, while imports of machinery, industrial raw materials and agricultural 
machinery were either exempted or charged at nominal rates. As a consequence of 
this policy, a small number of goods have been taxed heavily, promoting a large inflow 
of smuggled goods which led to the opening of "Bara Markets" (smuggled goods 
markets) all over the country. According to the National Taxation Reform 
Commission report, approximately 80 billion rupees worth of imports escape import 
duties each year (NTRC, 1986:225-227).
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Export duties
Export duties are used for a variety of reasons: to stabilise domestic prices of 
exportables; to raise revenues; and to provide preferential treatment for manufacturers 
(World Bank, 1978:11). These duties have never been a reliable source of revenue 
and are viewed as a device for siphoning off windfall gains otherwise accruing to 
exporters as a result of increases in international commodity prices. Though export 
duties are levied on a large number of goods, their impact is heaviest on cotton, rice 
and hides and skins. For example, in 1990-91, 63 per cent of total export duties 
collected were from the export of raw cotton and 30 per cent from cotton yarn 
(Revenue Division, 1992:234).
Excise duties
Excise duties were initially designed for the purpose of controlling consumption 
of selected products (Investment Advisory Centre of Pakistan, 1985:1). However, 
over time, these duties, as with other taxes, have been used to support the weak 
revenue base. In 1991-92, the excisable commodities list included 78 commodities and 
14 services (Revenue Division, 1993:133). The bulk of these duties, however, have 
been collected from a limited number of commodities. For example, in 1991-92, 85 
per cent of excise duties was collected from seven commodities namely, tobacco, 
sugar, oil and petroleum products, cement, natural gas, cotton-yarn and beverages 
(Revenue Division, 1993:149).
Sales tax
The sales tax is a single-stage manufacturing tax imposed on imports and on 
domestic production. As elsewhere, exports are exempt from sales tax. Under the
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Constitution services cannot be made liable for sales taxation (Justice Division, 
1985:86). Here again, the tax base has been distorted, as many goods and services 
have been exempted from the tax. At 1.8 per cent of GDP in 1992-93, collection of 
revenue from sales tax is low by international standards (Table 2.2). Given the current 
weakness in direct taxation and the heavy reliance on import duties, broadening the 
sales tax base has been viewed as an efficient alternative source for revenues 
(Casanegra et al. 1989:11; PIDE, 1992:35).
Government expenditure
Public expenditure (current and capital) as a proportion of GDP has increased 
from 23.7 per cent in the fifth plan (1978-83) to 26.1 per cent in the seventh plan 
(1988-93). This growth has been mainly due to the rapid increase in non-development 
expenditure (current expenditure) which over the last 15 years has increased from 14.8 
per cent of GDP in the fifth plan (1978-83) to 19.4 per cent of GDP in the seventh 
plan (1988-93). Table 2.3 indicates the growth pattern of non-development and 
development (capital) expenditure since the fifth plan period.
Table 2.3 Growth pattern of current and development expenditure (as a
percentage of GDP)
Fifth plan period 
(1978-83)
Sixth plan period 
(1983-88)
Seventh plan period 
(1988-93)
Total expenditure 23.7 25.8 26.1
Current expenditure 14.8 18.9 19.4
Defence 5.7 6.9 6.5
Interest payments 2.4 4.0 5.2
Subsidies 1.1 1.1 0.9
Government administration 1.9 2.3 2.3
Social services 1.8 2.5 2.7
Other current expenditure 1.9 2.1 1.8
Development expenditure 
Memorandum item:
8.9 6.9 6.7
GDP (current billion rupees) 1392.7 2654.4 5199.6
Sources: Appendix 2 .1 and Appendix 2.3.
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Current expenditure
The major items of current expenditure are general acministration and liw and 
order, defence, community, social and economic services, subsidies and debt-seMcing. 
Most of the increase in current expenditure has been due tto increases on defence and 
debt servicing liabilities. In 1992-93 these claimed approximately 60 per ;ent of 
current expenditure (Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.4 Structure of current expenditure, 1977-718 10 1992-93 (percentage 
share)
Years
EJAdmn. Ü Defence □ Subsidies Dlnteires □ Social Ser. ■ Other Exp
Notes: Admn. = Expenditure on government administration. 
Social Ser. = Expenditure on social services.
Other Exp = Other current expenditure.
Sources: Appendix 2.1 and Appendix 2.3.
Pakistan’s strategic vulnerability along it’s eastern borders has piovided 
justification for the higher defence expendiUre (Wilber, 1971:381). Both in terms of 
GDP (6.5 per cent in 1992-93) and as a proprrtion of curnen: government expenditure
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(33 per cent in 1992-93), defence expenditure has increased substantially and is high 
compared to the world average and to other countries in the region (Table 2.4).
Table 2.4 Pakistan's defence expenditure in comparison to other countries
(annual average 1972-88)
Defence expenditure as a percentage of 
Gross domestic Government
product (GDP)________ expenditure
- World 3.8 15.5
- Industrial countries 4.0 15.6
- Developing countries 3.0 14.6
- Asia 3.5 18.4
- Middle East 7.2 25.3
- Europe 3.6 19.3
- Western Hemisphere 1.3 6.5
Selected countries in the region
. Bangladesh 1.1 10.3
. India 3.0 19.2
. Indonesia 2.7 12.5
. Nepal 0.9 6.5
. Pakistan 6.0 33.0
. Philippines 2.1 19.2
. Sri Lanka 1.2 3.8
. Thailand 3.6 19.7
Sources: IMF, 1992. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1992, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
Government of Pakistan, 1992. Pakistan Economic Survey 1991-92, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990. World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency.
Developm ent expenditure
The share of development expenditure in total expenditure has been declining 
gradually. In 1977-78 it was approximately 41 per cent of total expenditure or 9.7 per 
cent of GDP (Appendix 2.1). In 1992-93 it has fallen to approximately 25 per cent of 
total expenditure and 6.4 per cent of GDP (Appendix 2.3). Since 1982-83, the most 
rapidly growing sectoral component of this expenditure has been energy. The growing 
socio-political tension resulting from long-hours of power load-shedding forced the 
government to give priority to development of power infrastructure. In 1992-93, 
approximately 39 per cent of development expenditure allocations were made to the
energy sector (Table 2.5).
Table 2.5 Public sector development outlays: sectoral shifts (percentage 
share)
1982-83 1987-88 1992-93
Agriculture and water 24.5 17.2 9.9
Energy 1 23.4 31.0 38.7
Industry 10.8 0.8 1.8
Transport and communications 16.9 12.9 29.6
Physical planning and housing 7.4 11.6 4.3
Education 5.2 8.3 4.5
Health 4.2 5.9 1.8
Other social sectors^ 4.3 7.4 5.5
Miscellaneous sectors 3.3 4.9 3.9
Total: 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: 1 Includes power, fuels and minerals sectors.
2 Includes population planning, social welfare, rural development.
Sources: Government of Pakistan, 1986. Pakistan Economic Survey 1985-86, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, 1994. Pakistan Economic Survey 1993-94, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
The high priority attached to the energy sector, however, has undermined the 
development of the social sectors. In 1992-93, only 12 per cent of development 
expenditure allocations were made for social sector programs. The most affected 
sectors were education and health. Allocations for the education sector have fallen 
from 8.3 per cent in 1987-88 to 4.5 per cent in 1992-93. The health sector's share in 
the development budget has been reduced from 5.9 per cent to 1.8 per cent over the 
same period (Table 2.5). Table 2.6 indicates that provision of public services at 7 per 
cent of GDP and expenditure on social services at 3 per cent of GDP in 1988 
compares very unfavourably with the majority of low-income, lower-middle income 
and upper-middle income countries.
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Table 2.6 Government expenditure in selected countries (as percentage o f 
GDP)
1973
l
Total
1980 1991
2
Public Services 
1973 1980 1991
3
Social Services 
1973 1980 1991
Low-income countries
India 204 25 31 54 5 6 44 6 8
Kenya 23 28 30 6 9 8 9 9 10
Pakistan 20 23 26 8 7 7 2 3 5
Sri Lanka 26 42 30 4 5 6 11 11 10
Indonesia 21 27 21 5 11 8 4 4 4
Lower-middle income countries
Philippines 16 17 22 3 5 5 4 4 6
Papua New Guinea 395 34 38 85 11 8 l l 5 10 11
Thailand 17 21 17 5 6 5 5 7 6
Upper-middle income economies
Mexico 13 18 25 2 4 2 6 7 6
Uruguay 25 26 36 7 6 7 14 17 23
High-income economies
Singapore 16 20 22 7 7 8 5 6 8
New Zealand 31 44 47 5 6 6 19 27 30
Belgium 46 59 56 6 8 6 28 37 34
United Kingdom 46 52 52 10 11 11 23 27 27
Australia 32 40 45 6 6 8 14 21 24
Germany 51 54 53 8 7 7 32 35 35
United States of America 27 31 35 7 6 8 15 17 18
Canada 47 42 44 6 5 6 26 24 24
Notes: ‘Consolidated central government and sub-level governments, including central
government transfers to sub-level governments.
“Public services includes, general public services, defence, public order and safety.
’Social services include, education, health, social security and welfare, housing and 
community amenities, recreation, cultural and religious affairs.
41974. 51975.
Sources: Asian Development Bank, 1988. Country Reports on Financing Public Sector 
Development Expenditure in Selected Countries (Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, 
India and Pakistan), Manila. Economic Office, Asian Development Bank.
Asia Pacific Economics Group, 1993. Asia-Pacific Profiles 1993, Canberra: The 
Australian National University.
IMF, 1978. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1978, Washington, DC:
International Monetary Fund.
IMF, 1985. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1985, Washington, DC:
International Monetary Fund.
IMF, 1993a. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1993, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
IMF, 1994. International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1994, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
OECD, 1993c. Revenue Statistics o f OECD Member Countries 1965-1992, Paris: 
OECD
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Public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR)
Deterioration in the fiscal situation has resulted in rapid accumulation of 
outstanding domestic and external debt. Outstanding debt which was 61 per cent of 
GDP at the end of the fifth plan period (1983) increased to 79 per cent of GDP by the 
end of the seventh plan period (1993) (Table 2.7). Consequently, debt servicing 
liability has increased substantially, claiming 5.6 per cent of GDP in 1992-93.
Table 2.7 Outstanding debt and debt servicing liability, 1983 to 1993 (as a
percentage of GDP)
End of fifth plan 
period (1982-83)
End of sixth plan 
period (1987-88)
End of seventh plan 
period (1992-93)
A. Outstanding debt
Total 61.1 77.0 78.5
Domestic 28.6 43.3 44.5
External 32.5 33.7 34.0
B. Interest payments 3.0 4.8 5.6
Domestic 1.8 3.6 4.4
External 1.2 1.2 1.2
Memorandum item:
GDP (current billion rupees) 364.4 675.4 1342.0
Sources: State Bank of Pakistan, 1985. Annual Report 1984-85, Karachi: State Bank of 
Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, 1994. Pakistan Economic Survey 1993-94, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Appendix 2.1 and Appendix 2.3.
Tax administration structure
Tax administration in Pakistan is based on laws governing the allocation of 
revenues and expenditures between various level of governments. Federal government 
collects 95 per cent of consolidated taxes, including the taxes shared between the 
central and provincial governments (Appendix 2.5). The provincial governments 
collect less than five per cent of total taxes. The administrative set-up, therefore, 
varies according to the responsibility of tax collection at the various level of 
governments.
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The federal Revenue Division/Central Board of Revenue (CBR) administers all 
major taxes through an established network. The provincial governments administer 
taxes through their finance and excise and taxation departments. Figure 2.5 below 
presents the organisational structure of the Revenue Division.
Figure 2.5 Organisational structure of the Revenue Division
D.G.Customs
Reforms
D.G. Capacity
M ember
Customs
M ember
Tax
Policy
M ember
Central
Excise
M ember 
Judical 
(Income Tax)
M ember 
Sales Tax 
and Admn
M em ber
Income
Tax
M ember
Judical
(Cus,CE & ST)
Secretary Revenue Division/ 
Chairman CBR
Collector 
Appeals - 
Karachi, 
South Zone 
and
N orth Zone
C hief Research 
(D irect Taxes)
C hief Research 
(Customs)
C hief Research 
(CE & ST)
C hief (Tax 
Education 
D irector (R& S)
C hief Customs 
(Procedures)
C hief (Rebate) 
M inister Customs 
Brussles,
C hief (Coord) 
Computer, Karachi 
Secreatry
(Custom I, II & III)
Customs
Collector 
(CE and ST) 
Karachi and 
Lahore
Chief (CE) 
Secretary (CE)
C hief D irect 
Tax (Admn)
C hief D irect 
Tax (Operation)
Chief D irect 
Tax (Policy)
Secretary (I & II)
C hief ( S T )  
Secretry (ST-I) 
Secretly (ST-II) 
Secretry (Admn)
Notes: CBR= Central Board of Revenue, Cus= Customs, CE= Central excise, ST= Sales tax, 
Admn= Administration, D.G= Director General, Coord= Coordination,
R&S= Research and Statistics.
Source: Revenue Division, 1993. CBR Yearbook 1991-92, Revenue Division, Central Board of 
Revenue, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan:7.
Tax administration in Pakistan is complex, involving approvals, checks and 
counter-checks. The cumbersome procedures have created many problems. First, 
much of staff time is spent on tax assessment and, as a result, survey and identification 
of new taxpayers has suffered. Second, the system has given rise to frequent litigation, 
partly as a tax postponement device to take advantage of the long drawn-out tax 
appeal procedures. Finally, centralised control by one agency has caused an ineffective 
and, in fact, spurious form of coordination (NTRC, 1986:13). Despite carefully
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conceived tax laws and efforts to build an efficient administrative machinery, tax 
administration has weakened over time.
Administrative constraints
The tax administration system suffers from many constraints. Lack of adequate 
infrastructure, low levels of skill, and lack of motivation and administrative 
commitment have had an extremely negative effect on the development of an efficient 
administrative machinery (Khan. A, 1992:1133). Further, lack of an appropriate data 
base and absence of automated systems have weakened the smooth operation of the 
tax agency. Some of the factors responsible for the weaknesses are briefly discussed 
below.
Administrative powers
Tax officers have substantial powers in matters of tax assessment and collection. 
These powers enable them to ask a taxpayer to attend the tax office and produce 
accounts and documents to support his/her returns, to impose penalties for failing to pay 
tax when due, to enter and search business premises and to impound business records. 
This process leads to harassment, delays, financial disadvantage and even personal 
indignities (NTRC, 1986:11), and undermines taxpayers’ confidence in the tax 
administration. The tax administration structure has proved limited in its effectiveness to 
minimise corruption among officials. The wide-ranging powers available to the tax 
collection officers encourage officers to solicit handouts from taxpayers (NTRC, 
1986:11).
Staff numbers
Tax administration is deficient in staff, while the existing staff suffer from poor 
morale. The available staff is not sufficient to effectively perform various functions, 
particularly the timely assessment of tax returns and investigation. The vulnerable
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nature of service careers also adversely effects the tax department’s ability to attract 
motivated personnel in adequate numbers.
Poor training facilities
Tax administrators form the linchpin of the tax system. They are responsible for 
making assessments, collecting information, investigating concealment, and recovering 
tax payments. Organisation of these activities along modern lines requires officials to 
be trained regularly through short and long-term courses. The only training provided 
to tax officers consists of an initial 9-12 month-long course upon entry, and a few 
short courses to personnel below the rank of tax officer. A shortage of properly 
trained tax technicians and administrators, to deal with modern taxation issues, has 
limited the speed of tax policy execution (Coopers and Lybrand, 1989:3.38).
Lack of research capacity
Research capacity on fiscal issues within the CBR is non-existent. The Research 
and Statistics Department of the CBR is used for compiling statistical data and is not 
involved in policy issues. Changes in tax policy are frequent, and policies are 
implemented without proper analysis. In 1992 , the Revenue Division was established 
to address tax policy issues, such as enforcement of tax laws and the impact of various 
taxes on the economy. However, the new Division has so far not mobilised to deal 
with aspects of tax policy other than revenue generation issues.
Conclusions
Much of the explanation for poor resource mobilisation in Pakistan can be traced 
to the structure of its taxation system. The system is primarily motivated towards
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mobilising revenues, yet it has failed to achieve this objective. Growth of current 
expenditure and the gradual reduction in development expenditure has severely 
undermined the growth of "nation building" activities. Increased public sector 
borrowing requirements have given rise to an increased debt stock, and servicing of 
debt alone claims more than one-fifth of total revenues. The structure of tax 
exemptions and incentives has resulted in poor tax compliance, inflicted tax 
administration and distorted resource base. Administrative constraints such as lack of 
necessary infrastructure, low level of skills, lack of motivation, lack of administrative 
commitment, and corrupt practices have had an adverse impact on the effectiveness of 
the tax agency.
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3Policy Options for Resource Mobilisation
Pakistan's fiscal system is incompatible with the needs of a developing society. 
Past efforts to mobilise domestic resources to satisfy the needs of a growing economy 
have faltered because of the built-in inflexibility of a system that is the result of years 
o f ill-conceived and contradictory policies. Deterioration in government revenue, 
rapidly growing government expenditure and heavy losses in public sector enterprises 
have contributed to chronic deficiencies in the fiscal system. Many changes, additions, 
modifications and amendments made in an attempt to improve the system have further 
aggravated the fiscal base. An analysis of developed and developing countries' 
taxation systems shows that in the last 20 years taxes have gone up world-wide, as a 
proportion of total income. During the 1980s, now considered the decade of tax 
reform, a majority of countries introduced comprehensive reform of medium and long­
term fiscal policies, with consideration for structural issues, growth, inflation, the 
provision of public goods and income distribution. Many governments reduced the tax 
burden on incomes by shifting to broad-based consumption taxes. Efforts were made 
to harmonise the tax structure through the adoption of a uniform taxation system 
(Khalilzadeh and Shah, 1991:xvi). In this process, tax bases were broadened through 
the rationalisation of tax incentives and tax rates. For example, between 1972 and 
1990 the tax base has widened in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, 
Sri Lanka, India, Malaysia and Singapore (Taylor, 1993:4; Azis, 1994:385), whereas 
Pakistan's position in world tax ranking deteriorated from 55th in 1972 to 69th in 1990 
(Asiaweek, 1993:15). Many factors have contributed to this weakness. The strategy
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of lavish legal and administrative provisions for incentives and tax exemptions to 
attract foreign and domestic investment led to massive tax evasion, corruption, and 
development of a large informal sector without any corresponding increase in 
investment (Gersovitz, 1987: 615; Shah and Toye, 1990:156).
Policy options
Since the 1980s, various studies and reviews have argued the need for 
comprehensive reform of the fiscal system through budgetary stringency and strong 
restraints on public spending to reduce the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP 
(NTRC, 1986:6; Ahmad and Stern, 1987:2; Peat Marwick, 1988:1-5; Coopers & 
Lybrand, 1989:4-3; UNDP, 1991a:206). This chapter analyses various options for 
strengthening the government's financial position by considering two possibilities one 
under the status quo policy scenario and the other under the adjustment policy 
scenario.
The status quo policy scenario (unchanged policy case)
The status quo policy scenario assumes the continuation of past budgetary 
trends and unchanged policies in respect to government revenue (tax and non-tax) and 
government expenditure (non-development and development). The implicit 
assumption is that in the present domestic and regional socio-political situation it will 
be difficult for the government to undertake major fiscal reforms. Projections under 
this scenario show that the consequences of avoiding fiscal reform (maintaining 
revenue and expenditure at current levels of GDP) would be grim. The fiscal deficit is 
projected to increase from 8 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 10.4 per cent of GDP by
1997-98 (Table 7.1).
The availability of resources for financing deficits of a large magnitude 
(approximately 10 per cent of GDP) from domestic non-inflationary and external 
sources is doubtful. The external economic environment, particularly of industrialised 
countries in the post-cold war period is such that it would be difficult for the 
government to mobilise foreign resources in amounts exceeding the present level (1.8 
per cent of GDP in 1992-93). Further, the present policy of relying heavily on bank 
borrowing (4.7 per cent of GDP in 1992-93), could not be relied upon over the 
medium or longer term because of its deleterious effects on the economy. Under these 
circumstances the government would have no option but to rely heavily on non-bank 
domestic sources, that is, to use private sector savings that are expected to increase 
from 1.5 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 6.6 per cent of GDP in 1997-98 (Appendix 
7.1). Under this scenario the outstanding public debt -  which is already large (about 
79 per cent of GDP in 1992-93) will substantially build-up (with its associated interest 
burden). The foregoing analysis suggests that this scenario is not sustainable.
The adjustment policy scenario (feasible policy case)
Given the nature of the budgetary problems confronting Pakistan the 
government need to either reduce its expenditure, particularly on defence, debt 
servicing, subsidies and government administration, or in the alternative, restructure its 
tax system to seek higher revenue and/ or to improve the revenue elasticity and 
buoyancy of the tax structure. In many countries fiscal correction has been achieved 
through taxation and expenditure-control measures (Nashashibi et al. 1992:8). Some 
of these countries include Colombia (Musgrave and Gillis, 1971; McLure and Zodrow, 
1991), Republic of Korea (Choi, 1990a), Turkey (Bulutoglu and Thirsk, 1991), 
Indonesia, (Gillis, 1990a; Asher, 1990) and Malawi (Shalizi and Thirsk, 1991).
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Primarily, in these countries tax reforms were geared towards improving the resource 
position. These were also aimed at eliminating the disincentive effects of high tax 
rates on incomes and cascading effect taxes on domestic production and distribution. 
In Pakistan, it is just as important to reduce budget deficits by increasing government 
revenue, as it is to control the growth of non-productive expenditure.
In Pakistan the primary objective of the fiscal policy should be to improve the 
government’s financial position by increasing government revenue and reducing 
expenditure as far as prudently possible. The adjustment policy scenario assumes that 
the status quo policy option is not sustainable. The growing fiscal deficits are not 
sustainable, have adverse, medium-term consequences for domestic financial stability 
and the balance of payments, and are likely to lead to a rapid accumulation of domestic 
and external debt stock and its servicing liability (Manasan, 1988:1). The adjustment 
policy scenario looks into major fiscal issues faced by the government and suggests 
possible policy directions and strategies to address these issues (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Policy matrix for adjustment policy scenario
Policy targets_______
1. Overall fiscal deficit
2. Government revenue
Policy direction___________ Strategies and measures
Achieve a reduction in the 
overall fiscal deficit/GDP 
ratio to 5 per cent by the 
year 2000.
Achieve an increase in the 
revenue/GDP ratio to about 
20 per cent by year 2000 
by fostering domestic 
resource mobilisation, 
efforts.
1.1 Expand tax base.
1.2 Reduce non-development 
expenditure.
1.3 Strengthen public sector 
management.
1.4 Reform public sector 
enterprises.
1.5 Strengthen tax
administration.__________
Implement a tax reform 
directed at expanding the 
tax base and increasing the 
tax elasticity and tightening 
tax administration.
- eliminate most tax 
exemptions and incentives.
- impose a tax on
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Policy targets_____________ Policy direction___________ Strategies and measures
agricultural incomes.
- implement a broad-based 
consumption tax._______
3. Government expenditure 1. Contain expenditure growth,
to 25 per cent of GDP by 
year 2000.
2. Increase effectiveness of 
expenditure control and 
monitoring.
3. Improve technical and 
administrative efficiency 
of public institutions.
Rationalise government
expenditure.
- assess the cost-benefit of 
defence expenditure with a 
view to reduce it.
- reduce expenditure on civil 
service.
- reduce implicit and explicit 
subsidies.
- implement tightened 
expenditure control 
procedures.
4. Weak budget Strengthen and restructure 1. Establish budget and
management system budget sector management. planning units in all 
ministries/departments.
2. Extend budgetary practices, 
reporting standards and 
expenditure control 
procedures.
3. Introduce mid-term fiscal 
planning to coordinate 
budget formulation, 
expenditure control, 
auditing and expenditure 
privatisation and program 
analysis activities in a 
systematic framework.
5. Poorly performing public Privatise most of the 1. Divest partially or fully
sector enterprises public sector enterprises. certain public sector 
enterprises.
2. Institute complete 
autonomy and 
accountability in the 
management of public 
sector enterprises.
6. Weak tax administration Strengthen and restructure 1. Improve institutional
tax administration. framework.
2. Improve policy 
making and 
implementation 
capacity of the tax 
administration at all levels.
3. Strengthen the operational 
control.
4. Resolve overlapping 
responsibilities between
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various organisational 
functions.
5. Overcome scarcity of 
qualified personnel through 
training and seminars on 
various aspects of tax 
administration, 
implementation and 
control issues.
Broadening the tax base
The decline in the relative contribution of taxes in Pakistan, particularly tax on 
incomes, is mainly due to tax exemptions and other policies providing incentives to 
individuals, organisations and institutions to condition their behaviour in one way or 
another. The full costs of these "incentive" policies -  direct payments (grants and 
loans), tax exemptions and allowances, preferential prices (including for credit) -  are 
not known. But the extent and coverage of these incentives indicates that the cost is 
substantial. These incentives are one of the root causes of inefficiency in the taxation 
system -  no societal group is taxed according to its ability to pay. Unless all the major 
exemptions are withdrawn, revenue generated by taxation is unlikely to go up. It is 
not the intention here to discuss all exemptions and incentives granted by the 
government. However, one of the major exemptions that has distorted the entire 
taxation structure, the exemption of agricultural income from the tax system is 
discussed briefly.
Tax on agricultural income. Tax on agricultural incomes has been the subject of 
substantial controversy in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. During the Mughal period, 
landlords as agents of kings collected land revenue as land rent on the basis of per acre 
production (Habib, 1982:235-240). During the British period the fixed land rent was 
the major source of government revenue (Kumar and Desai, 1982:928). This source
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of revenue fell with the weakening of British power in the sub-continent from 53 per 
cent of total taxes in 1900-01 to 7 per cent in 1946-47 (Table 3.2). The revenue 
collected during the Mughal and the British administrations was not a tax on 
agricultural incomes as conventionally understood, but a graduated surcharge on land 
revenue with a high exemption limit and low rates (Qureshi, 1987:159). In fact, taxes 
on agricultural income in areas which now constitute Pakistan never achieved a 
prominent position in federal or provincial budgets. Many factors contributed to this, 
including political influence, high administrative costs of collection, and assessment of 
tax which combined to bring small assessments into the tax net (Kumar and Desai, 
1982:924).
Table 3.2 Consolidated government revenue (selected years 1900-1 to 1946-
7)
Years Total tax collection 
(million rupees)
Percentage of total tax revenue
Land Customs^ Excise Income Others
1900-1 575 53 9 10 3 25
1917-8 914 36 18 17 10 19
1921-2 1269 27 30 14 15 15
1930-1 1310 23 36 13 12 16
1940-1 1424 19 28 16 19 18
1946-7 . 4420 • 7 22 22 37 11
t
Notes: ^Central and provincial governments.
A small amount of provincial income tax is included in customs.
Source: Kumar, D. 1982. ‘The Fiscal System’ in D. Kumar and M. Desai (eds), The 
Cambridge Economic History o f India, Volume 2 (1757-1970), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press:Table 12.7:929.
A number of expert committees and studies have examined the possibility of 
introducing a direct tax on farm incomes. These studies have covered almost the 
whole field of agricultural taxation, including the feasibility of extending the general 
income tax law to agricultural incomes. Most of the studies undertaken during the 
1960s and the 1970s maintained that the agriculture sector was already under heavy 
implicit and explicit taxes through hidden transfers, such as low priced raw materials 
for industrial production, subsidised food for the industrial work-force, an over-valued
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exchange rate, open taxes in the form of export duties, and profits of the government 
monopoly trading corporations and therefore the agriculture sector was not capable of 
bearing the burden of additional taxation (Hornby, 1968:105; Dixit, 1971:385; Azher, 
1973:83; Newbery, 1974:38; Newbery, 1987b:367-370; Qureshi, 1987:159; NCA, 
1988:529). These studies concluded that extending income tax laws to agricultural 
income would not be a productive source of additional revenue for the government 
(Joshi et al. 1968:329; Ahmad and Stern, 1991:253) and if a tax was imposed its yield 
would be negligible and its effect would be harmful to the sector's productive capacity 
(LUMS, 1986:63; NCA, 1988:536). Studies undertaken in the 1980s pointed out that 
although the vast majority of people engaged in agriculture were living below the 
subsistence level, a number enjoyed large incomes. Since their income is exempt from 
tax these landlords live luxurious lives and have made substantial investments in city 
real estate, creating a situation of antagonism among the trading and industrial classes 
as well as the professional class who are forced to pay income tax. This antagonism 
has discouraged tax compliance and provided strong incentives for tax evasion among 
business and professional income tax payers (Hamid, 1970:438; NTRC, 1986:134; 
NCA, 1988:530; Coopers & Lybrand; 1989:3.8).
The strongest opposition to a tax on agriculture income in Pakistan comes 
mainly from the influential lobby of well-to-do land owners who have so far 
effectively used their legislative and administrative power to block any policy aimed at 
taxing agricultural income. Their political influence has been apparent in the legislative 
assemblies from the beginning of Pakistan's history and has not diminished (Alam, 
1974:26; Qureshi, 1987:181). In federal and provincial elections since 1951, landlords 
have won 70-80 per cent of the seats. Because of their political influence, there has
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been no legislation introduced to reform the land tax system or to introduce any formal 
agricultural income tax (Herring and Chaudhry, 1974:272; Qureshi, 1987:181). In 
many instances federal government efforts to levy a tax on agricultural income have 
failed on legal grounds. In 1989, a high-powered Committee of Experts on Taxation 
of Agricultural Incomes was appointed by the Prime Minister to assess the possibility 
of implementing a tax on agricultural incomes. This Committee, like other 
Committees, failed to come to a conclusive resolution because of differences of 
opinion among its members (mostly agriculturists). The Committee observed that 
under the Constitution of Pakistan taxation of agricultural incomes is a provincial 
subject and, therefore, it is not legally proper to levy a tax on agricultural incomes 
through federal legislation without a Constitutional amendment (CCEP, 1989:6).
Since the early 1980s there has been an increasing resource flow into agriculture 
and a declining trend in the concealed tax burden on agriculture, resulting in increased 
agricultural incomes (Qureshi, 1987:167). Domestic agricultural prices are now 
closely aligned to world prices. In this environment, agriculturists are making large 
profits. On efficiency and equity grounds, therefore, there appears to be little 
justification for exempting agricultural incomes from tax. According to the 1980 
Agriculture Census report, about 77 per cent of the ownership holdings in Pakistan - 
claiming 41 per cent of cultivatable area - is 12.5 acres or less (the basic exemption 
level in the case of irrigated area that could be exempted for distributive and 
administrative reasons). Thus, only 23 per cent of ownership holdings, covering 59 
per cent of the operational cultivated area (Table 3.3), would come into the tax net, if 
a tax on agricultural income is introduced (Agriculture Census Organisation, 1980:2; 
Ahmad and Stern, 1991:258).
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Table 3.3 Land distribution and potential tax base
base
acres
Ownership Holdings Operational Holdings
No. (%) Area (%) No. of Area Cultivated Nos.'000
Farms (%) (%) (%) (acres)
Taxable Base® 
Av. Holding Total area
(acres) ‘000 acres
Taxable
'000
A cres
U nder 1.0 8 Q 5 n Q - - - -
1.0- < 2.5 19 3 13 2 2 - - - -
2 .5 -  < 5.0 20 6 17 5 6 - - - -
5 .0 -  < 7.5 15 7 17 9 10 - - - -
7 .5 -  < 12.5 15 12 23 19 21 - - - -
1 2 .5 -< 25 .0 13 19 17 25 26 4 9 2 .7 17.12 8436 2 276 .3
2 5 .0 - < 50 .0 6 17 6 18 18 2 2 7 .4 33 .2 7548 4 7 0 7 .2
5 0 .0 - <  150.0 3 20 2 15 13 113.7 78.1 8880 7 4 5 8 .7
150 and  above 1 17 n 9 6 37 .9 199.2 7548 7 0 7 5 .9
100 100 100 100 100 871 .7 324 1 2 21518 .1
(3 .7 9 m ) (4 4 .4 m  acres) (4 .07  m ) (4 7 .1 m  ac res) (3 9 .2 m  acres)
Notes: m = million.
Qless than 0.5 per cent.
®taxable base detennined with an exemption level of 12.5 acres.
-Zero.
Source: Agriculture Census Organisation, 1980. Agriculture Census 1980-All Pakistan 
Report, Agriculture Census Organisation, Lahore: Government of Pakistan:Table 
1.2:2; Table 3.1:11; Table 12.1:70.
Various methods have been proposed to introduce a tax on agricultural incomes 
on the above basis, such as extension of existing income tax laws (NTR.C, 1986.160; 
Mohammad, 1987:424-425) or land tax levied on potential yields with a simple rate 
structure (Qureshi, 1987:12; NCA, 1988:537; Ahmad and Stern, 1991:255-259). 
Under both methods, the agriculture sector has an income tax potential of about 3-8 
billion rupees (World Bank, 1987:26; Ahmad and Stern, 1987:43; Coopers & 
Lybrand, 1989:5-28; Nasim and Mukhtar, 1991:11). Thus, a proper policy to tax 
agricultural income would not only increase government revenue but also close many 
loopholes that facilitate tax evasion.
Expenditure control measures
Studies on the pattern of public expenditure based on time series and cross 
section data suggest that in developing countries public expenditure rises quickly as a
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by-product of development and as an instrument of growth (Williamson, 1961:53; 
Thorn, 1967:19; Martin and Lewis, 1972:73). In Pakistan, over time, the size and 
structure of public expenditure has changed significantly. Government expenditure in 
terms of GDP increased from approximately 24 per cent in 1977-78 to about 26 per 
cent in 1992-93. During this period non-development expenditure grew at a much 
faster rate, from 14.2 per cent of GDP in 1977-78 to 19.8 per cent in 1992-93, 
whereas the development expenditure as a proportion of GDP, 10.5 per cent in 1978- 
79, declined to 6.4 per cent in 1992-93 (Appendix 2.1 and Appendix 2.3).
In the existing situation, without a sizeable reduction in non-productive public 
expenditure, the government is likely to face the following risks: (i) deterioration in the 
financial position of the government; (ii) rising debt service liability; (iii) crowding out 
of private sector activities; and (iv) pressure on the real exchange rate which among 
other things would hinder Pakistan's export-led growth strategy. The experience of 
other developing countries show significant scope for reduction of government 
expenditure, if the right policies are adopted. Countries like Benin, Bolivia, Gambia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar and Sri Lanka significantly improved public resources by 
cutting wasteful spending (Nashashibi et al. 1992:28; Ramakrishanan, 1992:10). 
Similarly, in Pakistan, expenditure savings can be achieved by reducing "non­
productive" expenditure, such as prestige projects, subsidies that are not well targeted, 
trimming an excessively large civil service and containing the growth of defence 
expenditure in real terms.
The growth of defence expenditure in Pakistan over the last few years has been 
discussed extensively. There is widespread recognition that excessive defence 
spending drains the country's economy by moving resources away from important
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development issues. A number of authors have pointed out that defence spending in 
America has damaged their competitiveness and that expenditure in Britain has had a 
negative impact on the economy and has contributed to its decline (Poole and 
Bernard, 1992:438; DiFilippo, 1990:21). These arguments, however have in many 
cases not been well substantiated. In the international scene, there is no good evidence 
to show that defence spending always hurts the economy (Looney, 1990:4). The 
Pacific Rim experience has been entirely different. Taiwan has maintained one of the 
heaviest defence "burdens" while maintaining one of the fastest economic growth rates 
(Chand and Mintz, 1992:11). In North Korea, increase in export of major 
conventional weapons from 155 million US dollars in 1988 to 313 million US dollars 
in 1992 (SIPFJ, 1993:444) had positive spin-offs in civilian industry. Singapore 
developed an effective arms export industry by maintaining significant expenditure on 
defence. Similarly, China now accounts for eight per cent of the world deliveries of 
major conventional weapons (SIPRI, 1993:452).
Defence expenditure in Pakistan, influenced by international, regional and 
domestic political events, however, has created many budgetary problems. It would 
be difficult to argue that a country the size of Pakistan, should have a defence budget 
the size of a country as large as India. However, two wars within a decade (1965 and 
1971) and a continued threat to the country's sovereignty has forced Pakistan to 
prepare itself for any untoward threat to its territorial security, by building military 
capabilities. Given the state of military and domestic politics in the region, it is 
unlikely that there will be any decrease in defence expenditure in the near future. 
Events in Kashmir (Girilal, 1976:57-58), the proliferation of nuclear weapons (United 
States Department of Defence, 1989:124), delineation of the border at Siachen in
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Kashmir, and India's continued efforts in recent years to develop the relative military 
strength to become an influential regional player (Tomar, 1989: FA39; Coply, 1989:6) 
are the basic regional issues. Until a settlement is reached, the chances of controlling 
military expenditure in Pakistan are slim.
Public expenditure management. Public expenditure reform in Pakistan is difficult 
to accomplish because of a lack of adequate institutional capacity. The government 
finds it extremely difficult to control the rate of growth of public expenditure, even 
under very restrictive fiscal conditions. The lack of control over expenditure is the 
most important factor contributing to large fiscal deficits. Effective expenditure 
management requires the institutionalisation of the expenditure control mechanism. 
The weak institutional capacity of the implementing ministries/departments leads to 
ineffective and delayed implementation and wastage of scarce resources. Often the 
assumed linkage between the budget and various other activities has not reflected 
priorities set by the budget, for the economy as a whole, or within a given sector. 
Although the government in recent years has taken some steps towards improving the 
fiscal balance, large efforts are required on the current expenditure side. These 
include: (i) establishing strong linkages between macro-economic conditions and 
public expenditure within the budget process; (ii) establishing institutional capacity to 
direct macro-economic fiscal objectives toward specific targets; and (iii) securing 
system-wide acceptance of these targets.
The key to imposing public expenditure management lies in an efficient and 
effective coordinated operation between government agencies, legislators and other 
interest groups at the federal, provincial and local government levels. This strategy 
would require revision of the existing mechanism of isolated decision-making and
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policy implementation. To overcome the problem it is necessary that public sector 
expenditure be monitored and controlled from the very beginning. Establishment 
planning units in each Ministry/ department would effectively help to monitor and 
control public expenditure. Similarly, a medium-term rolling plan (on at least a three 
year basis) could assist the government to coordinate various expenditure demands 
and allocations. The Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) which has successfully 
been used in many countries can be a feasible option for the government to coordinate 
micro and macro activities related to the budget, investment levels, the balance of 
payments and the financial sector.
Medium term fiscal strategy (MTFS)
In many countries the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) has been adopted 
as an important element in the process of reform. The MTFS framework helps to 
improve the overall fiscal situation, by adjusting government expenditure according to 
available resources. The benefit of this strategy is that the government can avoid most 
drawbacks associated with the policy of a reduction of expenditure across the board 
that in the past led to serious misapplication of scarce resources. The experience of 
countries such as United Kingdom (United Kingdom, 1985:34) shows that a 
prioritized expenditure planning within the framework of MTFS greatly facilitates the 
process of allocating resources, and is useful in guiding budgetary cuts in any 
eventuality.
The main contribution of the MTFS would be a detailed analysis and approval of 
the expenditure plans of various spending units. The aim would be to evaluate 
expenditure against objectives, in a medium term framework (normally three years).
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Such review would also allow the opportunity to examine development and recurring 
expenditure together, and thereby mitigate the deleterious effects of the present system 
where the two are completely divorced. A second benefit would be a general 
agreement between policy makers, legislators and other agents on indicative targets for 
three years, in relation to expenditure plans, tax, pricing policies, and external and 
domestic borrowing (including deficit financing). A major advantage of such a plan 
would be that budget making would be spread out over the year as a continuous 
process, in which the executive and the legislature would be involved. This would 
substantially reduce the risks inherent in the present system, where all major budgetary 
decisions are made in a few days.
Privatisation of public enterprises
In many countries privatisation and restructuring of public sector enterprises has 
improved socio-economic conditions, promoted economic development and created a 
congenial investment climate (Kuria, 1992:27). On the basis of these benefits, many 
privatisation proponents argue that the potential efficiency gains associated with 
private ownership are so large that the benefits would be felt in the country's socio­
economic development from the very beginning (Vickers and Harrow: 1988:55; 
Hemming, 1992:84; Cheasty, 1992:54). The opponents of the privatisation program, 
on the other hand, argue that privatisation of public enterprises is not an efficient way 
to overcome budgetary crises (Peters, 1991:136). They argue that the private sector 
can be as inefficient as the public sector and might not be a suitable source of budget 
financing (Korani, 1990: 139; Chelminski, 1992:4). According to this line of argument 
the budget needs to be reformed properly by removing impediments associated with its 
imbalance, before revenue from the privatisation program can be realised. Cheasty
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(1992:54), Veljanovski, (1987:10); and Naqvi and Kemal (1991:119) argued that 
uncertain revenues associated with privatisation programs are not in line with the 
established norms of budget management. There is empirical evidence to show that 
changing the locus of ownership from public to private is not a sufficient condition for 
improvement in fiscal management (Naqvi and Kemal, 1991:107; Bollard, 1994:75; 
Krueger, 1994:211).
In Pakistan, the size of the public sector industrial undertakings and their 
operational performance -  the rate of return on equity and on capital employed 
(approximately eight per cent) has been substantially below the opportunity cost of 
capital (Kardar, 1994:1). Government strategy to protect these undertakings through 
implicit and explicit budgetary transfers (subsidy) has claimed substantial budgetary 
resources. Out of 118 public sector industrial enterprises in 1991, only 8 units were 
making reasonably good profits, 16 units were earning moderate profits, while the 
remaining 94 units were incurring losses (Government of Pakistan, 199la:2-3; EAC, 
1992:5). There is general consensus among authors, that the government may off-load 
those undertakings that run on a purely commercial basis (Hemmings, 1992:81). In 
Pakistan, public enterprises such as cement, vegetable ghee, sugar and textile 
industries, airlines and railways are public sector entities running purely on a 
commercial basis, so there is no economic justification for keeping them in the public 
sector. Off-loading these entities would help the government to improve its budgetary 
position.
Pakistan's privatisation program of selling 118 state-owned enterprises has not 
been very successful due to a number of factors (Government of Pakistan, 1991 a: 1; 
Kardar, 1994:1). First, the objectives of privatisation are not clear (whether the
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purpose of the program has been to mobilise resources or reduce the burden on the 
budget or improve allocative efficiency). Second, the government placed the highest 
priority on selling unprofitable parastals, which did not attract buyers and, therefore, 
hampered the process (Kardar, 1994:7). Third, enterprises offered for sale are 
seriously overstaffed. There is strong opposition to the privatisation program from the 
employees of state enterprises on sale. Fear of large scale unemployment -  100,000 
out of a total industrial work-force of 4.2 million (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
1992:42) -  united workers' unions against the program. Government policy requiring 
prospective buyers not to lay off staff for one year has done little to mollify unions. 
Unions representing employees have sued employers in an attempt to block the sale of 
many public enterprises. Fourth, a major stumbling block to the program has been 
establishing a reasonable price. Considerable difficulty has been meet in valuing public 
enterprises and in finding creditable private sector purchasers with the required capital. 
Most businessperson’s claim that the reserve prices, or minimum acceptable prices set 
by the government have been set too high. Fifth, government bureaucrats, due to their 
vested interest as managers of these enterprises emerged as a major source of 
opposition. The bureaucrats have been loathe to give up their powers and their 
opportunities for control and promotion. Their resistance has resulted in lengthy 
delays in the privatisation process. Finally, political uncertainty has influenced the 
whole program. Privatisation measures introduced by the ruling party have been 
threatened by the country's major opposition party, claiming that all the decisions 
would be reviewed if the party returned to power (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
1992: 44).
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It is too early to assess the impact of government’s privatisation program. 
However, government claim that the utilisation of sale proceeds to pay off public debt 
that could bring about a substantial reduction in the costs of debt servicing, has not 
been witnessed from the proceeds of 67 of the 118 units privatised by the government 
by June, 1994 (Table 3.4). The sale of these units neither reduced the level of 
outstanding debt nor debt servicing liability.
Table 3.4 Public sector undertakings 
privatised
identified for privatisation and
Units Identified Privatised Under privatisation
Automobiles 11 7 4
Cement 15 9 6
Chemicals 14 6 8
Fertiliser 7 1 6
Engineering 12 6 6
Vegetable ghee 25 16 9
Roti plants 14 13 1
Rice Mill 8 7 1
Other units 12 2 10
Total 118 67 51
Source: Government of Pakistan, 1994. Pakistan Economic Survey 1993-94, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Strengthening the tax administration
Tax potential in Pakistan is much greater than the amount presently collected. 
The NTRC (1986) report especially suggested that substantial net gains in revenue 
could be realised by strengthening tax administration, within a framework of consistent 
policies, without necessarily changing existing tax rates or introducing a new tax. A 
policy that strengthened tax administration through comprehensive reorganisation and 
retraining of tax staff along modern lines could well contribute to an overall 
improvement in tax collection. Most modern tax administrations are organised on a 
functional basis (Casanegra et al. 1992:130). Organising by functions has at least 
three advantages. First, it increases productivity by allowing employees to develop 
special skills with respect to the functions they perform. Second, it provides a system
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of checks-and-balances whereby one tax official does not handle all the functions of a 
given taxpayer. For example, China moved to an organisational structure where the 
audit function is separate from the assessment. Under this system if the tax assessor 
makes an incorrect assessment, it is likely to be discovered by another tax official 
when an audit is conducted (Casanegra et a l 1992:130). Third, a functional 
organisation enables the tax department to operate more effectively. For example, if a 
taxpayer has failed to pay sales tax, income tax and excise duties the collection 
problem is handled by one individual in the collection section, not by three different 
officials in three different sections.
In a number of countries, tax administration has been improved through 
improved training, salaries and conditions of service. For example, Ghana improved 
the efficiency of its revenue collection by establishing a new revenue bonus for meeting 
specified revenue targets. Benin, Bolivia and Tanzania introduced special incentive 
schemes for revenue collectors. Uganda is presently establishing a well-paid revenue 
collection entity. Benin, Niger and Senegal's tax administration reforms have centred 
on innovative ways of taxing the informal sector by improving coordination between 
the treasury and the tax and customs administrations and by combining assessment and 
collection activities and establishing procedures to limit and reduce exemptions 
(Nashashibi et al. 1992:23). In Senegal, Togo and Indonesia expatriate companies 
have been contracted to provide additional control over the administration of import 
duty collection (Gillis, 1990a:231; Burgess and Stern, 1993:801).
In Kenya, tax administration reforms accompanied numerous other initiatives to 
improve compliance in the system. Special emphasis was placed on providing 
adequate services by trained persons and other infrastructure facilities (Kuria,
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1992:27). In Sri Lanka, the complex tax system has been simplified by implementing 
specific measures, including improvement in the penalty and appeals system 
(Government of Sri Lanka, 1991:8; Burgess and Stern, 1993:808). In Tanzania and 
Niger, measures to correct structural deficiencies in the tax system and its 
administration have resulted in significant improvements in tax collection (Barlow and 
Snyder, 1993:1187). In Bolivia and Mozambique, tax administration reforms resulted 
in a rise in revenue/GDP ratio and allowed better control of government operations, as 
well as strengthening the efficiency of the government's expenditure program 
(Nashashibi et al. 1992:23-25). Pakistan can benefit from the experience of these 
countries.
Using the experience of these countries, this section proposes organisational 
reforms through a combination of strengthening existing units and reorganising new 
units at the following levels of tax administration: (i) at the Central Board of Revenue 
(CBR) headquarter; (ii) in the auxiliary organisations; and (iii) throughout the field- 
level collectorates.
The Central Board of Revenue (apex level). Strengthening of the Central Board of 
Revenue (CBR) at the apex level could be the first step towards improving tax 
administration. As stated in chapter 2, under the existing administrative arrangements, 
the CBR are qualified in a purely mechanical manner to levy, assess and collect taxes 
but do not have the capacity to evaluate the effects of taxation policies on the budget 
or the economy. This suggests that the tax policy unit in the CBR should specifically 
address policy research needs and should be able to contribute to the fiscal policy 
making process. It is also important that the CBR should be managed by staff well 
trained on fiscal and administrative issues. The CBR also needs to be organised in
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such a manner that each important tax unit should be headed by a full time Member of 
the Revenue Board. The dual function of “Member Sales Tax” and “Member 
Administration” should be abolished and replaced by creating a new post of Member 
Administration. Recruitment, supervision and training should be the responsibility of 
the new Member (Administration).
The Directorate of Research and Statistics. The Directorate of Research and 
Statistics is a subsidiary organisation of the CBR responsible for compilation, analysis 
and dissemination of statistical information relating to collection of federal taxes. Tax 
information received by the Directorate relate to major taxes, such as income tax, 
customs and excise duties and sales tax. Most of the reports are monthly, barring a 
few that are daily or fortnightly. Although the number of reports and returns are large, 
information required for decision making is often not readily available. There are, 
broadly, two reasons for this. First, information contained in various reports does not 
get compiled because of a lack of adequately skilled workers in the Directorate. 
Second, the reports concentrate heavily on revenue collections. For example, the 
reports do not provide any information on such matters as the number of excise 
documents, the number of excise assessments broken down by commodity, or the 
number of persons and firms paying turnover tax, and the classification of the 
assessments based on their location in the organised and small scale sectors. In 
addition, there is no information on the amount of duty foregone as a result of several 
exemptions in the income tax, customs and excise duties and sales tax legislation. This 
limitation of the Directorate adversely affects sound policy-making processes.
In order to improve the working climate of the Directorate of Research and 
Statistics, staffing needs to be improved and the Directorate needs to be linked with
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the main computer network of income tax, customs and excises duties and sales tax 
departments. This would improve the information flow to the Directorate and would 
simultaneously reduce its dependence on these departments. It would also enable the 
Directorate to provide timely information to the policy makers and facilitate better 
monitoring and tax collection.
Cadre management, personnel and training policy. Another important area that 
needs attention in tax administration reform relates to the cadre management, 
personnel and training policy for the incumbents of the tax administration. Effective 
cadre management requires careful assessment of work force requirements. It calls for 
a systematic program of training and refresher courses both within and outside 
Pakistan. It also involves provision of adequate opportunities for the promotion of all 
cadres, as well as effective utilisation of available resources. A significant proportion 
of the CBR headquarter and field organisations suffer from limited availability of 
skilled workers. This demands recruitment and the cutting out of redundant positions 
in some overstaffed organisations of the CBR so that funds can be utilised to augment 
areas of administration which need adequate staff support, without calling for 
substantial additional expenditure. The importance of these matters could be realised 
if, as recommended above, the CBR has a member exclusively in charge of cadre and 
personnel management, administration and training.
The experience of countries discussed in this section indicates that administrative 
reforms take time. New institutional structures cannot be created in months or even in 
a few years. Therefore any reform proposal will not give immediate results. 
However, a well-designed strategy that: (i) develops the guidelines for tax 
administration; (ii) provides a foundation for various administrative functions; and (iii)
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sets priorities, etc., will help to ensure that progress is made in an organised manner 
while setbacks and miscalculations are kept to a minimum.
Expansion of the tax base through taxation of consumption
The various policies analysed in this chapter have their merits and demerits. The 
status quo policy case suggests that the continuation of present policies would result in 
a substantial deterioration in the fiscal management. Recourse to policies discussed 
under the adjustment policy case can be expected to improve the financial and 
administrative position of the government. Past experience, however, suggests that 
implementation of these policies will not be easy. A tax on agricultural income has 
long been debated at various forums, but not introduced because of political 
resistance. It is not likely that, in the near future, the government will be strong 
enough to impose a tax on agricultural income. Fiscal arguments in favour of 
privatisation of public sector corporations are also weak. There is empirical evidence 
to show that changing the locus of ownership from public to private is not a sufficient 
condition for improvement in fiscal management.
On the expenditure side, the major benefit from containing the growth of non­
development expenditure would come from reducing defence expenditure. However, 
reducing defence expenditure is dependent on international and regional conditions. In 
the existing politically polarised climate of the region, it would be difficult for the 
government to compromise on defence expenditure. Similarly, a reduction of other 
non-development expenditure, such as subsidies and expenditure on civil 
administration in a society, where the majority of the population is living near to the 
subsistence level, cannot be maintained for a long period. Strengthening tax
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administration is the most desirable option for the government. However, 
restructuring the administrative set-up along modern lines would need clear policy 
direction and the reorganisation of the existing structure, simplification of procedures, 
staff performance evaluation, career planning and a more structured approach to in- 
service training. This will require time and resources.
On the financial side, the first three options under the feasible policy scenario, 
i.e., a tax on agricultural income, liquidation of public sector enterprises and a 
reduction of non-development expenditure, would generate some additional revenue 
but not sufficient funds to reduce the fiscal deficit to levels suggested by the 
international financial development institutions (less than five per cent of GDP). 
Imposition of a tax on agricultural income is expected to generate an additional 3-8 
billion rupees per annum. Its impact on the total budget deficit, however, would be 
negligible. Similarly, revenue from the sale of public sector enterprises under the 
privatisation program will not be very large.
An expenditure control program, excluding cuts of defence expenditure, could 
be expected to save 10 to 15 billion rupees per annum from subsidies, civil 
administration and cuts in other non-development expenditure. Like the other two 
options discussed above, savings from this measure will not be very large - only 
around one per cent of GDP. Assessment of the financial benefits from the fourth 
option -  improving the administrative set up -  is difficult and, therefore, no 
computation is made. The foregoing analysis indicates that policy measures under the 
"feasible" policy case, individually or collectively cannot generate the required 
resources to reduce the budget deficit to around 5 per cent of GDP and, therefore, the 
government has to look for other options. Other countries' experiences suggest that
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the government can improve its resource base by moving towards broad-based 
consumption taxes, such as the value-added tax (VAT).
The Value-added tax (VAT). Recent experiences with comprehensive tax reforms 
in many countries have been dominated by two common and simple themes: 
simplification of existing income tax systems; and expansion of consumption-based 
taxes, usually by adopting some variant of the value-added tax (Gandhi and Mibaljek, 
1992:155). VAT’s universality and general uniformity, its greater revenue raising 
potential, and administrative simplicity, has attracted the interest of policy-makers all 
over the world for a variety of reasons such as budgetary deficit reduction, capital 
formation, international competitiveness and increased resources for social welfare 
spending (Manasan and Querubin, 1986:53; Brashares et al. 1988:159). The tax has 
been successfully tested as a replacement of sales and turnover taxes. For example, 
the European Union (EU) and other European countries adopted the VAT to replace 
various forms of sales taxes, namely, retail sales tax in Sweden, a manufacturing sales 
tax in France and Denmark and a turnover tax in Germany and Netherlands (Shoup, 
1990:4).
The VAT is a more comprehensive and versatile tax than a single-stage 
wholesale or retail sales tax and is more product-neutral and factor-neutral than other 
forms of tax. It enables precise identification of exports so that a country's outgoing 
goods and services can be left free of tax, while imports are taxed on exactly the same 
footing as domestically produced commodities (Price Waterhouse, 1986:21; Tait, 
1992:205;). Also the VAT is not influenced by the forms or methods by which 
legitimate business is conducted. Nevertheless, its regressive effects on income 
distribution are admitted (United States Department of Treasury, 1984:3; Due,
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1988 198) 1° existing weak budgetary climate, the value-added tax could be a
feasible option for the government. The introduction of the VAT could be expected to 
reduce budgetary deficits considerably and improve Pakistan's position in international 
forums, as exports would be zero-rated. The tax will improve long run productivity of 
the taxation system. However, it is recognised that the VAT reform alone cannot 
offer a long term solution to the problem of the deficit. The government has to take 
other initiatives to improve the fiscal balance.
Conclusions
The fiscal system of Pakistan is in need of fundamental reform not only because 
it is raising insufficient revenue but also because it embodies major inequities and 
inefficiencies and is a hindrance to growth. Major adjustments in expenditure and 
revenue are needed to assure financial viability in the medium to long term. The long­
term goal of a sound fiscal policy should be to finance a substantial portion of 
budgetary expenditure with domestic resources. The option discussed under the 
unchanged policy case is not feasible because the continuation of existing polices 
would aggravate the government's financial position. Options discussed under the 
feasible policy case, however, do have the potential to generate additional revenue and 
correct many anomalies in the present system. Nevertheless, they individually or 
collectively cannot reduce the fiscal deficits to the desired level. The value-added tax 
has been adopted by a number of developed and developing countries and proved a 
good source of government revenue. The introduction of a value-added tax in 
Pakistan may be a feasible option for the government to reduce the growing imbalance 
between government revenue and expenditure. All the reform proposals discussed in 
this chapter have political and administrative implications. Without political will and
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administrative motivation, no matter how good a reform package is, it will be 
vulnerable to manipulation or abuse. Also, there will be political opposition to certain 
proposals as many reforms benefit some groups and hurt others, but under the present 
fiscal crisis, the government cannot avoid making such choices.
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4The Value-Added Tax
In a growing economy where government expenditures are increasing, it is 
difficult for the government to generate adequate revenue from a single tax. In an 
environment where many taxes are used, it is desirable that the tax system be capable 
of balancing interactions between various taxes in a manner that has little distortionary 
effect on efficiency, equity and economic growth. Adam Smith's canons of taxation -  
certainty (revenue productivity), equity (justice in sharing the tax burden), economy 
(allocative efficiency), and convenience (simplicity, administrative feasibility) -  are 
basic objectives that a tax system should achieve (Smith, 1860:347).
There is little dispute over how to define the principles of simplicity, certainty 
and economy. Simplicity is perhaps the most desirable quality of an individual tax and 
the tax system as a whole. A tax is simple, relative to others, if for each dollar 
collected, the cost of administration and compliance is small. This is only possible if 
the assessor and the assessed adequately understand the tax to which they are 
subjected. Allocative efficiency requires that the resources available for public use be 
as equal as possible to the resources withdrawn from the private sector: that is, the 
process by which resources are transferred should involve minimal 'waste'. A good tax 
system should be flexible and able to adjust to changing requirements. There is little 
agreement, however, among writers on fiscal matters, about how to bring about an 
equitable distribution of the tax burden. The two widely known principles of equity: 
horizontal equity (equal treatment of equals: people with the same income should pay
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the same tax); and vertical equity (unequal treatment of unequals: persons in unlike 
circumstances should be treated differently), suggest that the greater the ability to pay, 
the greater the burden of tax (Musgrave, 1959:160). Many theoretical arguments have 
been developed on the issue of equity but they have failed to provide a workable 
solution. For example, Samuelson (1972:496-504) benefit theory which is based on 
decentralised pricing system for public services, received wide criticism on the grounds 
that the benefit principle is contrary to the whole philosophy of government welfare 
activities designed to increase the well-being of the lower income groups (Due, 
1954:108; Prest, 1975:121-124; Musgrave, 1986:351). According to the theory the 
public goods (collective consumption goods) should be charged on the basis of market 
prices (Samuelson, 1955:355-356). It has been argued that their are public goods 
(defence, education, health, highways) which cannot be left entirely to market forces. 
An equal charge will greatly benefit rich people. Also, it is difficult to charge a correct 
price for public goods because individuals, as well as social groups cannot reveal their 
true preferences (Margolis, 1955:349; Musgrave, 1986:328). The pricing mechanism 
of public services on commercial lines would leave serious problems of 
implementation.
There is no optimal tax system that satisfies all the four criteria discussed above 
(Seligman, 1925:9-10; Hinrichs, 1966:33; Nimeiri, 1970:13; Peters 1991:1-2). The 
canon of equity may conflict with neutrality, and both may violate the efficiency in 
administration or revenue productivity criteria. Thus, every tax has its merits and 
demerits. Over the last three decades, the patterns of sales taxation throughout the 
world have undergone tremendous changes. The most significant change has been the 
widespread introduction of the VAT. The introduction and successful operation of the
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VAT in terms of revenue buoyancy, its broad coverage of most goods and services, 
neutrality, economic benefits and reductions in tax evasion have made the tax popular 
(Yeh, 1974:72; Burgess and Stern, 1993:778).
The value-added tax
The idea of taxing consumption is very old (Due, 1972:318). The Romans 
applied a general sales tax on goods sold in markets or by auction. In the Middle 
Ages, consumption taxes were widely used in Europe, especially in Spain and 
countries under its influence (OECD, 1993a:2). Consumption taxes were adopted by 
the English to compensate for the loss of land-based feudal dues, which resulted in the 
collapse of Crown revenues (Dwyer, 1992:1). Since the seventeenth century almost 
every country has adopted some form of consumption taxes. In the early 1950s, most 
Western Europe countries employed multi-stage or single-stage turnover taxes which 
were levied at each transfer of ownership in the course of production or distribution or 
both (Federation o f British Industry, 1964:12). A consumption tax has been preferred 
by many writers over other forms of taxes, especially tax on income on efficiency 
grounds. It has been argued that taxing savings is "unjust" (Mill, 1865:484; Marshall 
in Pigou, 1925:350-51; Hobbes, 1934:184; Fisher and Fisher, 1942:61; Pigou, 
1949:139; Kaldor, 1955:80; Hook and Argy, 1986:155; Bird, 1987b:244; Ahmad and 
Stern, 1991:79). A broad-based indirect consumption tax is seen as providing a 
simpler method of raising revenues than other taxes, and it leaves income -  which is 
not consumed -  untaxed (Head, 1989:19; Christian and Massa, 1989:xii).
The VAT is generally viewed as the latest in a series of successive improvements 
that have marked the history of consumption and sales taxation (Goode, 1984:157).
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While the VAT can be traced back to 1919 when the German economist Wilhelm von
Siemens used the concept of a " Veredelte Umsatzsteuer", or "ennobled turnover tax", 
to replace the German turnover tax (Terra and Kajus, 1991:3; OECD, 1993a:2), one 
of the earliest proposals to institute a VAT was made by Thomas Adams (1921:528) 
for the United States in the form of a business tax to substitute the United States 
corporate income tax. However, worldwide interest in the VAT as a stable source of 
government revenues began with the Shoup Mission's recommendation in 1949 for its 
introduction in Japanese local governments (Shoup, 1949:197-204; Ishi, 1992:21). 
Although the recommendations of the Shoup Mission received some serious thought 
in the form of legislation, the legislation was never implemented because of pressure 
from labour and business groups (Due, 1972:330). France adopted a consumption 
based VAT in 1954, when it provided for the taxation of each manufacturer on the 
basis of receipts from output, but with the privilege of deducting tax paid on goods 
purchased from other manufacturers (Due, 1966:123; Purohit, 1993:1). In 1968, the 
French Government merged this tax with the existing turnover taxes on services and a 
local tax on retail sales into a single comprehensive levy extending through to the retail 
stage. Denmark was the first European country to introduce a truly comprehensive 
VAT, in 1967 (Shoup, 1969a:236). The introduction of the VAT to developing 
countries began in the 1960s, initially in Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay and Argentina 
(Bird, 1970:114). Both in developed and developing countries, the tax has achieved 
considerable success in terms of coverage, revenues to the government and 
administrative simplicity (Tait, 1988:3; Bird, 1992:120; Burgess and Stern, 1993:812).
The biggest catalyst to the VAT movement, however, was provided by the 
European Common Market. In 1960, Article 99 of the European Economic
68
Community (EEC) Treaty advised member states to consider the "harmonisation" of 
turnover taxes in member states. The ABC Reports in 1963 (EEC Reports on Tax 
Harmonisation) and the report of the Fiscal and Financial Committee in 1963 
(Neumark Report) recommended that the member states abolish the cascade-effect 
taxes and instead adopt a VAT (Bondonio, 1981:254; Cnossen, 1988:261; OECD, 
1993a:55). The First European Community Council Directive (1967) clearly
mentioned that "harmonisation" should result in member states abolishing cumulative 
multi-stage taxes and adopting a common system of VAT. According to the Council 
Directive, the VAT should cover all stages of production and distribution and the 
provision of services by 1 January 1970. However, it was observed in the Council 
Directive that the application of VAT to the retail level might, in some member states, 
meet with practical and political difficulties. Therefore, member states were permitted 
to apply the common system only up to wholesale trade stage. The common system of 
VAT, as set out in the Second European Community Council Directive (1967) 
specifically laid down the basis of the VAT in the EEC countries including a tax on all 
supplies of goods and services within the territory and the importation of goods. 
Member states were permitted to establish their own standard rate of tax. However, 
the application of zero rates was strictly restricted. It was emphasised in the Council 
Directive, that imported goods should be taxed at the same rate as that applied 
internally to the supply of goods. A taxable person was required to keep sufficiently 
detailed accounts and to issue invoices for goods and services supplied by his/her 
business.
The EEC Directives of shifting from the cascading type of indirect taxes to a 
VAT system did not pose serious difficulties for most EEC member countries. In
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France, the existing system of "taxe sur la valeur adjoutee" was slightly modified to 
meet the EEC requirements. In 1967, Denmark also had VAT before the EEC 
Directive and therefore, adopted the VAT without much trouble. Belgium, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden adopted the VAT within the 
suggested time frame. However, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal took longer time to adopt the VAT because of political and administrative 
difficulties (Dorothy, 1975:4; Sandford, 1986b:247; Wallace, 1980:59-60; Wade, 
1982:79; Puchala, 1984:134). The VAT base was nearly harmonised in 1977 with the 
promulgation and subsequent enactment of the European Community's Sixth VAT 
Directive (Price Waterhouse, 1986:1; Buckett, 1990:5). The VAT harmonisation was 
designed to ensure that no EU member country gains an unfair economic advantage 
through the manipulation of its tax system (Puchala, 1984:21; Buchan, 1990; Peters, 
1991:20). To date the tax has been adopted by twenty-one of the 24 member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Though the tax has not so far been adopted by the United States and Australia, it has 
discussed widely (Chessell, 1993:4). In the United States, the VAT has been 
considered seriously on a number of occasions. Increasing pressure on government to 
reduce budget deficit and the Clinton administration's willingness to adopt a VAT to 
finance health care services are the most tangible evidence for its adoption in the 
United States (Ballard et al. 1987:445; McLure, 1993:346). Any country which joins 
EU as a full member is obliged to replace its existing sales tax with a VAT (Yeh, 
1974:3). Outside the OECD, the VAT has been either adopted or is in the process of 
being introduced by approximately 59 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
(Appendix 4.1).
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The VAT is a multi-stage, destination-based tax that includes all goods and 
services in its base (except those explicitly exempted). The tax is more comprehensive 
and versatile than a single-stage wholesale or retail sales tax, and is more product- 
neutral and factor-neutral than other forms of taxes on sales. It is collected in 
instalments on each increment in the value acquired by a product since the last taxable 
transaction, from the beginning of the production and distribution cycle to its 
culmination in the sale to the final consumer. Every taxable firm is required to charge 
tax on its sales, stating the exact amount on sales invoices. For any tax period, the net 
VAT liability is the difference between the total amount of VAT shown on all sales 
invoices, and the total amount of VAT shown on all purchase invoices (Cnossen, 
1992:215). The tax permits registered firms a credit on tax paid earlier on inputs. The 
refund mechanism establishes a system of checks and balances. The credit claim on 
purchases can be checked simultaneously against the tax reported by the person selling 
to the business (Shoup, 1990:11). In its ideal form, the tax represents simply a 
proportionate levy on personal consumption. The tax provides an accurate and 
complete exemption of investment goods and exports (Cnossen and Shoup, 1987:72).
In the majority of countries, certain services, non-profit activities and small 
trade activities are exempted from the VAT, while imports are taxed in exactly the 
same manner as domestically produced commodities (Bakker and Chronican 1985:5, 
Scott and Davis, 1985:46; Tait, 1992:205), and exports are zero-rated in almost all 
the countries (Tait, 1988:3). Being neutral with respect to foreign trade, the VAT 
does not distort domestic production and distribution. Thus, under the VAT, it makes 
no difference how often a product is traded before it reaches the final consumer. Also, 
the VAT is neutral regarding the production techniques that a business adopts. It
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makes no difference for tax liability whether a product is manufactured with capital or 
labour-intensive technologies. Nevertheless, VAT's regressive effects on income 
distribution are admitted (Bird, 1987a: 1151; Due, 1988:198), and have proven to be a 
significant barrier to its political acceptability (Tait, 1988:204; Ishi, 1992:25). In many 
countries the tax has created resentment and perpetuated the "politics of envy".
Pros and cons of the VAT
VAT's rapidly increasing popularity has instigated a lively debate between the 
proponents and the opponents of the tax. The proponents argue that the VAT is 
superior to income and narrow-based sales taxes in terms of efficiency and horizontal 
equity (Henderson, 1984:92; Peters, 1991:35; Freebairn, 1992:36), simplicity, and 
relative tax neutrality (Murphy, 1991:98). Under the tax, goods and services are 
subject to the same effective rate of taxation. The tax credit mechanism on 
intermediate goods improves the efficiency of the production sector (Stern, 1987:65). 
It has been suggested that it is fairer to tax people on what they take from society, 
rather than on what they contribute by working and investing (Teplitz and Brooks, 
1986:50; Weidenbaum et al. 1989:1). It has also been argued that the VAT provides 
considerable economic and administrative advantages (Dalamagas, 1978:12-13; 
Harberger, 1990:317). It has been maintained that VAT improves the balance of 
payments and leads to improved international competitiveness through border-tax 
adjustments that are permitted under VAT. Border adjustment under the VAT 
ensures that international competition between producers of goods and services is on 
the basis of ne t-of-tax  price (Sinn, 1992:4). There is the strong likelihood that 
increases in real after-tax rates of return received by savers will lead to increases in
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long-run capital accumulation (Henann, 1970:104; Cnossen, 1992:226; OECD, 
1993a:43).
It has been argued that the large revenue potential of the tax can help 
governments reduce the amount of public debt and budgetary deficits without 
adversely influencing savings (Crum, 1983: 276; Ichioka, 1986:321). The tax helps to 
reduce the black economy by effectively taxing smuggled goods (United States 
Department of the Treasury, 1984:14; Tanzi, 1991:166). The simplicity of the tax 
provides administrative advantages over other taxes (Oh, Yeon-Cheon, 1982:187; 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987:6), which help to reduce tax avoidance and tax evasion 
(Head, 1985:123; Osborne, 1992:13).
The opponents of the VAT question whether such gains are of sufficient 
magnitude to outweigh the negative regressive effects of the tax (Weidenbaum et dl. 
1989:15; Brooks, 1993:42). If levied at a uniform rate, taxes on basic foods (bread, 
butter, sugar, milk) and other basic consumables (such as books, newspapers, 
children's clothes, electricity and gas, transport, medical services and so on) hurt 
poorer families more because they spend a larger proportion of their income on these 
goods and services than rich families (Tait, 1991:5; Quiggin, 1992:1; Harding, 
1992:16). The basis of the VAT collection is based on invoices, dockets and book­
keeping. In the absence of such documentation, it is difficult to realise VAT’s 
perceived benefit. It has been argued that maintenance of sales and purchase accounts 
for the VAT is a real problem for many developing countries (Stout, 1969:9).
Opponents of the VAT also argue that the tax involves everyone in the 
production and distribution process and thus imposes substantial administrative and
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compliance costs on the tax collecting agency and taxpayers (Stadford, 1976:212; 
Ahmad and Stern, 1991:66). For example, in the case of Australia, the introduction 
of a VAT in place of wholesale taxes would mean a substantial increase in the number 
of registered taxpayers: from 75,000 active registered taxpayers to nearly 1.5 million 
taxpayers (McMullan, 1992:7) or more (Eichbaum, 1992:9). All taxpayers would be 
required to register with the tax office and undertake a heavy amount of extra 
accounting and paper-work activity. These extra requirements would mean 
substantial compliance costs for taxpayers. In developing countries, shortages of 
physical and human capital would impede the ability of tax administration to deal with 
the large number of taxpayers in a comprehensive manner (Ahmad and Stern, 
1991:67). In a country like Pakistan with a large non-monetised sector and a large 
number of small traders, extension of VAT to the post-manufacturing/ import stage is 
likely to create substantial administrative problems. In several developing countries 
this limitation has been overcome by having a fairly high threshold limit Small 
retailers were usually excluded from the tax. Small registered dealers were given an 
option to pay a small percentage of their turnover so that they need not cope with 
VAT accounting. It has been argued that in most developing countries the 
introduction of VAT is likely to increase the general price level (Lindholm, 1976:144; 
Garcia-Alba, 1982:216; Cnossen, 1992:224-225).
Over the past 20 years a number of studies have assessed various aspects of the 
VAT: its equity, efficiency and impact on international trade. A study undertaken to 
assess the VAT's incidence by substituting existing taxes for the VAT, has found that 
VAT has improved the allocation of resources (Bambang, 1989:164). In most simple 
theoretical models, the VAT has been found to be superior to the income tax
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(Bradford, 1986:60; Auerbach and KotlikofF, 1987:89; Aaron et al. 1988:7).
However, in complex theoretical models, the relative merit of the two taxes has been 
less clear, and the comparison has become blurred (McLure and Zodrow, 1991:15). 
In other studies, the VAT was found to be inherently simpler and more efficient than 
income and turnover taxes (Yu Pyung, 1985:32; Yu, Shi-Kwon, 1990:132). It is 
obviously much easier to design a tax system which uses a flat-rate structure for many 
types of payments and receipts. A consumption tax that is built upon VAT meets this 
condition. A study by Yu, Shi-Kwon (1990:134) indicates that VAT, compared with 
other indirect taxes, is more efficient and has a more favourable impact on 
international trade. Nazier (1989:131) found that the tax, with a uniform tax rate 
structure, is slightly regressive with respect to household income and the distribution 
of welfare gains, but became less regressive after tax exemptions were adopted to 
protect low-income groups. Garcia-Alba (1982:222) found that substituting VAT 
for other cascading types of taxes improves income distribution. The improvement, 
however, is very small.
Theoretical framework
The nature and forms of the VAT
A VAT, as its name implies, is imposed on the value-added at each stage of 
production and distribution. A VAT on incremental value-added allows a deduction 
or refund of tax paid on inputs at each stage until it reaches the final consumer who 
bears the ultimate burden, at least in theory. As such, VAT differs from cascading- 
effect taxes (Burgess and Stern, 1993: 777-778; McLure, 1993:348). The VAT is 
neutral between less efficient and more efficient producer (Smith, 1964:33). The 
simplest form of VAT is one that has a relatively high turnover figure for small
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producers and traders; that limits zero-rating; that keeps the number of exempt goods 
to a minimum; and that has only one rate. The varieties of the VAT adopted in 
various countries differ considerably with respect to administrative convenience. In 
implementing the VAT, the major policy question is: whether the VAT be applied to a 
comprehensive income base or to a comprehensive consumption base (Freebairn, 
1992:40). In either case, there is a second question: should the tax be imposed as a 
single-stage tax or as an incremental, multiple-stage tax? The choice of consumption 
base is between a retail-sales tax (RST) and a VAT, which is consumption-based. 
These issues are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.
Consumption versus income base
The choice of a base upon which the VAT is introduced, determines the 
distribution of VATs burden and its economic effects. There are two types of VAT 
which differ only on the basis of treatment of capital goods: consumption-based VAT 
and income-based VAT (Pechman, 1987:205). Under the consumption-based VAT, 
each firm is allowed immediate credit for all taxes paid on capital goods as well as for 
those paid on intermediate inputs, after which only sales to final consumers are taxed 
(Due, 1988:126). If there are no exemptions, the total tax base equals total personal 
consumption. Under the income-based VAT, deductions of input costs of capital 
goods are not permitted in the period of purchase. Firms are allowed credit for taxes 
on capital goods on the basis of the life of assets as those assets depreciate (Sullivan, 
1965:38; Shoup, 1969b:32). The term income-base is used because the total base of 
this tax is equal to total personal income (Ishi, 1992:24). The tax base can be 
computed by adding the factor rewards accruing to labour and capital. In this method,
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depreciation not the total amount spent on purchasing investment goods in the tax 
period is subtracted.
Methods of VAT calculation
A tax on the value-added can be calculated by various methods, including 
subtraction method, the addition method or the credit method (Table 4.1). Under 
these three methods, a uniform VAT rate, if applied to the same base of goods and 
services, would generate the same amount of tax revenue. However, confining the 
VAT to a uniform rate seems improbable for socio-political reasons. On equity 
grounds, policy makers prefer to tax goods which form an important part of the low 
income households’ consumption, either at zero-rate or at lower rates. In this 
situation, the invoice or credit method, has been accepted as more efficient than other 
methods in many countries. Under the invoice or credit method, the tax liability can 
be calculated at the convenience of the taxpayers: monthly, quarterly or annually. This 
method facilitates the application of rate differentiation and exemptions (Due, 
1988:126; Tait, 1988:4). The credit method allows registered suppliers to 
systematically claim refunds for taxes they have paid on goods and services. In this 
process, although the tax is applied at every level of production and distribution, the 
tax burden falls on the final consumer. Table 4.1 illustrates the mechanism under the 
three different methods.
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Table 4.1 Calculation of value-added tax under various methods
Stage of production
Firm A 
manufacturers
Firm B 
wholesaler
Firm C 
retailer
Total
economy
A. Subtraction method
Sales 350 850 1100 2300
Purchases 100 350 850 1300
Value-added (sales -  purchases) 250 500 250 1000
Value-added tax^ 25 50 25 100
B. Addition method 
Factor payments2
Wages 150 300 200 650
Rent 50 100 20 170
Interest 25 75 20 120
Profit 25 25 10 60
Total 250 500 250 1000
Value-added tax 25 50 25 100
C. Credit method
Sales 350 850 1100 2300
Tax on sales 35 85 110 230
Purchases 100 350 850 1300
Tax on purchases 10 35 85 130
Value-addedtax(tax on
sales tax on purchases) 25 50 25 100
Notes: 1 Tax liability is calculated at the rate of 10 per cent. 2 Including net profit.
Source: United States Department of Treasury, 1984. Tax Reform fo r  Fairness, Simplicity, and 
Economic Growth, Volume 3, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary, Department of 
the Treasury:Table 2-1:9.
Tax rate and exemptions
The academic literature and VAT implementation experience suggest that the 
base for the VAT should be as comprehensive as possible and that preferably, a 
uniform tax rate be used. The level of exemptions should be kept to a minimum so as 
to reduce distortions and opportunities for tax avoidance (Dalamagas, 1978:14; Peat 
Marwick, 1988:iv; Tait, 1988:50). In its ideal form, the VAT requires that all business 
activities up to the retail level be taxed. However, implementation experience of the 
tax, both in developed and developing countries, suggests that this condition is hard to 
achieve and certain exemptions have to be given on grounds of equity and 
administrative expediency. In many countries, certain items of expenditure that figure 
prominently in the budget of low-income families, such as food for home 
consumption, household utilities, medical expenses and housing, have been either
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zero-rated and exempted (Appendix 4.2) or taxed at a much lower rate to reduce the 
regressive impact of the tax (Harding, 1992:22).
Under the VAT, commodities, transactions or firms can receive preferential 
treatment in two different ways: either by zero-rating or by exemptions. Under zero­
rating, there is no tax on zero-rated goods. In practice, because of its administrative 
complexity, it is confined to exports, and a few sensitive goods and services 
(Mackenzie, 1992:259). With zero rating under VAT, it is necessary that the system 
of refunds on transactions meant for zero rated goods and services should be in place 
and enforced properly so that registered dealers can claim the tax refund immediately. 
The nature of exemptions in the VAT system is different. Goods and services are not 
completely free of tax. The VAT system, however, does provide relief to an exempt 
trader, but all inputs are taxed (Tait, 1988:50). The exemptions under the VAT 
system create many problems and influence the neutrality of the tax. For example, a 
firm selling exempted goods to the final consumer is at a clear advantage because of 
the reduced tax burden. But if the exempted firm is selling goods to other firms, it 
may increase the tax burden on the goods, because the tax credit sequence has been 
broken. The second inherent problem with exemptions is that it is difficult to 
distinguish between taxable and tax-free purchases. For example, if food is treated as 
a tax free good, should ice cream, candy, and soda be considered food? 
Administrative decisions must be made in these and many other areas to identify 
taxable and tax-free purchases. Compliance is less reliable when firms which sell both 
taxable and non-taxable commodities must allocate these sales to the appropriate 
categories.
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Comparison with other forms of sales taxes
VAT versus turnover tax
Compared with turnover taxes, the VAT avoids several deficiencies in 
production and consumption. A turnover tax is likely to result in widespread double 
taxation and pyramiding. Under a turnover tax, the entire tax must be paid at a 
relatively early point in the process of production. In this process, capital funds are 
tied up for prolonged periods between the tax payment and the final sales for 
consumption. Thus, the final cost to the consumer is not only the accumulated burden 
of sales tax, but also an accumulation of interest over the interval in which capital 
funds have been frozen. Another drawback of the turnover tax is that tax pyramiding 
provides an unfair advantage for big firms that wish to integrate. Their collusion or 
cartelisation provides them with an opportunity to evade taxes. A VAT, on the other 
hand, is independent of vertical integration within an industry. Each firm is taxed only 
on that portion of its final product which is over and above what it has purchased from 
other VAT paying units.
VAT versus expenditure tax
Fisher and Fisher (1942) and Kaldor (1955), strong advocates of an expenditure 
tax, argue that a tax on spending is a better measure of the ability of a person to pay 
than is income tax (Fisher, 1942:61; Kaldor, 1955:11-16). A tax based on an 
individual’s consumption was seen as the most appropriate form of taxation from the 
point of view of fairness. The expenditure tax closely resembles the income tax except 
that the tax base is spending. It is levied directly on the taxpayers and involves 
taxpayers filing annual returns with exemptions and deductions. In its simplest form, 
an expenditure tax requires no special tax on capital gains or imputed rent (Andrens,
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1974:1135). The tax has never been used in any industrial country (Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1974:7). The United States Treasury 
proposed a “ spending tax” in 1942, as a temporary measure to control inflation 
during the Second World War (Graetz, 1980:161). The proposal, however, was 
rejected by the United States Senate Finance Committee (Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1974:12). The tax was also recommended by a minority 
of the British Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income in 1955, by 
the Meade Committee in 1978 and a Swedish legislative committee, but their 
recommendations were not adopted (Pechman, 1986:299). India and Sri Lanka 
applied this form of tax for a few years but abolished it on the grounds of 
administrative and compliance inconvenience (Kelley, 1970:249).
It has been argued that while the tax is theoretically sound it was practically 
impossible to implement efficiently (Keynes in Moggride, 1978:206-207; Goode, 
1980:72). An expenditure tax with exemptions for the lower-income groups which 
vary the tax with the size of the family and some deductions, such as medical and 
education expenses could be made progressive, whereas VAT because of its 
proportional nature lacks progressivity (Due, 1988:21). However, the administration 
of an expenditure tax has always been considered a formidable task (Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1974:5). The administration and 
compliance under the expenditure tax is difficult and complex. Under the expenditure 
tax the taxpayers are required to calculate taxable expenditure. The enforcement of a 
personal expenditure tax requires that all cash inflows must be recorded and from this 
the actual permissible expenditure incurred in earning income is to be deducted. This 
involves substantial amount of record keeping. Since it is difficult for each taxpayer to
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keep adequate expenditure record, the compliance under the expenditure tax become 
difficult (Pechman, 1986:107). The main advantage of VAT over the expenditure tax 
is the convenience of the VAT administration. The VAT is a comparatively simple tax 
in its administration and enforcement, and convenient to both taxpayers and the tax 
collectors (Cnossen, 1987: 573;Zodrow and McLure, 1990:227).
VAT versus retail sales tax
The VAT and the RST are two different ways of taxing an identical tax base: 
private domestic consumption expenditure (Aaron and Galper, 1985:109). The 
general economic effects of the two taxes are the same, and the same people ultimately 
bear the burden of both types of taxes (Shoup, 1968:153; Due, 1988:117). Cnossen 
(1989:326) has noted that the VAT is a more robust form of sales tax than the RST, 
while Musgrave (1987:259) argues that in developing countries the RST is not an 
achievable tax because sales cannot be determined easily and enforcement of the tax is 
difficult. The EU, while considering various forms of sales taxation to achieve 
uniformity in border tax adjustments, has rejected a retail sales tax (Neumark 
Committee, 1963:47, 49).
The RST has the advantage in that it is only implemented on final sales, and 
relieves firms of the burden of tax liability at each stage of production and distribution, 
as required by the VAT (Ahmad and Stern, 1991:66). The RST is therefore regarded 
as more efficient because only the final-stage sale is included in the tax administration 
network. However, it is difficult and costly to identify the final stage. Under the RST, 
it is practically impossible, for administrative reasons, to eliminate all retail sales tax on 
business inputs. This implies that the destination principle can only be approximated
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under the RST. Imported consumer goods bear less of a tax burden than domestically 
produced goods because they are not impeded by cascading taxes on producer inputs. 
Also, the RST fails to eliminate the cascading effect on exports. Under VAT, 
imported goods are taxed the same amount as domestic goods, and exports are zero­
rated. The VAT allows an added degree of freedom in the design of tax policy 
(McLure, 1993:350). Even with exemptions of retail sales from the VAT, it is still 
possible to collect tax on pre-retail value added (Cnossen, 1987a:569-570). This is 
important in the context of developing countries where it is always difficult to register 
small traders and retailers for tax purposes. Under RST, no mechanism is available to 
capture its base fully, and this leads to massive tax evasion (Ahmad and Stern, 
1991:66, Cnossen, 1992:219-220). The advantage of VAT is that it taxes goods or 
services at the same rate, irrespective of the number of times they are sold or resold 
between the point of manufacture and the final sale to the consumer. At all stages, the 
product is taxed only on the increment in its value (Scott and Davis, 1985:17) This 
suggests that the VAT is a preferred option over the RST (McLure, 1993:352).
Revenue potential of the VAT
The biggest advantage of the VAT is that it is a buoyant source of government 
revenue (Cnossen, 1983b:327). Experience suggests that in the majority of countries 
where it is used, the VAT has raised substantial revenues. In OECD countries, the 
VAT (on average) raised approximately 15 per cent of the total tax revenue in 1975; 
by 1990 the share had increased to nearly 20 per cent (Table 4.2). The shift in New 
Zealand has been even more pronounced. In 1975, 9.8 per cent of total tax revenues 
was raised from consumption taxes; by 1990 this share increased to 21.6 per cent 
(Table 4.2). In EU countries, the VAT (on average) contributed to 20 per cent of
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total tax revenues; increasing from 16 per cent of total tax revenues in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s (Cnossen, 1983a: 151). In developing countries, the ratio of VAT 
collection to total tax revenue ranges from 7 per cent to 35 per cent (Casanegra, 
1990:171). In the majority of countries using VAT, the tax contributes around 15 to 
20 per cent of total tax revenue. Expressed as a percentage of GDP, in the majority of 
countries, the VAT contributed between one and ten per cent of gross domestic 
product (GDP). Table 4.2 shows VAT revenue collection in selected countries in 
terms of total tax revenue and as a proportion of GDP.
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Table 4.2 Revenue from value-added tax -  selected countries
As % of total tax revenue2 As % of GDP 2
1975 1985 1990 1975 1985 1990
OECD countries
Denmark 23.1 28.3 27.1 6.8 9.8 9.6
France 26.1 23.0 21.7 8.6 8.8 8.2
Italy 15.2 15.3 15.9 3.7 5.4 5.9
United Kingdom 10.1 17.9 19.3 3.1 5.9 6.13
New Zealand 9.8 10.8 21.63 2.7 3.4 7.7
Canada 11.4 11.8 14 83 2.0 2.0 2.63
Netherlands 14.3 16.6 17.1 6.3 7.2 7.3
Turkey 31.3 21.9 27.2 1.1 3.2 4.4
Spain 7.0 8.4 16.7 1.3 2.1 3.84
Other countries
Israel 15.3 31.2 34.9 6.0 8.7 11.7
Korea Republic of 14.1 24.0 24.6 1.9 3.6 3.3
Colombia 15.4 23.4 24.0 1.7 2.5 2.8
Indonesia 9.3 13.1 21.93 1.5 2.4 3.53
Philippine 11.8 8.6 10.5 1.5 0.9 1.5
Thailand 22.9 20.5 22.5 2.6 2.9 4.1
Mexico 19.2 19.1 22.3 2.2 2.9 2.9
Brazil 4.5 3.7 7.13 0.5 1. 03
Uruguay 23.8 28.9 23.6 4.2 6.3 5.9
Notes: .. Information not available.
'Where revenues are shown before VAT introduction they represent general sales tax 
collections.
Consolidated Central Government, 
information based on 1989 data, 
information based on 1988 data.
Sources: IMF, 1991. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1991, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
IMF, 1993b. International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1993, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
Tait, A. A., 1988. Value-Added Tax: International Practice and Problems, 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund:Table 1.4: 26-27; Table 1.5:28-29.
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Distributional effects of VAT
An important aspect of any tax reform is its impact on various income groups 
(Burgess and Stern, 1993:787). Empirical evidence suggests that among various 
taxes, the impact of the VAT on different income groups is more open (Stern, 
1990:103; Chisholm et al. 1990:150; Harding, 1992:16). Applied at a uniform rate on 
all goods and services and at every stage of distribution, the VAT is seen by many as a 
regressive tax (Brashares et al. 1988:155; McLure, 1990:32; Harberger, 1990:318; 
Bird, 1992:58; Quiggin, 1992:1). The Philippine experience suggests that the VAT is 
slightly more progressive than the taxes it replaced. In Pakistan the coverage of sales 
tax on domestic production and imports is limited because the tax base is riddled with 
large numbers of exemptions and concessions. The impact of a comprehensive VAT 
substituting for a sales tax is therefore likely to be regressive. In the majority of 
countries, measures have been taken to reduce the regressivity of the tax, by adopting 
multiple tax rates with low rates on necessities and higher rates on luxuries. Also, 
exemptions and zero-rates have been used to make the VAT less regressive by 
exempting essential items such as food and medicine. The regressivity of the tax has 
also been reduced by imposing selective excise taxes on non-essential and luxury 
commodities at substantially higher rates in addition to the VAT rate (Teplitz and 
Brooks, 1986:52; Musgrave, 1987:260).
Economic effects of VAT
This section examines some of the economic effects of the VAT, such as its 
neutrality, and its effects on savings, investment, economic growth, the general price 
level, and international trade.
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Neutrality
Neutrality is one of the chief advantages of the VAT. A consumption-type 
VAT is free from the cascading effects of taxing inputs to domestic manufacturing 
(Ahmad and Stern, 1991:44). In essence, the tax paid on business purchases is 
credited against the tax on sales, and purchases such as raw materials, intermediate 
goods and capital equipment. Ideally, the tax should be applied, at equal rates to all 
goods and services. Thus, it would not distort consumer decisions on how to spend 
their incomes or the way goods and services are produced (Dresch et al. 1977:4). The 
tax credit mechanism applying to all capital goods does not influence producer choice 
with respect to production techniques (labour-intensive versus capital-intensive 
methods). Also, the tax does not distort the choice of whether to consume now or 
later because it applies at equal rates to present and future consumption (Aaron, 
1982:17). However, experience suggests that the tax is not likely to be levied in its 
pure form: some exemptions are likely to be enacted as a matter of equity and 
administrative convenience. In practice, therefore, the VAT is likely to be 
substantially less neutral than in theory. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to consider the 
VAT a basically neutral tax.
Savings, investment and economic growth
One point usually made about a consumption-type VAT is its favourable impact 
on savings, investment, and economic growth (Shoup, 1969a:252). This is in contrast 
to personal income taxes which tax income, whether saved or consumed (Sullivan, 
1965:27; Scott and Davis, 1985:24). It has been demonstrated that adoption of a 
VAT has a positive effect on capital formation (Oakland, 1967:280; Yeh, 1974:v; 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1983:460). It has also been shown that the substitution of a
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VAT for an income tax system raises the capital-labour ratio as long as the savings 
rate on wage income is less than the savings rate on income from capital. This implies 
that given a constant rate of growth of the labour force, a change in the tax structure 
will change the time rate of change of the capital stock. Yeh’s (1974) analysis 
indicated that the adoption of a VAT improves capital formation which, in turn, has a 
positive impact on economic growth. However, a cross-country analysis of 20 OECD 
countries showed that savings rates are no higher in countries that rely more heavily 
on VAT for revenue purposes (Militzer and Ontscherenki, 1990:35). Moreover, the 
assumption that lower taxes on incomes encourage people to work harder and save 
more has not been substantiated by the experience of many countries using the VAT. 
There is no guarantee that a shift from an income tax to a consumption tax will 
increase the level of investment. People may invest their savings in luxury goods 
(Clark, 1991:13). Theoretically, there is a presumption that the income tax falls 
on present saving and consumption, while the consumption tax falls only on present 
consumption. The replacement of the income tax by the consumption tax could 
therefore induce higher saving. Under VAT the tax on capital goods gets a set-off. 
The same volume of monetary saving will buy more real investment.
Inflationary potential
A key question in the debate about the VAT is its effect on the price level. In 
appraising the effects of the VAT on prices, it is necessary to distinguish between 
imposing the VAT as a new source of revenue, or introducing the VAT as a substitute 
for existing direct and indirect taxes. If the VAT replaces some of the existing taxes 
with an equal revenue yield, there will be relative changes in prices, but theoretically 
there will be no overall price increase (Tait, 1992:203). However, if the structure of
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the VAT effectively increases the tax burden, or if the VAT is introduced as a net 
addition to the fiscal system, an increase in the prices of affected goods and services 
can be expected (Stout, 1963:330). This causal relationship between the tax and the 
seller's price of a commodity is based on the assumption that costs are increased by the 
amount of the tax, and that the profitability of the firm is maintained only if the 
quantity sold is not decreased by the price increase (Lindholm, 1976:144). An 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) survey on the impact of the introduction of the 
VAT in 35 countries, found that in 29 cases (83 per cent), the introduction of the VAT 
did not alter the rate of price change (Tait, 1991:8). In the remaining six countries, 
the introduction of the VAT, associated in each case with an expansionary wage and 
credit policy, contributed to an increase in prices. In three out of the six countries, the 
introduction of the VAT was not revenue-neutral, but rather was associated with an 
increase in the overall tax burden (Murphy, 1992:3; Chessell, 1993:12). It has been 
argued, however, that even if the VAT generates a net increase in revenue, a tax 
increase, other things being equal, should be deflationary rather than inflationary 
(Sinclair, 1983:382). In other words, it is not the VAT itself that is inflationary, but 
other policies that make it so.
Because many factors affect prices, it is difficult to isolate changes in price levels 
associated with the introduction of VAT. The simplest, and perhaps most accurate, 
assumption is that with the implementation of a VAT, prices would experience a one- 
off rise. For example, if business shifts full tax liability forward to the consumer, a 10 
per cent VAT would increase prices by 10 per cent.
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International economic effects
Amongst the most publicised features of the VAT is the border-tax adjustment 
allowed on international trade. In the Value-added tax system, exports leave 
completely free of tax or zero-rated, thereby allowing domestically produced goods to 
compete effectively on the world market (Cohen, 1971:399; Tait, 1992:205). Under 
the VAT, purchases for consumption are subject to the same tax, whether produced 
domestically or imported. In this process, exports are not taxed by the country of 
origin, but by the country of destination. The result of such a change in tax policy will 
be that lower export prices, and a tax on imports, are likely to increase exports and 
reduce imports, and will therefore have a positive impact on the balance of trade 
position of a country. However, trade transactions are not solely dependent on the 
matrix of customs duties. There are many other factors which influence a country's 
trade balance. For example, under a flexible exchange rate regime, trade benefits from 
VAT are only achievable if the domestic price level remains unchanged, or, is 
increased by less than the full amount of the VAT. Under these conditions, the price 
of a country's exports would decline relative to those of domestically consumed goods. 
In this case, there would be a tendency for the country's trade balance to improve. 
However, achievement of these circumstances is most improbable (Cnossen, 
1992:226; Tait, 1992:205). In the short-term, a country may benefit from these 
arrangements, but in the long-term it is difficult to maintain this parity. Trade 
implications of a VAT are, therefore, controversial.
Administrative feasibility
The success of any tax depends largely on its efficient administration. An ideal 
tax, from the standpoint of administrative efficiency and successful enforcement, is one
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in which taxpayers are easily identified as a body and the structure is simple. The tax 
should not impose unnecessary inconvenience on the taxpayer. The administration of 
the tax should involve small costs and these costs should be stable over time, and 
should be equitable in enforcement. A taxation system cannot be regarded as fair if 
the intention of the law is not fully carried out in practice. It is necessary, therefore, 
that the tax laws be enforced in such a manner that loopholes are closed and avenues 
of avoidance and evasion are minimised (Due, 1954:118). The experience of countries 
within and outside the EU suggests that the VAT is not a simple tax to administer 
(Dorothy, 1975:122). The administrative capacity of the tax authority to collect and 
process the information efficiently is an important constraint to the majority of 
countries adopting the VAT (Newbery, 1987a:200). Before recommending adoption 
of a VAT, careful analysis is needed of the existing administrative machinery and the 
resources available to the tax authority, such as the quality of staff and level of 
computer support.
Implementation framework
The first step toward successful implementation of the VAT lies in the political 
acceptance of the new tax. Political support and authority to enforce the tax appear 
most important in the case of the VAT, without which no progress can be made in 
administering the tax (Bird, 1970:99). In many cases a policy favouring the VAT has 
led to public resentment and caused considerable damage to the popularity of the 
political party which favoured its introduction. In a majority of the countries, a policy 
decision to introduce the VAT has taken a considerably long time. For example, in 
Japan, the Shoup Mission recommended a VAT as early as 1949, but a decision on the 
implementation of the tax was not taken until 1991. Prior to implementation, a
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number of policy issues should be resolved, including: structural issues 
(production/distribution stage to which VAT is to be applied, exemptions to be 
provided, treatment of small businesses, capital goods, services and so on); and 
consequential policy issues (registration provisions and period, mandatory and 
voluntary registration options, processing of returns, and so on). The next step in the 
implementation of the tax is an assessment of the time needed to implement the tax 
satisfactorily. This depends on various factors so there is no consensus on the time 
schedule. Based on experience, 18 to 24 months are generally needed from the date 
on which the decision to introduce the VAT is taken and to its implementation (United 
States Department of Treasury, 1984:124; Holland, 1991a:23; Ahmad and Stern, 
1991:219). Also important, is the choice of department that will administer the VAT. 
As part of the implementation schedule, it is also essential that work on the 
computerisation of the VAT system be started as early as possible.
Administration of the VAT
In terms of its coverage and compliance, the VAT has few features in common 
with other forms of sales taxes (Harberger, 1990:317; Casanegra and Silvani, 
1991:30). It requires new legislation, new procedures, newly trained staff, and a new 
approach to concepts of compliance, audit and computerisation (Newbery, 1987a:203; 
Ahmad and Stern, 1991:219; Burgess and Stern, 1993:798). The experience of 
countries using the VAT indicates that in many respects the operations of the tax 
system can be relatively standard across countries. This section discusses some of the 
basic administrative issues for successful introduction of the VAT, such as taxpayers' 
identification and registration, record keeping, filing of returns, tax collection 
procedures, and tax enforcement.
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Taxpayers identification and registration
A destination-based VAT has to deal with entire business entities, such as 
manufacturers, importers and exporters, wholesalers and retailers and various services 
whose sales of taxable goods and services exceed the minimum taxable limit. All those 
who sell goods or provide services above a minimum threshold level will be required 
to register their business with the VAT authority (Bascand, 1989:389). It is important 
that all liable taxpayers be identified well before the VAT commencement date, and a 
master list of possible taxpayers be prepared. All taxpayers on the list should be sent a 
letter enclosing a VAT registration application form and a registration guide. Taxable 
persons should be encouraged to register early and a cut-off date for the registration 
should be set.
In many countries, small retailers and traders and small farmers are exempted 
from the registration of VAT on the argument of higher administrative and compliance 
costs (Godwin, 1976: 48; Sandford et al. 1981:22). These businesses are exempted 
through various methods, by far the most popular of which is setting an annual 
turnover limit below which the business would be exempt from registration (Appendix 
4.3). An exempt business would, however, still be required to pay VAT on its 
purchases, but would not be charged VAT on its output, nor be required to issue tax 
invoices. It is necessary, therefore, that VAT legislation clearly define those who are 
exempted from the VAT. In the process, however, there will be certain persons who 
are not taxable, but would like to be registered so that they can claim a deduction for 
input tax and then issue tax invoices to other registered persons, or export their goods 
which are zero-rated. These persons should be encouraged to register voluntarily.
Each taxable person should be treated as a legal entity and he/she should be 
required to register only once. For administrative convenience, it is necessary that the 
country in which the VAT is introduced be divided into various regions, each of which 
is provided with a Regional Office which is equipped with a computer facility for VAT 
registration, assessment and tax collection work. A computer controlled regional 
National Tax Number (NTN) should be assigned to each business in the regional office 
jurisdiction. Each business NTN should show a specific area code, a business code 
and a personal identity number. A control mechanism at the central location (Head 
Office) should be developed to ensure that the regional offices report all details, such 
as taxable persons in the region, and tax collected (Tait, 1988: 334-35; Casanegra and 
Silvani, 1991:37). The master file of each tax payer should be kept on the computer 
system, preferably in the Head Office, and lists kept at each collection office. This will 
facilitate control, coordination and collection of the VAT.
Registration campaign
It is essential that taxpayers and the general public recognise and accept the 
VAT with no or minimum resistance. Publicity through notices, booklets, radio and 
television and newspaper advertisements is necessary to educate people on all aspects 
of the VAT (Casanegra and Silvani, 1991:30). A trader education program on the 
VAT would create an atmosphere of understanding, and would ensure that all taxable 
persons know about the registration procedure, application forms and other related 
procedures. Consultation with the business community would help the tax 
administration to understand the business community's point of view.
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Record keeping
All persons supplying taxable goods and services under the VAT system should 
keep adequate business records showing details of their purchases and sales of taxable 
supplies and the VAT charged thereon. A legally prescribed tax invoice should be 
issued in serially numbered order for all taxable supplies showing the amount of VAT 
charged. The advantage of invoicing is that it becomes the crucial documentary 
evidence and provides a good audit trail (Tait, 1991:4).
The accounting requirements of the VAT have been criticised on the grounds 
that they are not suitable for developing countries because of these countries low 
levels of literacy and because of the burden of compliance costs associated with the 
record-keeping requirements. This criticism has been overcome in many countries by 
designing simple accounting requirements. Taxpayers liable for VAT, but with a small 
turn-over, are required to maintain simplified accounts, such as a separate VAT 
Account Book to record periodically the amounts of VAT paid on inputs or charged 
on outputs and VAT paid to the government.
Filing of returns, tax period and payment
An essential part of the VAT operation is the furnishing of tax returns. Each 
taxpayer is required to submit a monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly or annual return to the 
tax department. In the majority of countries monthly or quarterly returns have proved 
most convenient both to the tax administration and taxpayers (Appendix 4.3). 
However, for reasons of simplicity and convenience, the tax returns should not contain 
any data other than that needed by the tax department. No supporting material or
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documents need to be attached to the returns. These should be retained by the 
taxpayer for inspection by a VAT auditor.
Collection procedures
Collection -  imported goods
Keeping administrative convenience in mind, VAT on imported goods may be 
collected by the Customs Department at the time of lodging the customs entry. All 
registered persons who import goods for their businesses should be required to 
indicate their National Tax Number (NTN) on their customs entries for subsequent 
selective checking against the value of inputs shown in their accounts.
Collection -  domestic supplies
Each VAT regional office should have tax collection machinery. Use of 
computers at the regional office should be made a precondition of VAT 
administration. This would help to provide details on the receipt of the return and the 
tax deposited with it. A system of some percentage of tax rebate for prompt payment 
should be introduced. Similarly, in the case of non-payment, or underpayment o f the 
tax, a notice should be issued imposing a penalty immediately. The legislation should 
clearly specify the acceptance of the tax without a fine no later than the due date of the 
return.
Enforcement
It is necessary that from the date of introduction of VAT, a high compliance rate 
be achieved. This can be achieved only by giving immediate reminders and taking 
appropriate enforcement action for each defaulter. Failure to make a return by the due
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date should result in the application of a fixed penalty for each month the payment is 
outstanding (Meyer and Due, 1988:15). Where, after due reminder and warning, the 
registered person continues to default, action should be taken to impose an 
appropriate penalty. However, the person should be given the right to appeal. The 
experience of most countries suggests that lack of enforcement creates serious 
problems in the implementation of the tax (Purohit, 1993:24).
Processing procedures -  tax verification and audit
Early attention has to be given to the verification of returns. The experience of 
various countries suggests that in the initial stage, this basic requirement has been 
neglected on the mistaken assumption that revenue receipts from the tax are 
satisfactory and, therefore, the tax implementation system is working efficiently. This 
approach is misguided. Overtime it may result in some irreparable damage to the VAT 
administration, because taxpayers will soon assess the effectiveness of administrative 
controls and take advantage of any perceived weaknesses. This suggests that an 
effective audit activity is central to the operation of the VAT system. The purpose of 
an audit should be to verify that the taxpayer selected for audit has paid the correct 
amount of VAT. It is important to note that this type of audit cannot be conducted 
from the desk. It is a field activity conducted on the taxpayer's premises. Also, it 
should not be a full investigation, but should be a targeted check aimed at a specific 
issue for a specific period. This implies, for example, a full check of input credits 
claimed for a given period.
For effective control it is also necessary for returns received to be verified on a 
random sample basis: for example, five or ten per cent of the total returns. However,
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it may be appropriate that the same cases do not get selected for detailed scrutiny in 
consecutive years: at least an interval of two to three years for large taxpayers, and 
smaller taxpayers may be audited once every seven to eight years, so as to avoid 
harassment of taxpayers. Also, to avoid corruption, detailed scrutiny of the cases 
should not be dealt with by individual officers: rather the cases should be assigned to a 
panel of experienced officers consisting of a qualified auditor and legal adviser. 
Similarly, the accounts and invoices should also be checked through selective visits to 
assess the reliability of registered persons. Middle and senior management should 
accompany officials on selected visits to the major taxpayers. In all cases, reports of 
these visits should be closely monitored to ensure that the results achieved are 
satisfactory.
Organisational structure
In many countries a whole new infrastructure has been created to administer the 
VAT: central and regional offices have been established; staff trained in all aspects of 
the VAT system; and the tax system fully computerised. The following paragraphs 
discuss the staffing and training requirements for successful VAT operation.
Institutional set-up
One of the most important decisions that has to be made before introducing a 
broad-based consumption tax (VAT) is the selection of the department to administer 
the tax. In making this decision, policy-makers generally have three options: to attach 
VAT collection to the income tax department; to the Customs and Excise department; 
or to create a new department (Holland, 1991b:49). In the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Denmark, VAT is administered by the department of Customs and
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Excise, and Consumer Taxes. In Belgium and Italy a separate body has been created. 
In Spain the tax is administered by the Ministerio de Economia o f Hacienda. In many 
countries a separate body has been established to exclusively administer the tax.
Staffing, recruitment and training
The number of staff required to administer the VAT depends on a number of 
factors. The most significant factor is the number of VAT payers. The ratio of staff 
to taxpayers ranges quite widely from 1 to 123 taxpayers in Belgium to 1 to 726 in 
Italy (Table 5.1). Countries with high ratios of taxpayers to staff, such as Italy, tend to 
have significant tax evasion problems. On average, the ratio is approximately one to 
200. For successful implementation, it is important that reliable and experienced staff 
be selected to administer the new tax. The overall administration may be entrusted to 
a chief executive, and his/her appointment should be given priority. He/she should be 
responsible for assessing the staffing requirements for the new tax and recruitment 
procedures. Similarly, at regional offices, regional chiefs in their respective regions 
should assess their staffing needs in consultation with the chief executive of the VAT 
department. Adequate and appropriate training, which is essential for all staff engaged 
in VAT work, needs to be a priority (Goode, 1981:256; Casanegra, 1990:175). 
Experience shows that this can best be done by selecting able and experienced 
personnel with relevant training and experience as instructors and consultants (Goode, 
1990:481). Assistance from foreign experienced trainers in VAT will be beneficial to a 
well-designed training program. The training program should be arranged in modules, 
each dealing with separate VAT subjects. The overall training objective should be to 
ensure that each staff member has both the skill and knowledge needed to perform 
his/her function.
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Conclusions
Over the last 30 years the VAT has gained substantial popularity because of its 
effectiveness. The tax offers the greatest scope for revenue generation. The tax is 
levied on the incremental value added in the production of consumer goods, including 
the retail stage. Since the sum of all value added throughout the production and 
distribution cycle equals the monetary value of the final product, economically the 
VAT is equivalent to a tax imposed on consumer prices: that is, a general sales tax 
levied up to the retail level. Among the various forms of broad-based consumption 
taxes, familiarity favours the retail sales tax, but economic neutrality is against it. 
Certain administrative features and the economic benefits favour a VAT. A VAT can 
be imposed on different tax bases, and tax liability can be calculated in various ways. 
However, the tax credit method has been used in the majority of countries. Under the 
VAT system, net liability for tax is determined by permitting each firm credit for 
intermediate and capital goods on the basis of invoices issued by the suppliers of 
inputs. The economic effects of the VAT, such as improvement in the rates of saving, 
investment, and international trade balances are controversial. Countries have had 
mixed experiences on these issues. The tax has been criticised on the basis of its 
regressive effects and this factor has proved to be a significant barrier to its political 
acceptance. Empirically, it has been observed that with a well-designed compensation 
mechanism, either through a lower tax rate on items that are mainly used by the low 
income groups, or through some other mechanism of transfer, the vulnerable groups in 
society can be protected from the tax’s regressive effects.
The experience of countries with the VAT suggests that administration of VAT 
is not simple. In its implementation, definition problems continuously arise. Its
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complexity requires that matters relating to administration should be addressed 
cautiously. This includes: designing a system for administration; developing complete 
staffing and equipment needs; developing a practical public relations program; and 
adhering to a realistic time-table. The staff associated with administering the tax also 
need be appropriately rewarded through pay and service conditions. Training both for 
tax officials and taxpayers on all aspects of the VAT is essential. Comprehensive tax 
publicity through mass media and other forms of publicity, not only reduce public 
concern over the tax, but provide a more congenial environment for tax education of 
the benefits to both the tax assessor and the tax assessed.
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5Value-Added Tax: An International Perspective
This chapter is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the administrative and 
organisational structure of the VAT. Part II reviews its revenue aspects, including the 
administrative and compliance costs. Part III discusses the economic effects of the 
VAT.
The precise form of VAT varies significantly among countries. In some 
countries, the VAT has been applied on selected commodities, in others it has been 
imposed at all levels of production and distribution (Shalizi and Squire, 1990:156). In 
most OECD countries, VAT has been introduced up to the retail level, with few 
exemptions, whereas in most countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, VAT 
coverage has been confined to the manufacturing or wholesale sectors, with many 
exemptions. In these latter countries, it has been administratively complex to tax 
hundreds of thousands of retail firms with a weak administrative infrastructure. In all 
countries, except Brazil, the collection and control of VAT has been the responsibility 
of the national administration (Poddar 1990:104; Longo 1990:122; Commission of the 
European Communities, 1992:1). In Brazil, VAT at the federal level is a selective tax 
with limited coverage of selected manufactured goods, whereas at the state level, the 
VAT covers most of the production and distribution transactions, including the retail 
sector sales (Purohit 1993:59). In most countries surveyed, exports are zero-rated, 
and a VAT rate equal to that on domestic goods and services is charged on imports. 
This chapter assesses VAT’s impact in 23 selected countries including 12 OECD
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countries, five Asian countries, and six African and Latin American countries. 
Supporting references have also been used to cover the experiences of other countries. 
Among the countries analysed, the majority opted for a consumption-based, credit- 
type VAT. Only a small number of countries -  Argentina, Peru, Morocco and Turkey 
-  opted for an income-based VAT.
Administrative and organisational structure of the VAT
The effectiveness of VAT administration is greatly influenced by the 
characteristics of the taxpaying population, such as number, size and sectoral 
distribution. A taxable person is an entrepreneur carrying on a commercial business 
activity on a continuous basis who needs to be registered with the tax office. In a 
majority of countries, the VAT regimes provide that state, regional, and local 
government authorities and other bodies governed by public law are not "taxable 
persons" in respect to activities or transactions they conduct as public authorities. 
However, government organisations engaged in commercial activities are required to 
register for VAT in the same manner as private sector traders (Appendix 5.1). The 
only significant departure from the above treatment occurs under the Irish VAT where 
no public bodies are considered "taxable persons" -  even those engaged in commercial 
activities (Ernst & Young, 1991:110).
Record-keeping conditions for VAT transactions are universal. Entrepreneurs 
subject to VAT must keep adequate account books to justify all transactions; 
maintaining records of all incoming and outgoing invoices for a certain period for 
auditing purposes (Appendix 5.2). In nearly all countries, an input tax refund is 
spontaneous. However, in some countries, conditions apply (Appendix 5.3). In the
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majority of countries small businesses, farmers, banking and insurance, and other 
financial services receive special treatment (Appendix 5.4). In most countries, special 
arrangements are made for appeals against the administration’s assessments of VAT. 
Mostly, appeals on VAT are heard initially by an independent VAT Tribunal, but the 
right to further appeals to higher judicial courts is available (Appendix 5.5). There 
appears to be no uniformity among countries on the administrative set-up. In some 
countries, VAT has been administered by the Customs and Excise authorities and in 
some cases a separate VAT body has been established to administer the tax (Appendix 
5.6).
VAT assessment methods are largely dependent upon the staff-taxpayer ratio. 
For example, in Belgium, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden, where 
the staff-taxpayer ratio is low, VAT audit performance is good and the tax evasion 
rate is low; but in countries, such as Italy where the staff-taxpayer ratio is high, tax 
yield is low and the tax evasion rate is high (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1 Ratio of staff to taxpayer for value-added tax -  selected countries
Country Year Ratio
Belgium 1:123
Ireland 1984 1:140
United Kingdom 1983 1:149
Cyprus (estimated) 1:160
France 1982 1:173
Portugal 1986 1:250
Sweden 1982 1:250
Netherlands 1979 1:280
New Zealand 1:350
South Korea 1:360
Italy 1978 1:726
Note: ..information not available.
Sources: Tait, A. A., 1988. Value Added Tax: International Practice and Problems, 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund:250.
Purohit, M. C., 1993. Principles and Practices o f Value-Added Tax: Lessons for 
Developing Countries, Delhi: Gayatri Publications:! 16.
Holland, G., 1991b. ‘VAT Organisational Issues’, in A. A, Tait (ed.), Value-Added 
Tax: Administrative and Policy Issues, IMF Occasional Paper 88, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund:Tablel:52.
103
In the majority of countries, self-assessment, simplification of VAT procedures 
and changed management programs have helped improve implementation. In most 
countries, tax offices are transformed into service agencies to assist taxpayers, who are 
called "clients" and "customers". For example, in South Korea, the Tax Appeals 
Division has been reoriented into a "Tax Payment Guidance Division" to enhance the 
quality of its service to taxpayers (Yoingco, forthcoming). New Zealand, Malaysia 
and the Philippines have set up a "one-stop service counter” in their Revenue 
Departments to attend to the needs of taxpayers. Public relations units have been 
established in tax offices in New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, Australia and Japan 
to discuss and resolve taxpayer problems expeditiously (Guevara 1990:57).
In the majority of countries, education of taxpayers on various aspects of the 
VAT system has facilitated understanding between tax administrators and taxpayers. 
Simulation exercises have been conducted to test the mechanics of VAT computation, 
filing of returns, and VAT payments (Chang and Recente 1988:29). In addition to 
advertisements in the media, VAT has been publicised through creative posters, 
brochures and pamphlets, and electronic displays in strategic places such as railways, 
highway stations and billboards along main roads, bridges and buses (Yoingco 
1988:12).
Training strategies and staff career programs in most countries have been 
designed to improve staff productivity and quality of work. This has involved 
enhancing recruitment strategies, reorganising career structures or services, 
incorporating more flexible employment and salary arrangements, and setting up 
training programs. For example, in Denmark, Ireland, France, the United Kingdom, 
New Zealand, South Korea and Indonesia, special arrangements have been made to
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cater for the training needs of tax personnel (Yoingco 1988:1; Gillis 1990a:240; 
Commission of the European Communities, 1992:18). Indonesia, Belgium and Ireland 
have established an in-house Tax Training Centre which provides training on VAT 
auditing, use of computers and VAT valuation. In New Zealand a "Change 
Management Program" has been implemented with the objective of training tax 
personnel to be productive and efficient. Japan has systematised the training of its tax 
personnel with the establishment of a "Tax College." The Tax College offers 
progressive training programs relative to the experiences and needs of the National 
Tax Authority (Yoingco, forthcoming).
Revenue implications of the VAT
In the majority of countries surveyed, the primary objective of the VAT has been 
to replace various indirect taxes of equal-yield. Nonetheless, in most countries, the 
VAT has become an important component o f tax reform -  to increase tax revenues, to 
reduce the growing budget deficits, and to permit the allocation of more resources for 
development expenditures, especially for deficient infrastructure and social sectors. 
For example, in Turkey, the introduction of the VAT in 1985 contributed to a 
reduction in the fiscal deficit to 4.2 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 from 10 per cent in 
1984 (Kopits and Robinson 1990:199; IMF, 1993a:83).
The VAT occupies a central position in the taxation system of the majority of 
OECD countries. Of the 12 OECD countries analysed, the VAT share of GDP in nine 
countries, has increased substantially since implementation. Among these countries, 
growth of VAT revenues has been most pronounced in the United Kingdom and 
Sweden. In both countries, the VAT share of GDP has almost doubled (Appendix
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5.7). Despite a good start, France, Norway and Germany, on the other hand, have in 
later years been unsuccessful in maintaining VAT revenue growth. In 1991, eight of 
the 12 OIICD countries collected a higher proportion of revenues from the VAT than 
they had a year aller its adoption, hi seven countries, the VAT's share in domestic 
taxes on goods and services has increased. In seven of the 12 OECD countries, the 
VAT share of private consumption has lisen (Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1 Share of value-added tax revenue in total taxes, in domestic 
goods and services taxes, in private consumption and in GDe­
selected OECD countries (various years)
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Notes: fötal fax ~ Share of VAT revenue in total tax revenue.
Taxes G&S = Share of VAT revenue in domestic goods and services taxes. 
Privt. Cons = VAT revenue as a percentage of total private consumption. 
GDP = VAT revenue as a percentage of GDP (market prices).
Sources: Appendix 5.7.
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In four of the five Asian countries, the VAT has proved a dependable revenue 
source. For example, in South Korea in 1976, a year prior to the implementation of 
the VAT, 663 billion Won of revenue was generated from business taxes, commodity 
taxes and other indirect taxes (Han, 1990:138). These taxes were replaced by the 
VAT in 1977. Consequently, the VAT share of GDP has increased from 3.4 per cent 
in 1978 to 4 per cent in 1991, while its share of total government revenues has 
increased from 22.7 per cent to 25.6 per cent (Figure 5.2). In 1992, the VAT was the 
single largest source of government revenue. However, with an almost identical 
economic structure to most OECD countries, South Korea has generated a relatively 
low level of VAT revenue in terms of its share of GDP and private consumption 
(Appendix 5.7).
In Indonesia, the VAT has become the principal source of non-oil and gas 
taxation revenue (Ridwan et al. 1988:81). Since its introduction in April 1985, the 
VAT has increased from 2.8 per cent of GDP to 3.9 per cent of GDP in 1991 (IMF, 
1993a:294). The VAT’s share of total tax revenue has increased from 19.3 per cent to 
22.8 per cent. In 1991 the VAT contributed 80 per cent of total domestic goods and 
services taxes -  up from 58.4 per cent in 1986 (Figure 5.2). Increases in VAT revenue 
reflect changes in the rate of tax on selected items, and improvements in the 
administration of tax collection. VAT coverage, which initially included only the 
manufacturing sector (with the exception of a tax on petroleum products at the retail 
level), expanded in 1989 to include goods and services in the wholesale sector. In 
April 1992, VAT coverage was further expanded to include most goods and services 
in the retail sector.
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On its introduction in the Philippines in 1988, the VAT was projected to be an 
equal-yield tax for the replaced indirect taxes (Yoingco et al. 1988:105). The first two 
years of the VAT’s implementation in the Philippines were problematic. As a ratio of 
GNP it was only 1.2 per cent in 1988 compared to 1.4 per cent for sales tax in 1987 
(the year prior to the VAT’s introduction). But, it has gradually improved to 1.7 per 
cent of GNP in 1994. During its introduction, the VAT has faced opposition from the 
media and consumer groups, as well as politicians. As a result, in the first three years 
since its implementation, substantial shortfalls from projections have been experienced 
(National Tax Research Centre, 1990:193). It appears that the government’s 
administrative capacity has been grossly ineffective in mobilising the revenue potential 
of the VAT and it has been unable to counter opposition from various interest groups.
Since implementation of the VAT in Taiwan, in 1986, and in Fiji in 1992, there 
has been a favourable growth in VAT revenues, in terms of its share in total tax 
revenues, in domestic taxes on goods and services and in GDP (Figure 5.2; Appendix 
5.7). In Fiji, the VAT share in total tax revenue -  in domestic taxes on goods and 
services, in private consumption and in GDP -  has been substantially higher than the 
majority of Asian, African and Latin American countries surveyed, and compares 
favourably with many OECD countries (Appendix 5.7).
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Figure 5.2 Share of value-added lax revenue in total taxes, in domestic 
goods and services taxes, in private consumption and in GDP- 
selected Asian countries (various years)
36
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Notes: As per Figure 5.1.
Sources: Appendix 5.7.
Of the African and Latin American countries surveyed, Kenya's VAT 
performance, at 8 9 per cent of GDP in 1991, has been outstanding (Figure 5.3), and 
compares favourably with OLCD countries. Total tax revenues increased to 2.1 billion 
Kenya Pounds in 1991 from 1.8 billion Kenya Pounds in 1989, an annual increase of 
15 per cent. This increase is partly attributable to the strong performance of the VAT 
(Republic of Kenya, 1993:81). In 1991, Uruguay and Morocco collected VAT 
revenues totaling approximately 6 per cent of GDP. The VAT share of total tax 
revenue -  of domestic taxes on goods and services and of private consumption -  has 
been substantially higher than other Latin American countries surveyed (Appendix 
5.7) Ihe VAT’s performance in Mexico has been weak and in Argentina VAT 
revenue, as percentage of GDP, has declined from 1.1 per cent of GDP in 1976 to 0.7
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per cent in 1991 (Figure 5.3). Among the many weaknesses in implementation in 
Argentina, the VAT sutlers from liberal exemptions granted to promote sectoral and 
regional objectives. As a result, there has been substantial evasion (Schcnonc, 
1990:120),
Figure 5.3 Share of value-added tax revenue iu total taxes, in domestic 
goods and services taxes, in private consumption and GDP- 
selected African and Latin American countries
Notes: As pci Figure 5.1. 
Sources: Appendix 5.7.
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Administrative and compliance costs of the VAT
The administrative features of the VAT system are significantly different from 
retail sales taxes and other cascading effect taxes. Because of its large taxpaying 
population, VAT collection and control requires that substantial amounts of 
information be processed in order to calculate taxpayers’ tax liability. VAT taxpayers 
are required to maintain input and output sales records for every taxable transaction 
for the purposes of claiming input tax refunds and for tax office assessment. Thus, the 
VAT imposes high administrative and compliance costs (Casanegra 1990:177). 
Different taxpayer populations across countries means that administrative costs vary 
according to the administrative methods used and the size of the businesses. For 
example, in Luxembourg which has 19,000 taxpayers, VAT administrative methods 
are considerably different from Italy, with over 5 million VAT taxpayers (Commission 
of the European Communities, 1992:9). In countries where the proportion of large 
firms is higher, such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom, VAT 
administration is relatively easier, compared with countries where the number of small 
businesses is large, such as Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1992:9).
Studies on VAT administrative and compliance costs are sparse and therefore 
evidence on VAT administrative and compliance costs is inconclusive. A study 
undertaken by Sandford and Hasseldine (1992:235-236) on businesses in New Zealand 
estimated that VAT compliance costs are about 7.3 per cent of total VAT revenues. 
Another study based on a 1977-78 survey, estimated that VAT administrative costs in 
the United Kingdom were two per cent of VAT revenue and compliance costs 9.3 per 
cent (Sandford and Godwin, 1990:208). The burden of VAT compliance costs was
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found to be higher on small firms. From the 1977-78 survey, it was also estimated 
that 40 per cent of the compliance costs and approximately 50 per cent of the 
administrative costs were borne by 69 per cent of the taxpayers who contributed less 
than 5 per cent to VAT revenues.
However, a follow-up 1984-85 survey by Sandford and Godwin (1990) showed 
that with improved VAT enforcement and simplification of procedures both 
administrative and compliance costs have been reduced considerably from the 1977-78 
estimates (Table 5.2). Nonetheless, there are complaints about the high compliance 
cost burden in the United Kingdom. The Common Public Affairs Committee in the 
United Kingdom in 1994 observed that because of the low level of understanding of 
the VAT system, it was imposing a heavy burden on businesses. The cost of 
complying with VAT regulations was estimated to be 1.6 billion British Pounds for 
traders, nearly four times the cost of administering the VAT system. The Committee 
further observed that because of the high VAT burden, companies in the United 
Kingdom under-declared VAT by more than two billion British Pounds in 1992-93 
(Tett and Jack, 1994:6).
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Table 5.2 Estimated administrative and compliance costs and value-added 
taxation in the United Kingdom, 1977-78 and 1984-85 (million 
British Pounds)
Items 1977-78 1984-85
1 . Revenue from VAT 4,200 18,500
2. Administrative costs 85 191
3. Compliance costs 392 940
4. Value of cash benefits 1 73 495
5. Net compliance costs (3-4)2 319 435
6. Administrative costs (as % of revenue) 2.0 1.0
7. Compliance costs (as % of revenue) 9.3 5.1
8. Net compliance costs (as % of revenue) 7.6 2.3
Notes:  ^Calculated using interest rates of 7 per cent for 1977-78 and 10.75 per cent for 1984- 
85.
^No allowance has been made for managerial benefits.
Sources: Sandford, C. and M. Godwin. 1990. ‘VAT Administration and Compliance
Britain’, in M. Gillis., C. S. Shoup. and G. P. Sicat (eds), Value Added Taxation 
Developing Countries, Washington, DC: World Bank:210.
Estimates of compliance costs of major Commonwealth taxes in Australia by 
Pope et al. (1993a and 1993b) and Pope (1993) show that VAT compliance costs are 
substantially below those of other taxes such as taxes on income (Table 5.3). 
Nonetheless, administrative costs of PAYE tax in Canada, at one per cent of the tax 
revenues (Vaillancourt, 1987:406-407), and 1.53 per cent in the United Kingdom 
(Sandford, 1986a: 108-110) have been below VAT administrative costs (see Table 
5.2).
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Table 5.3 The estimated compliance
Commonwealth taxes, 1990-91
costs of major Australian
Tax Revenue 
$ million
Compliance costs 
$ million As % of revenue
Personal income Tax 39,780 3,642 9.2
Employers' PAYE2 43,672 629 1.4
Employers' PPS2 1,358 120 8.8
Companies' income tax1 14,166 3,246 22.9
Fringe benefit tax 1,169 128 10.9
Wholesale tax (WST)2 9,365 179 1.9
Payroll tax^ 5,709 206 3.6
Notes: M990-91 estimates.
21989-90 estimates.
PAYE = Pay-As-You-Eam.
PPS = Prescribed payments tax system.
Sources: Pope, J., Fayle, R. and Chen, D. L., 1993a. The Compliance Costs o f Employment- 
Related Taxation o f Australia, Research Study No 17, Sydney: Australian Tax 
Research Foundation.
Pope, J., Fayle, R. and Chen, D. L., 1993b. The Compliance Costs o f Wholesale Tax 
in Australia, Research Study No 19, Sydney: Australian Tax Research Foundation. 
Pope, J. 1993. Policy Implications arising from Compliance Costs o f Taxation, Paper 
presented to the 1993, Australian Taxation Office Research Conference, Canberra: 
Commonwealth Treasury.
Economic effects of VAT
Evaluation of the impact of VAT on macroeconomic variables is complex 
because of the simultaneous interaction of various economic factors. Over the last 15 
years, in the majority of countries analysed, economic growth has been weak, and 
household and business confidence depressed. High interest rates, growing levels of 
unemployment, fiscal and current account deficits, and build-up of public debt have 
adversely influenced the economic climate of the majority of countries. 
Internationally, fluctuating oil prices, the slump in non-oil commodity prices, together 
with limited access to international capital has severely constrained growth, especially 
in developing countries (Linn and Wetzel, 1990:9). The introduction of VAT in the 
majority of countries surveyed, however, has proved to be a reliable revenue source 
and helped to reduce the revenue-expenditure gap, but in the absence of sufficient 
empirical research on the impact of VAT it is difficult to be conclusive about the 
efficiency and neutrality of the VAT.
114
Simulation analysis suggests that a broad-based consumption tax has a 
favourable effect on the long-term performance of the economy because of VAT’s 
possibly beneficial impact on capital accumulation (Noguchi, 1990:123). 
Georgakopoulos’ (1975:337) analysis suggests that substitution of indirect taxes with 
VAT has improved the built-in flexibility of the tax structure in the United Kingdom. 
In South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia the VAT provided increasing revenue to 
support incentives for industrialisation, export promotion and reduced distortion 
effecting investment climate (World Bank, 1993:229-230). However, as it is safe to 
assume that there are many other factors that, have influenced the macroeconomic 
outcome in the post-VAT period, the following analysis does not focus only on VAT, 
but includes other policy measures.
Effects of VAT on prices
A common experience when adopting VAT is some price-increasing effect 
(Bollard, 1992:9). In the majority of countries surveyed, therefore, a coordinated set 
of fiscal, monetary and pricing policies have been used to restrain the impact of VAT’s 
introduction on prices (Tait, 1988:209-10). In South Korea, Indonesia, France, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Taiwan price control measures have been used effectively to 
dampen the potential price-wage acceleration after the introduction of VAT (Tait, 
1990:30). South Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom 
have adopted interventionist policies to control prices at the time of introduction of 
VAT. For example: a price freeze has been used by Belgium; the United Kingdom 
adopted price and wages control policies; while the Netherlands adopted a policy of 
controls on profit margins (Purohit, 1993:20).
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Analysis of the experience of the 23 countries surveyed, on the basis of 
quarterly and annual consumer price index (CPI) changes, shows that consumer prices 
increased from their pre-VAT introduction levels. Nearly all the countries analysed 
experienced price rises in the quarter of VAT introduction and in the first and second 
quarters following. Nonetheless, in the majority of countries, increases in consumer 
prices have been substantially below the standard-VAT rates (Table 5.4). Only five of 
the 23 countries -  New Zealand, Turkey, Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico -  
experienced increases in consumer prices above the VAT standard rates in the quarter 
of VAT implementation. Belgium, France, Germany, Taiwan and Morocco have 
experienced surprisingly small increases in consumer prices (Table 5.4).
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Table 5.4 Consumer prices (percentage change before and after the VAT 
introduction) -  selected countries
Date of VAT VAT 2 Percentageydiange in consumer prices 
introduction standard CPI in CPI in CPI in 1st CPI in 2nd
rate (%)' quarter quarter quarter quarter
before VAT of VAT after VAT after VAT
introduction introduction introduction introduction
OECD countries
Belgium Jan. 1971 18.0 129.9 1.8 1.7 1.8
Denmark July 1967 10.0 122.0 7.9 1.7 1.1
Netherlands Jan. 1969 12.0 126.3 5.8 2.1 -0.5
France Jan. 1968 13.6 113.5 1.6 0.7 1.5
Italy Jan. 1973 12.0 114.4 3.1 4.1 2.8
Luxembourg Jan. 1970 8.0 119.2 2.8 1.5 0.9
Norway Jan. 1970 20.0 128.4 8.3 1.7 3.1
New Zealand Oct. 1986 10.0 113.2 10.1 2.9 4.2
Sweden Jan. 1969 11.1 150.5 3.6 14.9 -11.3
Germany Jan. 1968 10.0 110.8 1.5 0.2 0.0
United Kingdom Apr. 1973 10.0 123.0 3.8 2.1 4.3
Turkey Jan. 1985 10.0 386.7 47.9 27.8 23.4
Asian and Pacific countries
South Korea July 1977 10.0 125.6 4.3 1.1 6.8
Indonesia Apr. 1985 10.0 97.5 2.9 0.5 0.3
Philippines Jan. 1988 10.0 107.4 3.5 1.8 1.9
Taiwan Apr. 1986 5.0 99.6 0.5 1.2 0.5
Fiji July 1992 10.0 150.7 7.4 -0.1 3.8
African and Latin American countries
Kenya Jan. 1990 17.0 134.6 3.9 4.0 2.0
Guatemala Aug. 1983 7.0 111.1 3.8 7.1 -2.6
. Argentina Jan. 1975 16.0 496.0 96.0 170.0 641.0
Uruguay Jan. 1968 14.0 982.0 378.0 270.0 160.0
Morocco Apr. 1986 19.0 107.6 0.7 0.8 0.8
Mexico Jan. 1980 10.0 220.2 19.8 13.7 16.7
Notes: 'At the time of value-added tax introduction.
Consumer price index.
Sources: OECD, 1994. OECD Economic Outlook No. 55, Paris: OECD: Annex Table 25.
IMF, 1990b. International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1990, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
IMF, 1994. International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1994, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
In the first quarter after the VAT introduction, OECD countries experienced a 
contraction in consumer price index. Only two countries -  Italy and Sweden -  
experienced an increase in prices. Among Asian countries, Taiwan experienced only a 
nominal price increase, while in the other four countries, prices were reduced from the 
earlier quarter. The African and Latin American Countries experienced mixed 
behaviour in consumer prices. For example, Kenya, Guatemala, Argentina and
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MOrOCCO eXPCrlel,Ced inc,eases in " ,e C,>l- vvllereas in Uruguay and Mexico consumer 
l»'.ces declined. In the second quarter alter the VAT introduction, consumer prices
generally declined: only two of the 2d countries (South Korea and Argentina) 
witnessed a price rise. In the majority of countries, prices stabilised or fell alter the
quarterly movements o f consumer prices in New Zealand and Taiwan.
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In 17 of the 23 countries surveyed consumer prices measured on a yearly basis 
increased from their pre-VAT level. In seven countries -  New Zealand, Turkey, South 
Korea, the Philippines, Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico -  CPI changes have been 
above the VAT standard-rate. In New Zealand, the inflation rate rose from 13.3 per 
cent in the year of VAT implementation (1986), to 15.7 per cent in 1987 (Appendix 
5.8). In New Zealand, 70 per cent of the GST has apparently passed through into the 
CPI (Grimmond, 1992:8).
In South Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan, the introduction of VAT was followed 
by a decrease or only a small increase in consumer prices (Yen and Guevara, 1988:60). 
In South Korea, when the VAT was adopted, the prices of 251 goods were tightly 
controlled by the government (Han, 1990:139). A new law, "Stabilisation of Price 
Level", was enacted for the purpose of price control and the law has been enforced 
strictly. In Taiwan, growth of consumer prices in the post-VAT period was closely 
monitored. The Ministry of Finance published a Price Guide comparing the ratio of 
pre-tax to post-tax prices. The Guide was widely circulated to consumers. Also, 
Government bonds were issued to reduce domestic liquidity. Prior to the 
implementation of the VAT, import duties on nearly eight hundred commodities were 
lowered. The government also reduced or froze prices of various government- 
controlled goods and services (Yen and Guevara, 1988:56).
In the Philippines, the inflation rate rose from 12.2 per cent in the year of VAT 
introduction to 14.1 per cent the year after its implementation (Appendix 5.8). It has 
been argued that increases in prices in the Philippines cannot be solely attributed to 
VAT (Yoingco et al. 1988:105; PIDS, 1994:6). In the absence of an efficient 
information scheme, sellers of goods and services increased their profit margins over
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and above the anticipated tax changes (Guevara, 1990:58). In Kenya, the inflation 
rate rose continuously after the introduction of VAT from 13.3 per cent in 1989, to 
15.8 per cent in 1990, and 19.6 per cent in 1991. Besides the VAT, there have been 
several factors behind the price increase, predominantly, increased domestic liquidity. 
The rate of growth of money supply rose from an annual rate of 20 per cent at the end 
of 1990, to 23 per cent by the end of 1991 -  considerably above the growth of 
nominal GDP (Republic of Kenya, 1993:17).
The foregoing analysis suggests that the VAT’s effect on prices in the majority 
of countries surveyed has not been severe. The VAT has not instigated any 
inflationary impact.
VAT effects on economic growth
As discussed earlier, given the complex interaction of many variables, 
assessment of the nature and the level of the impact of the VAT’s influence on 
economic activity is difficult. Even assuming the influence of other factors on 
economic activity is absent, it would still be difficult to isolate the VAT’s impact on 
economic growth and other macroeconomic variables. A switch from income taxes to 
VAT is likely to have a deflationary impact on economic activity in the short-run, 
considering a declining proportion of income is consumed as income rises, while a 
switch from a cascading effect-type tax has either a positive or negative impact. The 
proponents of consumption tax argue that a beneficial longer-term growth effects may 
result from the VAT, through its effect in generating a higher level of savings 
(Feldstein, 1978; Boskin, 1978; Zodrow and McLure, 1990:237) -  provided these 
savings are channelled into productive investments. Realisation of both these
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conditions, however, is not certain -  they are dependent on the investment climate in 
the country and the risk bearing capacity of private investors.
In the countries surveyed, a mixed pattern of economic growth can be observed 
in the post-VAT period. One year after VAT implementation, economic growth was 
lower than in the pre-VAT year in 12 countries, while the remaining 11 countries 
witnessed positive growth over the pre-VAT level. Growth performance was more 
favourable in Sweden, Germany, Turkey, South Korea and Taiwan (Appendix 5.9).
VAT effects on savings and investment
Tait (1988:222) argues that the consumption-type VAT promotes savings and 
investment. Boskin (1978: S-3) argued that taxes on incomes significantly reduce the 
real net rate of return and retard capital accumulation which causes a substantial waste 
o f resources. Galper and Steuerle (1983) argued that an effective method of providing 
savings incentives would be to convert individual income tax systems into individual 
consumption tax systems, because the VAT provides better incentives for capital 
formation and savings. It has also been argued that the increased savings, from a 
switch to consumption taxes, increases the capital stock and hence has a positive 
impact on economic growth and labour productivity (Break, 1985:149; Summers, 
1981:541). These arguments are supported by the Yeh (1974) study which found a 
positive capital formation effect from the adoption of a VAT.
The analysis of 23 countries reveals a mixed pattern of national savings growth 
in the post-VAT period, relative to the pre-VAT period. Of the 12 OECD countries, 
five had lower savings rates and seven had higher rates one year after the
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implementation of VAT. Five years after implementation, the national saving 
performance in seven of the 12 countries had improved (Appendix 5.10). The 
majority of the Asian, African and Latin American countries also experienced 
increasing saving rates in the post-VAT regime.
The VAT impact on capital formation in the post-VAT regime is also mixed. It 
can be observed that gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) rates in six of the 12 OECD 
countries, were higher than the pre-VAT level one year after VAT implementation. 
Nonetheless, in subsequent years, a declining trend in capital formation is observed. In 
1991, only two of the 12 OECD countries had fixed capital formation rates above the 
pre-VAT level (Appendix 5.11). However, all the Asian countries experienced 
continuous growth in fixed capital formation in the post-VAT periods (Appendix 
5.11). For example, in South Korea, the VAT was more conducive to investment than 
the old indirect tax regime (Choi, 1990b:380). In South Korea, the largest share of 
refund on capital investment accrued to the manufacturing and electricity and gas 
sectors. Investment in both sectors increased sharply after the introduction of VAT 
(Han, 1990:139). In Taiwan, private investment also increased (Yen and Guevara, 
1988:61). The majority of African and Latin American countries, however, have been 
unsuccessful in maintaining their capital formation rates in the years following VAT 
introduction (Appendix 5.11).
VAT effects on exports
One of the goals of adopting the VAT has been the elimination of tax 
distortions inhibiting the export sector (Choi, 1983:27, 29; Break, 1985:152). It has 
been argued that the zero-rated mechanism of the VAT (when based on the destination
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principle) automatically provides incentives for export promotion (Tait, 1988:223; 
Han, 1990:140), and thus, the use of VAT improves a country’s competitive position 
in international markets. Little, Scott, and Scitovsky (1970) and McKinnon (1973) 
also showed that high and differential tariffs on imports caused severe discrimination 
against and within the foreign trade sector in many developing countries. Lower 
tariffs and a broad coverage of domestic goods and services under a VAT regime not 
only provides a broader tax revenue base, but also reduces distortions caused by the 
tariff structure (McKinnon, 1973:521). Although it is difficult to quantify the impact 
of the VAT on exports, it has been observed that in the majority of countries surveyed, 
reform of the indirect tax system in favour of VAT removed some of the tax 
disadvantages placed on the export sector by the cascading effect indirect tax system. 
For example, in South Korea, after the introduction of the VAT, exports increased 
rapidly, from 53.6 billion Won in 1978, to 86.6 billion Won in 1982 (Choi, 1983:27 
and 29). In Taiwan, together with other favourable trade developments, the VAT has 
improved the performance of the export sector. Exports from April to December 
1986 grew by 29 per cent, relative to 1985 export levels (Yen and Guevara, 1988:48).
Table 5.5 shows that of the 23 countries analysed, 13 experienced higher export- 
GDP ratios one year after the introduction of VAT. After five years of VAT 
implementation, the export-GDP ratio further improved: 15 of the 23 countries had a 
higher export-GDP ratio. In 1991, the export-GDP ratio in 14 of the 23 countries was 
above the pre-VAT introduction level. Export sector improvements were more 
pronounced in OECD countries. The export-GDP ratio was higher in the first year of 
VAT introduction in seven of the 12 OECD countries (Table 5.5). In the Asian 
region, South Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan achieved substantial growth in their
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exports in the post-VAT periods. However, African and Latin American countries 
performances in the post-VAT years have been less impressive. Other factors have 
obviously affected the export sector. For example, in Kenya, in the post-VAT period, 
the volume of exports of coffee and tea (the main foreign exchange earners) were 
adversely affected by the fall in the world prices of those commodities (Republic of 
Kenya, 1993:9).
l
Table 5.5 Merchandise exports f.o.b (as a percentage of GDP) -  selected 
countries
Date of VAT 
introduction
One year 
before VAT 
introduction
One year 
after VAT 
introduction
Five year 
after VAT 
introduction
Exports 
in 1991
OECD countries
Belgium Jan. 1971 35.1 Plus Plus Plus
Denmark July 1967 21.8 Minus Minus Plus
Netherlands Jan. 1969 31.2 Plus Plus Plus
France Jan. 1968 9.7 Plus Plus Plus
Italy Jan. 1973 13.4 Plus Plus Plus
Luxembourg Jan. 1970 73.1 Minus Plus Minus
Norway Jan. 1970 22.9 Minus Plus Plus
New Zealand Oct. 1986 24.7 Minus Minus Minus
Sweden Jan. 1969 18.1 Plus Plus Plus
Germany Jan. 1968 17.6 Plus Plus Plus
United Kingdom Apr. 1973 14.6 Plus Plus Plus
Turkey Jan. 1985 14.3 Minus Minus Minus
Asian and Pacific countries
South Korea July 1977 27.0 Minus Plus Minus
Indonesia Apr. 1985 23.7 Minus Plus Plus
Philippines Jan. 1988 17.1 Plus Plus Plus
Taiwan Apr. 1986 49.0 Plus Minus Minus
Fiji July 1992
African and Latin American countries
28.7 No change
Kenya Jan. 1990 11.6 Plus Plus
Guatemala Aug. 1983 13.4 Minus Plus Minus
Argentina Jan. 1975 8.5 Plus Minus Minus
Uruguay Jan. 1968 9.6 Plus Plus Plus
Morocco Apr. 1986 16.7 Minus Minus Minus
Mexico Jan. 1980 6.5 Plus Plus Plus
Notes: ..information not available.
'fob = free on board. 
Sources: Appendix 5.12.
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Conclusions
In the 23 countries surveyed, the VAT has proved a potent tax revenue source. 
Despite use of exemptions, VAT has provided some neutrality and administrative 
advantages. Administrative improvements in the taxation system in the majority of 
countries surveyed have been a product of intensive planning and administrative 
efforts, coordination between various agencies, and extensive education and 
information campaigns.
The macroeconomic consequences of VAT, measured in terms of various 
macroeconomic variables, such as consumer prices, economic growth, savings, 
investment and exports, appear to vary across countries, but are difficult to isolate 
because of the concurrent interaction of various economic factors. Notwithstanding, 
the analysis suggests that in the majority of countries surveyed, introduction of the 
VAT has not created any economic consequences of a severe nature. The VAT 
impact on prices in nearly all the countries analysed has been smooth. In many of the 
countries surveyed, given coordination of fiscal, monetary and price policies, 
consumer prices have contracted and in many cases been below the growth in the pre- 
VAT period. This analysis, therefore, suggests that it is not the VAT which instigates 
inflationary pressures in an economy, but other factors.
The experience of the countries investigated suggests that enhanced staff morale 
-  through greater participation in decision making and information sharing -  has 
improved the work environment substantially. These changes have helped to achieve 
maximum benefits from the VAT implementation. However, additional efforts are 
required, in facilitating compliance through simplified legislation and procedures,
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improved cooperation with taxpayers via better information and service, and 
reinforced attention to taxpayer rights to reduce VAT’s administrative and compliance 
costs.
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6An Outline of the Analytical Framework
An in-depth empirical analysis of various aspects of the VAT system is 
necessary. A single model applicable to the three study objectives i.e., assessment of 
VAT revenue productivity, its distributional consequences on different income groups, 
and taxpayer compliance and administrative feasibility was not appropriate, and 
therefore, different analytical methods were matched to each of the objectives.
To examine revenue productivity, a simulation of individual federal and 
provincial government revenue and expenditure items has been undertaken, based on 
18 years of time series data. Using this approach the projected level of fiscal deficit in 
the years 1993-98 has been assessed. The fiscal deficit is defined as total government 
revenue minus total government expenditure. The relationship between dependent and 
independent variables has been investigated using econometric techniques. Variables 
were constructed representing major components of government revenues and 
expenditures for use in the multiple regression analysis. Forecasting of government 
revenues and expenditures was made on the basis of the estimated regression 
coefficients. However, domestic and external interest liability for the years 1993-94 to 
1997-98 has been calculated on the basis of domestic and external outstanding public 
debt stock and the increase in public debt each year. Revenues from the VAT have 
been computed under the assumption that the VAT option is one of the best policy 
options available to the Pakistan government to improve its fiscal position, i.e., to 
contain the growth of fiscal deficits and improve resources for the development of
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social and economic infrastructure. The VAT base has been constructed using the 
simplest form of the tax with the following features: (i) minimum differentiation of 
VAT rates; and (ii) a minimum number of exemptions and zero-rating. The results of 
this analysis are reported in chapter 8.
The Lorenz-curve and Gini-coefficients were used to assess the income group 
incidence of the tax across national, rural and urban levels. The results of this analysis 
are reported in chapter 9.
An analysis of VAT administration and taxpayer compliance was made on the 
basis of a field survey and is reported in chapter 10. The data analysed in the 
subsequent three chapters comprises a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
information. Besides secondary sources of data, primary data were gathered in face- 
to-face interviews and focus group discussions through open-ended and closed-ended 
questions. Personal interviews with senior tax officials in New Zealand and the 
Philippines during November-December 1993 (Appendix 6.1) and observations on the 
operation of VAT in these two countries were used as the basis for interviews in 
Pakistan. The remainder of this chapter briefly describes the methods of analysis used, 
variables used, data sources, and comments on the quality of the data.
Analysis of VAT revenue productivity 
Outline of the model framework
A fiscal simulation model of government revenues and expenditures was 
developed using applied econometrics and the research of Lotz and Morss (1967:497), 
Musgrave (1971:110-118), Hinrichs (1966:12-20), Tanzi, (1969:207-209;1987), Bahl
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(1971:592), Fries et cd.(1982:150), Ahmad and Stern (1991:47) and Naqvi et al.
(1993:96-97). The model, a combination of behavioural equations and identities, sets 
out the relationship between the dependent variables and two or more independent 
variables (details in Appendix 6.2). All equations in the model were estimated 
independently using ordinary least squares (OLS) with an 18 year estimation period 
ranging from 1975-76 to 1992-93. Equations were estimated in log-linear form as, for 
example, In = a  + ß  In X i + e . .
Where:
Y i= dependent variable 
Xj = independent variable 
a  = intercept
= estimates coefficient 
s i = error terms.
Forecasting with the simulation model
Forecasting has been carried out by simulating the model forward in time beyond 
the estimation period. Diagnostic test found presence of autocorrelation and 
multicollinearity in some of the model equations. These equations were corrected. All 
equations in the model have been estimated in nominal terms and forecasts are made in 
nominal terms.
VAT tax base estimates
A VAT without exemptions and with zero-rating limited to exports and 
purchasers of capital goods is a tax on consumption. The base of the tax is the value 
of final sales of consumer goods and services which can be derived from the following 
formula:
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GDP at market prices + imports - exports - gross capital formation a)
In assessing the VAT base, it is useful to begin with an expression for the total 
value of sales in an economy, both intermediate and final. This is given by the 
following expression:
Cd + Id + X + ISd + ISm + Im + Cm (2)
Where:
C = value of final sales of consumer goods 
I = final sales of capital goods 
IS = intermediate sales 
X = exports
d, m= subscripts for domestically produced and imported goods.
A VAT without exemptions is levied on all sales, both intermediate and final, 
however, when there are no exemptions, the tax liability generated by an intermediate 
sale is offset by the credit received by the purchaser. Since purchases of capital goods 
and exports are zero-rated, the only sales that generate a net tax liability are sales to 
consumers. Under this condition the formula for the VAT base would be:
Cd + Cm = C (3)
Nonetheless, the VAT base has to be adjusted for several factors, including 
VAT treatment of non-profit institutions and government non-commercial agencies, 
before arriving at a net VAT base. Private non-profit institutions are defined as 
entities which do not operate on a commercial basis. Such institutions include 
professional welfare organisations (such as the Edhi and Ansar Burni Trusts in 
Pakistan), fraternal societies, community groups, religious institutions, and other 
charitable organisations, whereas non-commercial categories of government 
consumption represent expenditure on defence, law and order, social, economic and
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community services by the departments and agencies of the federal, provincial, and 
local governments. Also, for administrative simplicity and reduced administrative and 
compliance costs, small businesses of the distributive (wholesale and retail) sectors and 
financial services are exempted. International experience suggests that it is difficult to 
tax most of these activities. Their inclusion in the tax base would make the number of 
taxpayers too unmanageable in the implementation phase. A disproportionate amount 
of administrative resources would be devoted to collecting a small amount of revenue. 
For this reason most countries imposing a VAT, exempt small business and financial 
services from VAT (see chapter 4). For the same reason the primary sector in the 
majority of countries has not been taxed, or taxed lightly (chapter 5). Also, on 
grounds of social policy and equity, some goods and services such as medical supplies 
and prescription drugs, residential rents, health and education services, and public 
transport should be zero-rated or exempted from VAT.
The preceding discussion suggests that two adjustments should be made to 
aggregate consumption to take account of exemptions: (1) the value of exempted 
consumer goods must be subtracted; and (2) the value of exempted consumer goods 
to the exempt sector, and purchases of taxed capital goods by the exempt sector 
should be added -  they should be treated as intermediate sales -  because the 
purchaser, being exempt, does not receive credit for the tax content of the capital 
goods.
In the absence of an official input-output model for Pakistan, sectoral 
assessment of the VAT burden and evaluations of exemptions and zero ratings have 
been made by adjusting the national accounts data and using the technological 
coefficients matrix constructed by Ahmad et al. (1985), which divided the Pakistan
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economy into 87 sectors. The level of exemptions and zero rated goods and services 
has been estimated by decomposing the 1992-93 national accounts data: deducting the 
amount of public and private sector gross capital formation from the sectoral value 
added estimates (Table 6.1). The public sector consumption expenditure has been 
derived from the budgets of government bodies. An element of estimation was 
necessary for the budgets of many local governments. An assumption is made that the 
structure of the economy, as used by the AJimad et al. (1985) input-output matrix, did 
not change between 1980-81 -  the year for which Ahmad et al. estimated the matrix -  
and 1992-93. This allows the matrix to be used to estimate the value of final sales of 
exempt products and the value of sales of taxed inputs to the exempt sector in 
subsequent years. The following steps have been considered before arriving at the 
value of final sales of exempt products:
(1) The 1992-93 national accounts have been used as the benchmark.
(2) Estimates of gross production of the exempt sectors’ value added have 
been derived directly from national accounts data (Government of 
Pakistan, 1994: ). Sectoral exemptions have been estimated by assuming 
exemptions of 80 per cent value added in the agricultural sector, 100 per 
cent in mining and quarrying, 50 per cent of the small scale 
manufacturing, 80 per cent in the construction sector, 100 per cent public 
sector, and 100 per cent in services. The estimates of the intermediate 
consumption of the exempt sectors have been made on the basis of 
Ahmad et al. 's (1985) estimates.
(3) Estimates of exports and imports for the goods sector have been 
calculated from publications of the Federal Bureau of Statistics and 
Economic Survey of Pakistan.
(4) The estimate of the VAT base has been increased by the amount of 
capital goods purchases made by the exempt sectors. The estimate of 
investment by the exempted sectors has been derived from data on gross 
fixed capital formation (Appendix 6.4).
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Details o f the VAT base constructed on the above basis are given in Table 6.1. 
The potential VAT base, as a ratio o f private final consumption, has been used for 
assessing VAT revenues in the years 1993-94 to 1997-98.
Table 6.1 The potential revenue base for the value-added tax 1992-93
(billion Pakistan rupees)
1. Gross domestic product (market prices) 1342
2. Plus: Imports of goods 284
3. Less: Capital formation 257
4. Less: Exports of goods 176
5. Less: Final demand for exempted goods and services 682
6. Plus: Taxable inputs in production of exempted goods and services 239
7. Plus: Adjustment for capital formation by exempted sectors 86
8. Less: Adjustment for small traders 33
9. Less: Wholesale-retail margins 39
10. Potential VAT Base: 764
Sources: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1992. Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1992, Statistics 
Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1994a. Foreign Trade Statistics o f Pakistan 1992, 
Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Karachi: Government of Pakistan. 
Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1994b. National Accounts o f Pakistan 1992-93, Statistics 
Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1994c. Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1994, Statistics 
Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, 1994. Pakistan Economic Survey 1993-94, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan 
Ahmad, E., Barrett, S. and D. Coady., 1985. Input-Output Matrices for Pakistan 
1980-81, Discussion Paper No. 68, Warwick: Development Economic Research 
Centre, University of Warwick.
Since estimation o f the VAT base using the above approach has been 
approximated on the basis o f various assumptions and an input-output model 
developed in 1980-81, it is obviously open to error. Therefore, the VAT revenue base 
has also been estimated under an alternative approach, based on final consumption 
expenditure. Final consumption expenditure essentially refers to purchases made by 
individuals or households, governments, and non-profit organisations. Because of 
perceived problems o f measuring the taxable components o f financial services, public 
sector and non-profit organisations in the majority o f countries with VAT it is 
common to exempt or zero-rate banking, insurance and other financial sector 
transactions, government bodies and non-profit organisations from the VAT (Bakker
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and Chronican, 1985:5; Scott and Davis, 1985:21; Department of Finance Canada, 
1989:55; Kay and Davis, 1990:77-78; Gillis, 1990b:83). In Pakistan, on the basis of 
Ahmad et al. augmented taxable input-ratios (Appendix 6.3), the government sector 
gross output of approximately rupees 105 billion in 1992-93 could generate rupees 1.5 
billion VAT revenue at 15 per cent VAT rate, but because of associated problems of 
identification, collection and compliance costs the study exempts government sector 
and non-profit organisations consumption expenditure, along with financial sector 
transactions and from the final consumption expenditure. The VAT impact on 
government budget and on different income groups has been assessed on the basis of 
households final consumption expenditure. The advantage of this approach is that the 
value of goods and services purchased by households automatically captures the 
destination principle of the VAT, since it excludes exports and includes imports. The 
limitation of such an approach is that exemption of certain items from VAT will 
introduce some tax cascading as VAT-exempt goods are not allowed to receive a 
rebate for taxes paid on their inputs. These will be passed on to final consumers 
(partially or fully). This suggests that the effective tax rate on final consumption is 
slightly higher than the VAT rate assumed by the study. The main data source for this 
approach is the 1990-91 Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES). This survey 
is carried out periodically by Pakistan's Federal Bureau of Statistics and contains 
information on household income and consumption patterns for urban and rural 
households.
Household consumption expenditure under HIES 1990-91 (Federal Bureau of 
Statistics, 1993) is divided into 30 major categories and 102 individual consumption 
items. Of the 30 major household expenditure categories, 15 categories represent
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food items, and the remainder include expenditure on fuel and lighting, clothing and 
footwear, housing and rent, medical care, education, recreation, furniture, and durable 
and non-durable items. Nonetheless, it appears that the HIES 1990-91 did not include 
expenditure on various durable items of household expenditure, such as jewellery. An 
adjustment has been made to include these items in the VAT base. To arrive at the 
annual VAT base, on a Pakistan-wide basis, the HIES household consumption 
expenditure estimate has been converted into per capita consumption expenditure and 
multiplied by the 1992-93 population (119.07 million). Details of these estimates are 
given in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 The value-added tax base for 1992-93
estim ate (billion Pakistan rupees)
-  consum ption expenditure
Expenditure category Amount
Household expenditure:
Food and beverages 290.0
Tobacco and chewing products 12.8
Fuel and power 35.4
Clothing and footwear 48.5
Housing and rent 82.8
Medical care and health 17.8
Educational expenditure 9.6
Transport and travel 1.9
Furniture and fixtures and other household equipment 11.1
Recreation, entertainment and cultural services 0.2
Personal care articles 72.6
Personal effects 5.3
Purchase of jewellery 49.8
Other durable goods (radio, TV, VCR, refrigerator) 3.5
Other non-durable goods 9.8
Other consumption expenditure 20.0
Total consumption expenditure/potential VAT base 671.1
Source: Appendix 6.5.
The potential VAT base of rupees 764 billion under the first approach (Table 
6.1) and rupees 671 billion under the second approach (Table 6.2 above) show a 
difference of rupees 93 billion, or approximately 12 per cent. Using a uniform VAT 
rate of 10 per cent, rupees 76 billion VAT revenues would be generated under the first
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approach, and rupees 67 billion under the second approach. A difference of rupees 9 
billion of VAT revenue under the two approaches is not large. The second approach, 
however, is appropriate on grounds of convenience for assessing level of exemptions 
and zero-rating of individual consumption items. The second approach has been used 
in assessing VAT revenues in the subsequent analysis.
Evaluating the VAT burden on income groups
The VAT's impact on various income groups has been assessed using household 
consumption expenditure estimate from the HIES 1990-91 (Federal Bureau of 
Statistics, 1993) data. According to this survey, the income of a household consists of 
material income in cash or kind earned in exchange for goods and services, and it 
includes wages and salaries, pensions, contributions by boarders and lodgers, 
professional fees, interest and dividends, earnings from agricultural activities, business, 
commercial and industrial undertakings, land rent and other property income, gifts and 
assistance (relief payments in cash or kind), and social and insurance benefits. 
Household income also includes remittances from members of the household who are 
working abroad. Household final consumption expenditure includes outlays on non­
durable and durable goods and services out of monthly income in the last 30 days. To 
estimate the VAT burden on different income groups, household income and 
expenditure is arranged into six income groups (Table 6.3) by merging 11 of the 1990- 
91 HIES income groups.
136
Table 6.3 Average monthly income
(Pakistan rupees)
per household by income group
Income groups HIES income groups Proposed income groups
1 < 1000 < 1500
2 1001 - 1500 1501 -2500
3 1501 - 2000 2501 - 3500
4 2001 -2500 3501 - 5000
5 2501 - 3000 5000 - 7000
6 3001 - 3500 7001 and above
7 3501 -4000
8 4001 -5000
9 5001 -6000
10 6001 -7000
11 7001 and above
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1993. Household Integrated Economic Survey 1990-91, 
Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Karachi: Government of Pakistan.
The “degree of VAT burden” has been estimated by following the traditional 
absolute incidence in a partial equilibrium framework instead of using the differential 
incidence approach. The shares of total income accruing to various groups have been 
examined by calculating the net VAT burden on each group (VAT-sales tax). Tax 
burdens have been measured through a graphic representation known as the Lorenz- 
curve (LC) and Gini Coefficients (Atkinson, 1970:244). The Lorenz-curve relates the
cumulative proportion of income units to the cumulative proportion of income 
received when units are arranged in ascending order of income (Kakwani, 1977:719). 
If all incomes were equal, the LC would lie along the 45° line, the line of perfect 
equality (Figure 6.1). Otherwise, a plot of the cumulative proportion of the population 
running from zero to unity along the horizontal axis will show the cumulative 
population share, vis-a-vis the cumulative proportion of total income received by 
various income units of the population (Chakarvarty, 1990:1).
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Figure 6.1 Distribution of income under the Lorenz-curve
Cumulative 
percent 
of income
Line of equal distributio.
Cumulative proportion of population
the Lorenz relationship provides a partial ordering: only some pairs of 
distributions can be compared (Lambert, 1993:35). Consequently, the Gini-coefficient 
has been employed widely to measure income distribution: by Samuelson (1967) and 
Atkinson (1970) in the determination of income inequality; by Yitzhaki (1983) for the 
measuring of risks in portfolio analysis; and by Kendall and Stuart (1977) for assessing 
absolute differences between observations of a random variable. The Gini-coefficient 
is equal to the expected absolute difference in income, relative to the mean, between 
any two persons drawn at random from the population (Kendall and Stuart, 1969:47; 
Dorfman, 1979:147). In effect, it measures the area between the Lorenz-curve and the 
45° line as a fraction of the total area under the 45° line. For a given income 
distribution, the Gini-coefficient (G) is defined as (Adams, 1989:59):
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(4)G = 1+ — -H
2
~HY
Where:
G = Gini Coefficient 
H = Number of units
yh = Quantity over which inequality is measured 
Y = Total inequality
p(h) = Rank assigned to household h ranked by y.
Besides using it to assess the VAT burden by income group, the Gini-coefficient 
is also used to assess the welfare loss or gain for each income group in terms of the 
following equation (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992:26):
per capita post-VAT income times (1 - Gini) (5)
Evaluating taxpayer compliance and VAT administrative feasibility
Assessment of taxpayer compliance and administrative feasibility is important 
because these two elements of the VAT system operate inter-dependently in such a 
manner that a defect in either one can cause severe distortion in the system. 
Experience of VAT in the majority of countries surveyed suggests that the tax is more 
complicated to administer than any other form of consumption tax (chapter 5), 
particularly in an economy like Pakistan, where the majority of the population is 
illiterate, small business forms a large part of business activities, proprietors often keep 
few or no business records, and barter exchange of goods and services is not 
regulated. Successful implementation requires wide dissemination of the 
administrative network so that both tax administrator and taxpayer understand the 
system precisely and their areas of responsibility.
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The implementation plan for VAT, therefore, should be worked out clearly, 
setting targets for each activity. Various questions have to be resolved before 
introduction, such as, whether the VAT should be introduced up to the manufacturing 
level, or wholesale level, and whether it should be applied to all sales of goods and 
services up to the retail level. Also important, are decisions on the exclusion of 
commodities, transactions, and types of activities from the VAT base. One of the 
most important decisions to be made before introduction, is who is responsible for its 
administration. In many countries, a whole new administrative machinery has been 
created with central and regional offices and service centres. It is also necessary to 
consider staff requirements for its implementation and administration and compliance 
costs. Field staff need a fair knowledge of the business organisations and people likely 
to be taxed. This requires proper training of field staff and an incentive-based service 
structure.
Political acceptance of the VAT is important. The experience of many countries 
suggests that without political will, implementation of a broad-based VAT, covering 
all stages of production and distribution, will be difficult. Gaining political favour for 
the VAT, requires widespread discussion of the tax with the general public and 
business community.
The field survey
The field-work segment of research was undertaken in January-April 1994, to 
obtain responses from various groups to most of the questions raised in the preceding 
paragraphs. A sample survey using five different questionnaires was designed. Each 
of the questionnaires was divided into three sections. Section one elicited background
140
and personal information about the respondent's education, employment status and 
family size. Personal background information, although not directly related to the 
assessment of the objectives, was included with the consideration that it might help in 
understanding the respondent. The format of questions was predominantly in closed- 
end form, but some open-ended questions were included to allow respondents to add 
suggestions on how to improve VAT administration and the government's financial 
position. Of the five questionnaires, questionnaire one was designed to solicit views of 
senior executives associated with tax policy at the federal and provincial government 
level. This part of the questionnaire benefited greatly from my discussions with tax 
officials in New Zealand and the Philippines. Some tax practitioners and researchers 
were also interviewed (Appendix 6.1). Questionnaire two was prepared for tax 
administrators working in the field. Questionnaire three was aimed at grassroots 
politicians, questionnaire four for business entities, and, questionnaire five for the 
general public.
Geographically, the survey covered two districts of each of the four provinces of 
Pakistan. These districts were selected on the grounds that one district should 
represent an industrial base and an organised urban sector in which, parallel to 
manufacturing activities, financial and other commercial activities form a large part of 
the service sector. The second district in each province was selected on the basis of its 
representation of an agricultural base in which commercial activities were 
predominantly based on trading of primary agricultural goods. This division was 
important from the point of view of ascertaining the opinions of industrial, commercial 
and agricultural sectors on VAT administration and taxpayer compliance. Primarily, 
the field survey had the following objectives: (i) to measure taxpayer perception of an
equitable and fair tax structure; (ii) to assess the level of public compliance with VAT 
and determine, from the taxpayer's point of view, the problems that were likely to 
influence VAT's implementation; and (iii) to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of 
the existing organisations, functions, staff and procedures from the tax officials' point 
of view.
At the policy making level the questions were limited to the political, technical, 
and administrative feasibility of the VAT. In-depth interviews with field tax 
administrators focused primarily on their service conditions, prospects for promotion, 
training and other incentives. Their views were also solicited on the implementation of 
the VAT. Questioning of grassroots politicians, individually, as well as in focus 
groups, covered many aspects of area development they were representing. 
Discussion with this group focused mainly on the availability of public utilities, such as 
education, health, drinking water, electricity, roads, public transport, sewerage and so 
on. Their views were specifically sought on whether the community was willing to 
participate in the provision of public goods by paying user charges and taxes. 
Discussions with business concerns largely focussed on their business, tax payments, 
record keeping and acceptance of VAT. The sample of business entities included all 
types of businesses, from large industries to retail level business establishments. 
Finally, the views of the general public individually, and as focus group participants, 
were obtained through direct questions on their income and expenditure. Prior to the 
individual interviews, six focus group discussions of 8-10 people were used to 
ascertain responses to the questions. In total, 232 sample interviews were conducted, 
as detailed in table 6.4.
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Table 6.4 Distribution of the field survey respondents
Districts Tax head 
office
Field tax 
office
Area
councillors
Business
entities
Individuals Total
Islamabad (FCT)1 
Punjab Province
21 0 0 0 0 21
Rawalpindi 0 4 3 5 13 25
Faisalabad 
Sindh Province
0 2 2 6 10 20
Karachi 4 7 2 8 16 37
Sukkur
NW FP2 Province
0 4 7 6 11 28
Peshawar 0 5 6 11 22 44
Abbottabad 
Baluchistan Province
0 2 5 8 7 22
Quetta 1 3 3 6 8 21
Pashin 0 1 4 4 5 14
Total respondent 26 28 32 54 92 232
Note: 'Federal Capital territory.
NWFP = North West Frontier Province
Source: Field survey undertaken in Pakistan for the study during January-April 1994.
Data sources
The primary sources of data for the simulation of the fiscal model were the 
Government of Pakistan's federal and provincial budget documents, foreign exchange 
budgets, annual and medium-term economic development plans, Pakistan Economic 
Surveys, State Bank of Pakistan's Annual Reports and National Accounts of Pakistan, 
and the Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) 1990-91. Information on 
Pakistan's government finance and national accounts was also collected from the 
United Nations Yearbooks on National Accounts, the International Monetary Fund’s 
Government Finance Statistics Year Books and International Financial Statistics.
For forecasting budgetary revenues and expenditures, the Government of 
Pakistan's eighth five year plan (1993-98) projections of growth rates of exogenous 
variables, such as gross domestic product and gross national product, price 
assumptions, industrial production targets in large scale and small scale manufacturing, 
imports and exports, and other relevant information were used (Appendix 6.4).
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The data sources for assessing the burden of the VAT on different income 
groups were the 1990-91 HIES and the Eight Five Year Plan (1994-98). The bulk of 
the research data has been derived from personal interviews, where respondents were 
chosen at random. The information collected was analysed in order to assess the 
VAT's administrative feasibility and taxpayer compliance by measuring frequencies and 
establishing relationships between variables through cross tabulation.
Limitations of the data
Data collected from the HIES 1990-91 sample survey suffers from the following 
limitations:
i) Wide variations in consumption patterns from area to area, even from 
household to household;
ii) Under-estimation of household expenditure, mainly due to non- 
marketable consumption; and
iii) Under-estimation of expenditure in higher income households. HIES did 
not separately include large expenditures for durable goods such as cars, 
and other luxury items such as refrigerators and washing machines.
The Government of Pakistan's documents on national accounts do not provide 
sectoral and itemised information on private and public consumption, and details on 
household income. Data published on Pakistan by international agencies, such as the 
United Nations document on National Accounts, also fail to include the relevant 
information. In the absence of secondary information, a number of adjustments have 
been made on the basis of informed estimates and experience from other countries’. 
Use of the adjusted data, therefore, has its own limitations on the analytical outcome. 
Furthermore, interviews about taxation in a developing country like Pakistan, are not a 
forum where the respondents (especially individuals and business entities) reveal their 
feelings honestly. Despite cautious efforts, it is possible that the information provided 
by various groups may reflect personal biases on various issues.
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7Revenue Productivity of the Value Added Tax
This chapter presents the regression results from estimation of the equation with 
model and the results of simulation exercises with the model of the Pakistan 
Government’s revenue and expenditure, to analyse the government’s financial situation 
under differing circumstances. The revenue block of the model (Appendix 6.2) 
contains 12 individual equations explaining direct and indirect taxes and non-tax 
revenue; the expenditure block contains ten equations representing non-development 
(current) and development expenditure. The growth of government revenue and 
expenditure is sensitive to domestic political pressures and international events. For 
this reason two dummy variables are used to capture the influence of domestic political 
developments and the impact of worldwide recession during 1985-87 and 1988-93 on 
major items of government revenue and expenditure.
The results of empirical tests indicate that the majority of the equations fit well 
and most of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant and plausible. The 
actual and predicted series of government revenue and government expenditure are 
reasonably close as indicated by correlation. The estimated parameters have the right 
sign, and their computed values are consistent with a priori expectations. All 22 
estimated slopes coefficients are statistically significant - 21 at the one-per cent level. 
In some cases, the dummy coefficients are statistically insignificant which indicates 
that the events proxied had little or no effect on various taxes and expenditure. The 
forecasting performance of the model is satisfactory. In most cases the predicted
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error represents a relatively small fraction of the actual changes in the variables. 
Figures 1 to 8 in the subsequent sections show the trend of the actual and the 
predicted series for major taxes and expenditure.
Estimation results 
Government revenue equations
The majority of the parameters estimated in the tax and non-tax revenue 
equations are statistically highly significant. Results of equation (1) in Table 7.1 below 
show that taxes on income and corporate profits are significantly related to non- 
agricultural incomes, which is defined as total income less agricultural income. The 
positive statistical relationship, i.e., t-statistics above 3, adjusted R2 at 0.97 and F- 
statistics, signify that the coefficient of the non-agricultural income variable is highly 
significant. The model predicts the actual series from 1975-76 to 1992-93 with a high 
degree of accuracy, despite several discretionary changes in the tax rates and high 
rates of inflation during the estimation period (Figure 7.1). The negative sign of the 
dummy coefficients suggests that income tax growth has been negatively affected by 
domestic and external events.
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Figure 7.1 Growth pattern of actual and predicted income tax revenue from 
1975-76 to 1992-93 (billion Pakistan rupees)
Actual - - Ar - - Predicted
o' 20 --
5  15 - -
1975-76 1977-78 1979-80 1981-82 1983-84 1985-86 1987-88 1989-90 1991-92
Sources: Government of Pakistan, 1980. Pakistan Economic Survey 1979-80, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Appendix 2.1 and 2.3 and simulation model’s predicted values.
Regression results of equations (3) and (4) relating to custom duties show that 
the estimated equations are extremely useful because of their high explanatory power. 
The statistically significant magnitude of equation (3) relating to imports duties 
indicates a strong relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
Figure 7.2 shows that actual import duties are closely convergent to the predicted 
values, except in the years 1986-87 and 1992-93. The statistical relationship of 
equation (4) on export duties is also highly significant. However, as discussed earlier 
(chapter 2), export duties are not used by the government to generate revenue and, 
therefore, their share in total revenue is negligible.
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Figure 7.2 Growth pattern of actual and predicted import duties revenue 
from 1975-76 to 1992-93 (billion Pakistan rupees)
Actual - A  - - Predicted
1975-76 1977-78 1979-80 1981-82 1983-84 1985-86 1987-88 1989-90 1991-92
Years
Sources: Government of Pakistan, 1980. Pakistan Economic Survey 1979-80, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Appendix 2.1 and 2.3 and simulation model’s predicted values.
The estimated parameters of equations (5) and (6) relating to taxes on domestic 
production are found to be positively related to the value added in the large scale 
manufacturing sector. Equation (5) on excise duties shows that the size of the 
associated coefficients is reasonable. The overall ‘fit’ of the equations is good (Figure 
7.3). However, the impact of the dummy variable in the case of excise duties is 
insignificant.
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Figure 7.3 Growth pattern of actual and predicted excise duties revenue 
from 1975-76 to 1992-93 (billion Pakistan rupees)
'  - A• - PredictedActual
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1977-78 1979-80 1985-861975-76 1981-82 1983-84 1987-88 1989-90 1991-92
Years
Sources: Government of Pakistan, 1980. Pakistan Economic Survey 1979-80, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Appendix 2.1 and 2.3 and simulation model’s predicted values.
Equation (6) relating to sales tax on domestic production with an elasticity of 
1.55 and adjusted R2 = 0.81 indicates the impact of the sales tax burden on the 
manufacturing sector. In 1993-94, approximately 61 per cent of the total domestic 
sales tax collected came from only 16 commodities of the nearly 550 commodities 
subject to domestic sales tax; further, four commodities, viz., cement (16.9 per cent); 
cigarettes (11.6 per cent); iron and steel products (7 per cent) and lubricating oils and 
oils additives (5.7 per cent) have contributed approximately 41 per cent of the total 
domestic sales tax. The majority of these commodities such as cement and tobacco 
were also heavily liable to excise duties (Revenue Division, 1993). The impact of 
government policy to broaden the sales tax coverage on domestic production and 
imports since 1986-87 is associated with measures taken by the government to 
broaden its coverage on imports and local production, including increase in the
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Standard rate from 10 per cent to 12.5 per cent; from 12.5 per cent to 15 per cent and 
15 per cent to 20 per cent (Revenue Division, 1993:105). As a result of these 
measures the share of sales tax collection in total tax revenue fluctuated between 7.7 
per cent to 13.1 per cent during 1986-87 and 1992-93 (Appendix 2.2 and 2.3). The 
impact of these measures is apparent from the behaviour of actual and predicted sales 
tax revenue series (Figure 7.4 and 7.5).
Figure 7.4 Growth pattern of actual and predicted domestic sales tax 
revenue from 1975-76 to 1992-93 (billion Pakistan rupees)
—0— Predicted* —Actual
1975-76 1977-78 1985-86 1987-881979-80 1981-82 1983-84 1989-90 1991-92
Years
Sources: Government of Pakistan, 1980. Pakistan Economic Survey 1979-80, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser's Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Appendix 2.1 and 2.3 and simulation model’s predicted values.
Equation (7) relating to the sales tax on imports shows that sales tax on imports 
is positively related to its base, that is, total imports. The parameters associated with 
the equation show high explanatory power (Figure 7.5).
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Figure 7.5 Growth pattern of actual and predicted revenue from sales tax 
on imports from 1975-76 to 1992-93 (billion Pakistan rupees)
—Actual A—Predicted
1977-78 1979-801975-76 1981-82 1983-84
Years
1985-86 1987-88 1989-90 1991-92
Sources: Government of Pakistan, 1980. Pakistan Economic Survey 1979-80, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Appendix 2.1 and 2.3 and simulation model’s predicted values.
Equations (10) and (11) relating to motor vehicle taxes and stamp duties, two 
taxes levied by the provincial governments, show that these taxes are positively related 
to the gross national product (GNP) and are highly significant statistically at the one 
per cent significance level. The relative stability of the estimated parameters of 
equation (12) relating to non-tax revenue, including the contribution of autonomous 
bodies, indicates a statistically significant relationship between GNP and the growth of 
non-tax revenue.
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Table 7.1 Results o f regression equations on Pakistan government revenue
No. of equation R 2 D.W F1
Revenue block
(1) Income and corporation taxes
(2)
LnTy = -4.32 +1 .13LnYnang -0.25Di -0.16D2 
(-15.817)* (22.800)* (-3.172)* (-1.874)
Other direct taxes
0.97 1.83 188.630
(3)
Ln Totdir = -4.68 + 0.77LnYnag 
(-8.881)* (8.462)* 
Import duties
0.80 1.90 71.176
(4)
Ln Tm = - 1.50 + 1.04LnMt + 0.21D2 
(-9.445)* (28.725)* (2.995)* 
Export duties
0.97 1.60 295.558
(5)
Ln Tx = - 4.03 + 1.05LnXi 
(-4.296)* (4.134)* 
Excise duties
0.52 1.85 17.089
(6)
Ln Texc = -0.45 + 0.81LnYmani - 0.07Dj 
(-2.097)** (14.226)* (-1.080) 
Sales tax on domestic production
0.85 1.85 46.231
(7)
Ln Sdom = -5.55 + 1.55LnYmani + 0.39Di 
(-7.502)* (8.031)* (1.941)**
Sales tax on imports
0.81 1.50 36.736
(8)
Ln Stm = -2.88 + 0.93LnMt + 0.20Di + 09D2 
(-22.509)* (28.911)* (3.711) * (1.554) 
Development surcharges
0.99 2.29 801.596
(9)
Ln Surrey = -3.47 + 1.25LnYmani 
(-6.334)* (8.827)* 
Motor vehicle tax
0.80 2.08 67.599
(10)
Ln Tmv = -5.70 + 0.84LnYg
(-20.472)* (18.510)* 
Stamp duties
0.95 2.00 336.323
(11)
Ln Dgpnp = -5.25 + 0.87LnYg 
(-10.721)* (10.942)* 
Other indirect taxes
0.87 2.07 116.846
(12)
Ln Totind = -4.3 + 0.65LnYg 
(-2.136)** (1.979)** 
Non-tax revenue2
0.15 1.65 3.885
LnN tr = -4.10+ 1.13LnYg +0.16Di 
(-11.692)* (18.917)* (1.767)
0.97 1.85 296.887
Notes: -t-statistics are in parentheses. The significance is determined as follows:
*the coefficient is significant at 1% level. **the coefficient is significant at 5% level. 
'F-statistic (zero slopes).
includes contribution by public sector autonomous bodies under the budget.
Source: Author’s computation.
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Government expenditure equations
The empirical results verify the ability of the simulation model to ‘track’ 
accurately the (actual) historical behaviour of government expenditure during the 
sample period. The regression equations (1) to (9) of Table 7.2 below present strong 
evidence on the growth pattern of current expenditure. In the majority of cases, the 
parameters in the estimated equations are significant at the one per cent level. The 
defence expenditure elasticity of 1.05 and domestic interest payments elasticity of 
1.30, the two major components of the government’s current expenditure, show the 
major sources of the continuous growth of current expenditure. Equation (1) of Table 
7.2 indicates a positive relationship between administrative expenditure and GNP. 
Growth in the Pakistan Government’s administrative expenditure is influenced both by 
the growth of the economy and the domestic political context (Figure 7.6).
Figure 7.6 Growth pattern of actual and predicted expenditure on 
government administration from 1975-76 to 1992-93 (billion 
Pakistan rupees)
* - A  * - PredictedActual
1977-78 1979-80 1981-82 1983-84 1985-86 1987-88 1989-90
Years
1991-921975-76
Sources: As per Figure 7.1.
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The results of equation (2) indicate that defence expenditure is fully related to 
the growth of gross domestic product (GDP). The negative sign of the dummy 
variable, however, indicates that internal socio-political developments have not 
contributed to the increase in defence expenditure. Figure 7.7 shows a marginal 
deviation in the predicted and actual series of defence expenditure growth.
Figure 7.7 Growth pattern of actual and predicted expenditure on defence 
from 1975-76 to 1992-93 (billion Pakistan rupees)
Actual - - A  - - Predicted
1975-76 1977-78 1979-80 1981-82 1983-84 1985-86 1987-88 1989-90 1991-92
Years
Sources: Government of Pakistan, 1980. Pakistan Economic Survey 1979-80, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Appendix 2.1 and 2.3 and simulation model’s predicted values.
The results of equations (4) and (5) on debt servicing liability on domestic and 
external debt indicate that the accumulation of debt is one of the main causes of 
pressure on the government budget through increased interest payments. The overall 
fit o f the equations is good. The actual and predicted values move closely during the 
analysis period (see Figure 7.8 for domestic interest expenditure).
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Figure 7 8 Growth pattern of actual and predicted expenditure on domestic 
interest payments from 1975-76 to 1992-93 (billion Pakistan 
rupees)
Actual * - A  - - Predicted
*  30 -
1975-76 1977-78 1979-80 1981-82 1983-84 1985-86 1987-88 1989-90 1991-92
Years
Sources: Government of Pakistan, 1980. Pakistan Economic Survey 1979-80, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Appendix 2.1 and 2.3 and simulation model’s predicted values.
Equations (6), (7) and (8) relating to social, economic and community services 
indicate their positive relationship with the growth of GDP. Equation (10) on capital 
expenditure, with an elasticity of 0.66, shows that development expenditure growth is 
not commensurate with the growth of GDP. The insignificant impact of the dummy 
variable shows that domestic political events and deterioration in the internal law and 
order situation have an insignificant influence on the growth of development 
expenditure.
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Table 7.2 Results of regression equations on Pakistan government 
expenditure
No. of Equation R2 D.W F1
Expenditure block
(1) Expenditure on law and order
(2)
Ln Gio = -4.92+ 1.16LnYg + 0.13Dj + 0.14D2 
(-22.245)* (29.962)* (2.111)** (2.071)** 
Expenditure on defence
0.99 2.10 853.873
(3)
Ln Defexp = -3.08 + 1.05LYd - 0.03Di 
(-10.205)* (21.231)* (-0.816) 
Expenditure on subsidies
0.94 1.80 119.708
(4)
Ln Sub = -2.90 + 0.70LnYd+ 0.38Di 
(-3.482)* (4.989)* (1.816) 
Interest on domestic debt
0,75 1.80 26.293
(5)
Ln Intdom = -4.25 + 1.30Lndomdcbt 
(-25.643)* (39.490)* 
Interest on external debt
0.99 1.93 1395.040
(6)
Ln Intext = -3.31 + 0.99LnEtdebt 
(-11.259)* (18.299)* 
Expenditure on social services
0.95 1.55 210.187
(7)
Ln Sersoc = -5.11 + 1.21LnYd 
(-19.760)* (28.628)* 
Expenditure on economic services
0.97 2.00 647.990
(8)
Ln Sereco = -3.49 + 0.76LnYd 
(-5.153)* (6.813)* 
Expenditure on community services
0.72 1.83 44.510
(9)
Ln Sercom = -6.06 + 1.14LnYd 
(-10.452)* (12.002)* 
Other current expenditure
0.85 1.47 95.198
(10)
Ln Curoexp = -6.14 + 1.15LnYg - 0.5 ID \ 
(-4.173)* (4.568)* (-1.308) 
Capital expenditure
0.60 2.07 13.590
Ln Capexp = -0.51 + 0.66LnYd + 0.06Dj 
(-3.036)* (22.181)* (1.445)
0.99 1.83 929.187
Notes: -t-statistics are in parentheses. The significance:
*the coefficient is significant at 1% level.
**the coefficient is significant at 5% level.
'F-statistic (zero slopes).
Source: Author’ computation.
Forecasting government revenue and expenditure
Using the results of regression analysis, Pakistan Government revenue and 
expenditure are projected for the years 1993-94 to 1997-98 under the status quo 
scenario. Projected government revenue estimates under the assumption of a
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continuation of past fiscal policies show a gradual decline from 18.2 per cent of GDP 
in 1992-93 to 18 per cent of GDP in 1997-98 (Table 7.3). A marginal increase, 
however, is expected in tax revenue because of the increase in direct taxes. Direct 
taxes are expected to increase from 2.8 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 3.1 per cent in 
1997-98. Indirect taxes are expected to decline marginally from 10.6 per cent of GDP 
in 1992-93 to 10.5 per cent in 1997-98. Most of the decline in indirect taxes is in 
import duties, which are expected to decline from 4.7 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 4 
per cent in 1997-98 -  apparently because of the reduced total imports estimates of the 
eighth five-year plan (1993-98). Excise duties and sales tax revenue, as a proportion 
of GDP are expected to remain at the 1992-93 level. The growth of non-tax revenue 
is found to be consistent with the government policy of exclusion of various public 
sector autonomous bodies from the budgetary mechanism. The non-tax revenues are 
expected to reduce to 4.5 per cent of GDP in 1997-98 from 4.8 per cent in 1992-93 
(Appendix 7.1).
Projections of Pakistan Government expenditure indicate that current 
expenditure will continue to increase -  from 19.8 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 22.1 
per cent in 1997-98. The main beneficiaries of this increase will be defence and debt 
servicing payments. These two expenditures are expected to claim about two-thirds of 
current expenditure. Defence expenditure is expected to increase from 6.5 per cent of 
GDP in 1992-93 to 6.9 per cent, whereas debt servicing payments on external and 
domestic outstanding debts are likely to increase from 5.6 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 
to 7.0 per cent. No significant change in current expenditure allocations for social, 
economic and community services is projected. As a proportion of GDP, these 
expenditures are expected to remain at approximately the 1992-93 level. However, a
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moderate increase in government administrative expenditure and expenditure on 
maintenance of law and order, from 2.3 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 2.5 per cent, is 
expected (Appendix 7.1).
Projections of growth in development expenditure indicate that the continuation 
of government policy of maintaining fiscal deficits mainly through a significant 
decrease in public sector development expenditure is likely to result in a substantial 
decline in development allocations from 6.4 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 4 per cent 
of GDP in 1997-98 (Appendix 7.1). Such a reduction, with all its accompanying 
social and political ramifications, will seriously undermine “nation building” activities. 
This situation is clearly not desirable for a developing country such as Pakistan in 
which millions of people live below the poverty line (UNDP, 199 lb :87). It is probably 
reasonable to assume that in the long term the government would wish to increase 
development expenditure in line with the growth of nominal income. Capital 
expenditure, therefore, has been assumed to remain at the 1992-93 level, that is, 6.4 
per cent of GDP, for the period 1993-98.
Thus, under the status quo scenario, the fiscal gap is expected to widen from 8 
per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 10.4 per cent of GDP in 1997-98 (Table 7.3). Both 
the primary deficit and the deficit accruing as a result of interest payments liability will 
increase substantially. The primary deficit is expected to increase from 2.4 per cent of 
GDP in 1992-93 to 3.4 per cent, whereas the deficit related to interest payments is 
expected to increase from 5.6 per cent of GDP to 7.0 per cent. Public sector 
borrowing requirements (PSBR) for financing these deficits, assuming constraints on 
the availability of domestic bank and external borrowings (chapter 6), will be met from
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domestic non-bank sources. Non-bank borrowings, therefore, are expected to 
increase from 1.5 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 6.6 per cent of GDP in 1997-98.
Table 7.3 Projected government revenue, expenditure and deficits under
the status quo scenario (as percentage of GDP)
Actual Projected
1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Government expenditure 26.2 26.6 27.0 27.5 28.0 28.5
Current expenditure 19.8 20.2 20.6 21.1 21.6 22.1
Development expenditure 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4
Government revenue 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.1 18.0 18.1
Tax revenue 13.4 14.0 13.9 13.8 13.6 13.6
Non-tax revenue 4.8 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5
Fiscal deficit 8.0 8.4 8.8 9.3 9.9 10.4
Primary deficit 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.4
Interest payments 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.3 6.6 7.0
Financing
Domestic borrowing 6.2 6.6 7.0 7.5 8.1 8.6
Non-bank borrowing 1.5 4.6 5.0 5.5 6.1 6.6
Bank borrowing 4.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
External borrowing 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Memorandum items:
GDP (current billion rupees) 1342.0 1555.0 1776.0 2030.0 2320.0 2651.0
Source: Appendix 7.1.
The above projections suggest that in the absence of major adjustments in its 
taxation and expenditure policies, the Pakistan Government is expected to face a 
serious fiscal crisis in the very near future. Budget deficits will be simply 
unsustainable. Policy measures involving a very substantial program of resource 
mobilisation and restraint on non-development expenditure, therefore, will be required 
to avoid fiscal crisis and its adverse impact on the economy. Analysis of possible 
policy initiatives in Chapter 3 suggests that most of the measures can be expected to 
have a positive effect on the government’s financial position, but will not reduce the 
fiscal gap to approximately five per cent of GDP (a ceiling considered as prudent by 
both the Pakistan Government and international financial development agencies). The 
government needs additional revenue of at least 4-5 per cent of GDP. Apparently, 
revenue of this magnitude cannot be generated solely from deficit reduction strategies
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discussed in Chapter 3. The VAT has been tested in a number of countries (Chapter 
5) as an independent revenue source. Implementation of a broad-based VAT in 
Pakistan at 15 per cent (current sales tax rate) could generate resources equal to 4-5 
per cent of GDP. The VAT, therefore, may be a useful option worth considering by 
the Government of Pakistan to overcome its financial crisis. The analysis in the 
following sections assesses the VAT’s revenue potential and its impact on government 
finances.
Assessment of VAT revenue
As discussed in Chapter 6, VAT revenue is evaluated on the basis of household 
consumption expenditure under three scenarios: broad-coverage of the VAT; narrow- 
coverage of the VAT; and a multiple VAT rate system. The advantage of assessing 
VAT revenue on the basis of household consumption expenditure is that the value of 
goods and services purchased by consumers automatically incorporates the destination 
principle of the VAT, since it excludes exports while including imports. Another 
advantage of using this base in Pakistan is that it automatically exempts public sector 
consumption, financial services (such as banking and insurance services) and exports. 
This base also allows for an analysis of the effects of the VAT on different classes of 
consumers.
Furthermore, because of the complex nature of the exemption system under the 
VAT arising from policy considerations along with administrative and technical 
complexities, estimation of VAT revenue under the three scenarios does not take into 
account exemptions of various commodities of household consumption items, such as 
health and education services, long-term residential rents, and urban transit: instead, all
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these items are zero-rated. Although this approach under-estimates revenue from 
VAT because its effect on intermediate inputs has not been taken into consideration, 
this approach avoids many complexities associated with the exemption system, 
especially in developing countries such as Pakistan. The analysis in the ensuing 
sections, therefore, is based on the combination of the VAT system of zero-VAT rates 
and a standard rate of 15 per cent for various consumption items (scenario 2) and 
zero-rates, a low rate of two per cent for necessities, a 15 per cent standard rate and a 
high VAT rate of 30 per cent (scenario 3). Appendix 7.2 presents the size of the VAT 
rate structure under the three scenarios.
Scenario 1 -  broad-coverage of the VAT
Under this scenario a uniform VAT rate of 15 per cent (current sales tax rate on 
domestic production and imports) is applied to all the household consumption 
expenditure items (Appendix 7.3). Projections under this scenario indicate that the 
VAT will generate substantial revenue. VAT revenue is expected to increase from 
rupees 122 billion in 1993-94 (from a small sales tax collection of rupees 23.7 billion 
or 1.8 per cent of GDP in 1992-93) to rupees 198.6 billion in 1997-98. In terms of 
GDP, VAT revenue would average 7.7 per cent of GDP per annum during 1993-98. 
Under this scenario, substitution of VAT revenue with sales tax could be expected to 
reduce the fiscal deficit from eight per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to approximately 1.6 
per cent of GDP in 1997-98 (Table 7.4). On primary accounts (revenue minus 
expenditure less interest payments), the government will have a surplus equal to 
approximately three per cent of GDP. Budgetary deficits will accrue because of debt 
servicing liability which, because of the low public sector borrowing requirements, will
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also reduce substantially from 5.6 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 3.5 per cent of GDP
in 1997-98.
Under this scenario, with global coverage and a single rate and with no 
exemptions, the VAT would be an ideal revenue source for the Government, especially 
keeping in view the government’s weak financial position. However, no country has 
this kind of VAT system. Socio-political and administrative considerations force 
modifications, and this is likely to be true in Pakistan. In the majority of countries, the 
VAT has multiple rates rather than a single rate, and a substantial part of the tax base 
is either zero-rated or exempt from the tax (Chapter 5). Nevertheless, Table 7.4 
below presents the projected results of adopting the VAT at the 15 per cent rate.
Table 7.4 Government revenue and expenditure under Scenario 1 (as
percentage of GDP)
Actual Projected
1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Government expenditure 26.2 25.8 25.5 25.3 25.1 24.9
Government revenue 18.2 24.0 23.9 23.8 23.5 23.3
Tax revenue 13.4 19.8 19.7 19.4 19.1 18.8
Value-added tax1 1.8 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.5
Fiscal deficit 8.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6
Primary deficit 2.4 -3.3 -3.0 -2.7 -2.3 -1.9
Interest payments 5.6 5.0 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.5
Financing:
Domestic borrowing 6.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5
External borrowing 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1
Memorandum item:
GDP (current billion rupees) 1342.0 1555.0 1776.0 2030.0 2320.0 2651.0
Note: 11992-93 sales tax on domestic production and imports.
Source: Appendix 7.4.
Scenario 2 -  narrow-coverage of the VAT
VAT revenue under scenario 2 is calculated on the basis of zero-rates for 
various household consumption items, such as cereals, pulses, fruits and vegetables,
clothing, second-hand goods, kerosene oil, housing and rent, medical and educational
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services and public transport (Appendix 7.2). A standard VAT rate of 15 per cent for 
the remaining household consumption items is applied (Appendix 7.5).
Under this scenario Pakistan Government is expected to collect revenue equal to 
4.6 per cent of GDP (1993-98 average). The fiscal deficit is expected to reduce 
substantially from eight per cent in 1992-93 to an annual average of 5.9 per cent of 
GDP during 1993-98. Of this, the primary deficit is expected to be approximately one 
per cent of GDP. Most of the deficit will accrue because of the interest payments 
liability, which is also expected to reduce from 5.6 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 5.3 
per cent of GDP in 1997-98. Table 7.5 below gives details.
Table 7 5 Government revenue and expenditure under Scenario 2 (as
percentage of GDP)
Actual Projected
1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Government expenditure 26.2 26.2 26.3 26.4 26.6 26.8
Government revenue 18.2 20.9 20.8 20.7 20.5 20.3
Tax revenue 13.4 16.7 16.5 16.3 16.1 15.8
Value-added tax1 1.8 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.5
Fiscal deficit 8.0 5.3 5.5 5.7 6.1 6.5
Primary deficit 2.4 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.2
Interest payments 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3
Financing:
Domestic borrowing 6.2 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.3 4.7
External borrowing 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Memorandum item:
GDP (current billion rupees) 1342.0 1555.0 1776.0 2030.0 2320.0 2651.0
Note: 11992-93 sales tax on domestic production and imports.
Source: Appendix 7.6.
Scenario 3 -  multiple VAT rate system
Scenario 3 is based on the assumption that a uniform standard rate of 15 per 
cent on most consumption items will create social and political tension among various 
income classes, because of a uniform burden on low and high income groups. To 
avoid political resentment, the majority of countries with VAT have adopted a multiple
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VAT rate system (Appendix 4.1). Scenario 3, therefore, is based on the assumption of 
zero-rating for various goods such as fruits and vegetables, fire-wood, kerosene oil 
and dung-cakes, housing and rent, medical and educational services and public 
transport; a low VAT rate of two per cent on many goods presumably consumed in 
large quantity by low-income households including, cereals, pulses, milk and milk 
products edible oils, sugar and sugar preparations, and clothing; and a high VAT rate 
of 30 per cent for items such as soft-drinks, kitchen equipment, china ware, 
televisions, VCRs, refrigerators, personal transport and jewellery which are assumed 
to be consumed mostly by the high income groups (Appendix 7.2 and Appendix 7.7).
Under this scenario the VAT is expected to generate revenue equal to 4.7 per 
cent of GDP (1993-98 average). The implementation of VAT under this scenario will 
result in a reduction of the fiscal deficit from eight per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 5.8 
per cent of GDP during 1993-98. The primary deficit under this scenario is expected 
to be approximately one per cent of GDP. Budgetary deficits will occur primarily 
because of debt servicing liability which is expected to decrease from 5.6 per cent of 
GDP in 1992-93 to 5.3 per cent of GDP in 1997-98 (Table 7.6).
Table 7.6 Government revenue and expenditure under Scenario 3 (as
percentage of GDP)
Actual Projected
1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Government expenditure 26.2 26.2 26.3 26.4 26.5 26.7
Government revenue 18.2 21.0 20.9 20.8 20.5 20.3
Tax revenue 13.4 16.8 16.6 16.4 16.2 15.9
Value-added tax' 1.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.5
Fiscal deficit 8.0 5.2 5.4 5.6 6.0 6.4
Primary7 deficit 2.4 -0.2 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.1
Interest payments 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
Financing:
Domestic borrowing 6.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.2 4.6
External borrowing 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Memorandum item:
GDP (current billion rupees) 1342.0 1555.0 1776.0 2030.0 2320.0 2651.0
Note: '1992-93 sales tax on domestic production and imports.
Source: Appendix 7.8.
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Conclusions
Previous research on the VAT’s revenue impact on a government’s financial 
position is limited (Smith et al. 1973; Crum, 1991). The results of the forecasting 
analyses carried out here suggest that enactment of VAT could result in substantial 
improvement in the Pakistan Government’s budgetary position. Nevertheless, its 
impact varies according to the VAT rate structure, zero-rating and exemptions of 
goods and services.
The empirical analysis suggests that with the continuation of existing fiscal 
polices, the Pakistan Government will soon face a serious fiscal crisis which will have 
significant socio-political and economic ramifications. The growing fiscal deficit will 
not be sustainable in the long-term and the government needs to urgently address the 
issue. VAT revenue productivity under the three scenarios indicates that the tax will 
generate substantial revenue to the government, and in a period of five years, the 
government will be able to substantially reduce its primary fiscal deficits. A reduction 
in public sector borrowing requirements will also result in a gradual reduction in fiscal 
deficits related to the debt servicing liability. Furthermore, reduced public sector 
borrowing requirements will decrease consumption of private savings by the public 
sector which may have a positive impact on investment and the growth potential of the 
economy. The analysis also suggests that the implementation of the VAT will permit 
the government to maintain development expenditure at a moderate level. All these 
improvements are expected to have a healthy impact on the socio-political and 
economic development of Pakistan.
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8Distributional Implications of the Value-Added Tax
A tax structure cannot be designed exclusively on the basis of efficiency. 
Aspects of equity must be considered as well, especially with a tax such as the VAT 
which is perceived as regressive in its characteristics (Brashares et al. 1988:156; Shah 
and Whalley, 1991:171). In almost all the countries with VAT, measures have been 
taken to reduce its regressivity, essentially using different methods of zero-rating, 
exemptions and low rates (Hemming and Kay 1981:82; Pedone, 1981:217; Aaron, 
1981:17). The VAT incidence (burden) determines whether the tax is equitable 
(progressive) or inequitable (regressive), which depends primarily upon the form and 
the nature of its enactment. For example, incidence of a VAT substituting for one or 
more other taxes will be different from a VAT implemented as a new tax.
Two standard principles are extensively discussed in the tax incidence literature 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984:228): the benefit principle, that is, taxpayers pay taxes 
according to the perceived benefits they receive from the consumption of public goods 
and services; and the ability-to-pay principle, that is, people pay taxes according to 
their ability. The benefit principle relates tax burden directly to the expenditure side of 
the budget (Lambert, 1993:140). This principle, despite its theoretical attraction, has 
received little support in research work. The problem is that the beneficiaries of public 
goods and services cannot be induced to reveal their true willingness to pay for the 
consumption of public goods and services and, therefore, the principle is not 
comprehensive enough in its application to serve as a general benchmark of equity in
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the distribution of tax burden (Herber, 1983:125; Musgrave and Musgrave, 
1984:228). The majority of studies have investigated tax burden in relation to income 
(the ability-to-pay).
Studies on VAT incidence have used personal income or consumption as 
variables for estimating the burden of VAT imposed as an individual tax or as a 
companion to other taxes. Kaldor (1955) and Davies (1959) have been the leading 
advocates for using consumption as a tax base. One reason for advocating 
consumption is that the cost to society and the benefit to the individual is what the 
latter withdraws from the pool of resources - namely, consumption. A different 
justification for using consumption as a base derives from Fisherian and Friedmanian 
views of income. According to them, actual income is liable to change over the life 
cycle of the earner and is subject to short-term fluctuations. If consumption is a 
function of permanent or life-time income, it will be relatively free of transitory or 
cyclical changes in income. According to this line of argument, on a lifetime or 
permanent income basis, a VAT would be less regressive, and perhaps even 
proportional, because consumption tends to be a uniform proportion of lifetime or 
permanent income at all income levels. However, because of perceived difficulties of 
assessing lifetime income and expenditure the current year’s income or expenditure is 
usually regarded as the most practical basis for the comparison of VAT burden at 
various income levels (United States Department of the Treasury, 1984:90).
Studies on VAT incidence differ considerably in their conceptual framework, 
methods used and data sources employed (McLure, 1990:32). As a result, 
comparison of these studies is difficult. The majority of studies on the incidence of 
consumption-type VAT has focussed on a particular tax structure already in place
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(Schaefer, 1969; Ghazanfar, 1978; Phares, 1973,1980). These studies have found that 
proportional consumption-type VAT falls more heavily on lower income groups. The 
study by Pechman and Okner (1974) found that a comprehensive VAT is regressive. 
Under a comprehensive system, lower income groups would bear a higher proportion 
of burden than middle and upper-income taxpayers. Brashares et al. (1988:172) found 
that the implementation of VAT would make the tax structure less progressive. A 
United States Department of the Treasury study found that a consumption type VAT, 
imposed at a uniform rate, would be regressive and place a significant tax burden on 
low income groups (1984:89). Tait (1972:85) argues that the substitution of a 15 per 
cent VAT for existing sales taxes without any adjustment would be regressive. 
Studies by Heller (1981) on Korea, Mwega (1985) on Kenya and Bovenberg (1987) 
on Thailand found that consumption-type VATs were regressive. However, the Serra- 
Puche (1979) study found that VAT in its original form is regressive, but 
regressiveness of the tax could be reduced, to a certain extent, with exemptions for 
goods that were weighted heavily in the consumption basket of the poor, plus the use 
of a higher tax rate on luxury goods. Manasan’s (1990) study on Philippines found 
that VAT coupled with excise taxes on a very limited list of luxury items (automobiles, 
jewelry, perfumes and yacht) is a slightly less regressive tax.
Some studies have argued that the VAT will not necessarily be regressive in its 
incidence. Shoup (1969b:300-302), for example, argued that a VAT is likely, but not 
with certainty, to be regressive. Dresch et al. (1977:112) who estimated the 
distributional effects of a VAT in replacing the corporate income tax, found that VAT 
substitution would have a marginal effect on income distribution. However Dresch et 
al. model, under the VAT regime, observed redistribution of income from low- to high
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income households (Dresch, 1977:171). The National Economic Development Office 
(NEDO) of the United Kingdom 1971 Report found that an adjustment in the VAT 
rates through zero-rating and exemptions of “necessities” would make the tax 
substitution less regressive. A Brookings Institutions study on the experience of six 
Economic Union countries found that it is possible to convert a VAT from a 
regressive tax to a progressive tax (Aaron, 1981:8). Further, a Garcia-Alba (1982) 
study on Mexico found that the VAT burden was smaller on goods that were weighted 
heavily in the consumption basket of poor compared to other cascading effect taxes. 
The substitution of VAT for turnover taxes improved income distribution (1982:201).
The majority of these studies have assessed the VAT burden on income classes 
in proportion to their consumption of taxed commodities (Shoven and Whalley, 
1984:1015). This process simplified the final settlement of the tax burden. In these 
studies, a constant value of marginal utility of income has been assumed throughout 
the allocation process, and is compared with the pre-change level of tax burden for the 
purpose of evaluating policy alternatives. In addition to this, the average concept has 
been generally assumed; that is, each member of a specific income class has the same 
utility (or demand) function.
The aim of this chapter is to examine the distributional implications of a 
consumption-based VAT which is substituting for a sales tax in Pakistan. The impact 
on household income and consumption expenditure is analysed under three scenarios. 
It has been argued that a VAT applied to all consumption goods at a uniform rate 
would be proportional with respect to consumption, but it would be regressive with 
respect to income. This is the result of a decreasing incidence of expenditure on food 
consumption and increasing incidence on non-food consumption as income increases
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(Aaron, 1981:17). The chapter, therefore, estimates the impact of VAT both for an 
income base and a consumption base. It also investigates the extent to which the 
regressivity of VAT can be reduced to improve its perceived political acceptability, 
while maintaining a prudent level of VAT revenues. Despite its perceived limitations, 
the analysis assesses the VAT burden on the basis of current income and household 
consumption expenditure net of sales tax burden, and no effort is made to assess the 
VAT burden on the basis of lifetime income and expenditure. The VAT impact on 
income inequality is assessed separately at national, rural and urban levels. The rural 
and urban distinction is made because of perceived differences in income and 
consumption patterns at the two levels.
The VAT burden on the different income groups is estimated pre-VAT and 
post-VAT. The before-and-afiter comparison makes it possible to evaluate whether 
there would be a significant change in tax burden with the introduction of VAT. Since 
the VAT would likely replace the existing sales tax, an adjustment in VAT revenue 
estimates has been made to net out the sales tax impact on the different income 
groups.
A number of caveats should be stated with regard to the VAT incidence analysis 
in the subsequent sections. First, no effort has been made to incorporate the whole 
taxation system, nor to incorporate the impact of government expenditure in the 
analysis - although a VAT implemented for revenue purposes helps governments, 
especially in developing countries, to reduce fiscal deficits and improve public 
allocations for social and infrastructure sectors. Under both situations, households are 
the net beneficiaries. For example, reduced public sector borrowing requirements 
would reduce the level of deficit financing and thereby the rate of inflation in the
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economy, while increased allocations for social sectors would improve public 
transfers. Second, the consumption pattern in 1993-94 has been assumed as fixed on 
the basis of the 1990-91 Household Integrated Survey. Finally, the assumption of 
constant utility has many flaws. Differences between rural and urban groups or among 
income classes, in socio-economic factors such as family structure, income sources, 
size of income, demand patterns, education, factor mobility and political, cultural and
A
religious influences, inevitably exert an influence on the level of incomes and their 
dispersion.
Analysis of the distributional implications of the VAT
The simplest and most efficient broad-based VAT imposed at a uniform rate 
would place a significantly high tax burden on low income households as compared 
with middle and higher income households (United States Department of the Treasury, 
1984.89). Adoption of tax in such a form would be resented by the majority of voters 
which makes its political acceptability difficult. It is generally believed that the 
regressivity of the VAT can be reduced by using a combination of zero-rating, 
exemptions and low rates for products which rank high in the budgets of the lower 
income households (Nazier, 1989:149). International experience suggests that the 
majority of countries on VAT have commonly used two methods to reduce 
regressivity: (i) exempting items of consumption expenditure which have income 
elasticities o f demand below 1.0, such as food, drugs and medicines, shelter, and 
clothing normally considered to be necessities; and (ii) using lower-than-standard tax 
rates for goods and services deemed to be necessities combined with higher rates on 
luxuries (goods with income elasticities of demand above 1.0) (Carlson and Patrick,
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1989:344). The analysis of the distributional aspects of VAT in the following 
paragraphs is based on the following policy alternatives.
(i) Scenario 1 - a uniform VAT rate of 15 per cent for all 
household consumption expenditure items.
(ii) Scenario 2 - zero-rates for various household consumption items
and a standard VAT rate of 15 per cent for the remaining household
consumption items.
(iii) Scenario 3 - multiple VAT rates: low rates for necessities and 
high rates for luxuries items.
The distributional impact of the VAT, based on the above scenarios, has been 
analysed using various methods (discussed in detail in Chapter 6). The Lorenz-curve 
technique is used to measure income concentration across income groups for pre-VAT 
and post-VAT levels. The inequality measured nationally and across income groups 
under the VAT has been investigated by using the Gini-coefficient, computed 
separately for the income base and the consumption base. The income base has been 
computed by assuming that household income will be reduced by the amount of VAT 
passed on by producers and sellers of goods and services to the final consumers in the 
prices which households pay for goods and services they purchase. The VAT impact 
has also been evaluated on the basis of household welfare at the national, rural and 
urban levels.
Measurement of income inequality - Lorenz Curve
The Lorenz-curve (constructed on the basis of table 8.1 below) presents the 
cumulative share of household income for alternative scenarios under the pre-VAT 
and post-VAT environment. The Curve shows that under a flat rate VAT system 
income inequality across households would increase. However, the extent of the 
increases would have very little effect on the distribution of income. The after tax
172
distribution differed only slightly from the before tax distribution. The changes under 
scenarios 1, 2 and 3 was so small that the Lorenz curve can not be distinguished on the 
scale used in figure 8.1. The curve, however, shows that under scenarios 2 and 3, the 
Lorenz-curve moves backward, but stays above the pre-VAT level. Under scenarios 2 
and 3, the VAT burden on all income groups would be identical.
Figure 8.1 Measurement of income inequality under the VAT using Lorenz 
Curve analysis, by income groups
6001-70004001-50003001-35001001-1500 2001-2500
Income Groups
M— Scenario 3Scenario 2-♦— Pre-VAT —®— Scenario 1
Source: Data source Table 8.1.
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Table 8.1 Cumulative income
systems (proportions)
concentration under alternative VAT
Income groups Pre-VAT Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Up to 1000 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
1001-1500 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
1501-2000 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
2001-2500 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13
2501-3000 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.19
3001-3500 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.27
3501-4000 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35
4001-5000 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.45
5001-6000 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.57
6001-7000 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.69
> 7000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: Appendix 8.1.
Gini Coefficient measurement of income inequality -  income base
A consumption-type VAT imposed at a uniform rate would be regressive and 
place a significant tax burden on low income households. Table 8.2 shows that the 
income inequality under a uniform VAT rate system at the national level would 
increase from 0.4011 to 0.4977 (scenario 1). These results are consistent with the 
United States Department of the Treasury study (1984) and the Brashares et al 
(1988) study results. Both studies found that a consumption-type VAT, extended 
through the retail level and imposed at a uniform rate, would be regressive. Table 8.2 
shows that a change in the VAT rate structure allowing zero-rating and low rates for 
necessities (scenario 2) would mean a lesser increase in inequality. The Gini- 
coefficient would reduce from 0.4977 to 0.4546. A multiple VAT rate system with 
zero-rating for various necessities (scenario 3) would give approximately the same 
results for scenario 2 at the national level.
The Gini-coefficients calculated for rural and urban areas indicate that VAT 
would also increase income inequality in these areas. Table 8.2 shows that income 
inequality would be higher under a uniform VAT rate system. However, compared to
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scenario 1 income inequality would be less under scenario 2 and scenario 3. In the 
aggregate, under the three scenarios, the implementation of VAT would result in an 
increase in income inequality from the pre-VAT level, but its impact would be highest 
on urban households.
Table 8.2 Impact of value-added tax on household income under 
alternative scenarios
Case Income base
National
Gini coefficient 
Urban Rural
Case 1 Pre-value-added stage 0.4011 0.4021 0.4159
Case 2 With a 15 per cent flat value-added tax1 0.4977 0.5153 0.5132
Case 3 With zero-rate for necessities and 
15 per cent standard rate“ 0.4546 0.4659 0.4760
Case 4 With multiple value-added tax rates3 0,4548 0.4642 0.4749
Notes: ’Scenario 1. 
2Scenario 2. 
’Scenario 3.
Source: Author’s computation.
Gini Coefficient - measurement of income inequality -  consumption base
The Gini-coefficients measured on the basis of household consumption 
expenditure also show that inequality would increase under the three VAT scenarios. 
At the national level, inequality will increase from 0.2965 in the pre-VAT situation to 
0.4018 under scenario 1 (Table 8.3).
The consumption base measure on income inequality indicates that the impact of 
the VAT on rural groups is more regressive than shown by the income measure. In 
the urban areas, under scenario 1, the Gini-coefFicient would increase from 0.3208 to 
0.4225, whereas in rural areas the Gini-coefificient would increase from 0.2903 to 
0.3966 (Table 8.3).
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Table 8 3 Impact of value-added tax on household consumption 
expenditure under alternative scenarios
Case Consumption base Gini-coefficient
National Urban Rural
Case 1 
Case 2 
Case 3
Pre-value-added stage
With a 15 per cent flat value-added tax
With zero-rate for necessities and
0.2965
0.4018
0.3208
0.4225
0.2903
0.3966
Case 4
15 per cent standard rate
With multiple value-added tax rates
0.3548
0.3536
0.3779
0.3765
0.3779
0.3547
Source: Author’s computation.
Distribution of VAT burden on households -  income base
The absolute VAT burden on households by income class has been measured at 
the national, rural and urban levels. For national income averages, Figure 8.2 below 
shows that a flat rate VAT would be highly regressive. Under scenario 1, the VAT 
impact would be highly skewed towards the lower income groups whose monthly 
income is up to rupees 1500. This income group would incur a VAT burden of 
approximately 26 per cent, compared with approximately 10 per cent by the high 
income group (income above rupees 7000 per month). However, the VAT burden on 
low income households would reduce under scenarios 2 and 3 from 26 per cent to 
13.9 per cent and 11.5 per cent respectively.
176
Figure 8.2 National average: value-added tax burden on households by 
income classes
National Average
Upto 1500 1501-2500 2501-3500 • 3501-5000 5001-7000 > 7000
Income Groups
— Scenario 1 —0 — Scenario 2 - A - Scenario 3
Source: Appendix 8.1.
As shown in Figure 8.3, the impact of a flat rate VAT on urban households 
would also be highly regressive. The tax impact on lower income households would 
be 38 per cent compared with 15 per cent on the highest income group. Under 
scenarios 2 and 3 the regressiveness is greatly reduced, especially under scenario 3. 
Figure 8.3 also shows that under scenarios 2 and 3 the VAT burden on middle income 
households would be identical.
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Agure 8.3 Urban areas: value-added tax burden on households by income 
classes
Urban Areas
S 20 -
Upto 1500 1501-2500 2501-3500 3501-5000 5001-7000 >7000
Income Groups
— Scenario 1 —0 — Scenario 2 —A— Scenario 3
Source: Appendix 8.1.
As shown in Figure 8.4, the VAT burden on low income rural households, vis-a- 
vs high income rural households, would be high. The regressivity of the VAT burden 
vould be greatly reduced under scenarios 2 and 3 as would the extent of the tax 
harden on all households.
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Figure 8 4 Rural areas: value-added tax burden on households by income 
classes
Rural Areas
1501-2500Upto 1500 2501-3500 3501-5000 5001-7000 > 7000
Income Groups
-•— Scenario 1 —0 — Scenario 2 —£ — Scenario 3
Source: Appendix 8.1.
The VAT is clearly regressive under all scenarios. However, zero-rating and 
lower rates for most necessities of the low income households and high rates for most 
luxury items significantly mitigate the regressivity of the tax. Still, in the absence of 
compensation through public sector transfers, the low income households would be 
worse off, especially the urban households. The VAT schemes defined in scenarios 2 
and 3 substantially lower the tax burden on all taxpayers as compared to the flat tax 
regime.
Distribution of VAT burden on households -  consumption base
The VAT burden on various income groups has been calculated as a ratio of 
VAT liability to household consumption expenditure for the three scenarios presented. 
Figures 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7 show that a flat rate VAT on household consumption 
expenditure, without exemptions, would have a proportional burden on all income
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groups. Relaxing the flat rate by allowing zero-rating for necessities (scenario 2), the 
VAT burden would gradually increase at higher income levels. The effective VAT 
rates would be even more progressive under scenario 3 (Figure 8.5). Under this 
scenario, the low income households would bear 6.7 per cent of the VAT rate burden, 
vis-a-vis 12.3 per cent for higher income households (above rupees 7000).
Figure 8.5 National average: value-added tax burden on households by 
income classes
National Average
> 70003501-5000 5001-70002501-3500Upto 1500 1501-2500
Income Groups
—• — Scenario 1 —E3— Scenario 2 —A— Scenario 3
Source: Appendix 8.1.
Figure 8.6 below indicates that under scenario 2 the low income urban groups 
would have an approximate eight per cent tax burden, whereas the VAT burden on 
high income urban households would be approximately nine per cent. Under scenario 
3, the effective VAT rate increases for high income groups. The low income groups 
would have a 7.4 per cent VAT burden, whereas the high income groups would have a 
tax burden of approximately 11 per cent (Figure 8.5). Under scenarios 2 and 3, the
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VAT burden on middle level income groups (rupees 2501 to rupees 7000) would be 
almost identical.
Figure 8.6 Urban areas: value-added tax burden on households by income 
classes
Urban Areas
2501-3500 5001-7000 > 70001501-2500 3501-5000Upto 1500
Income Groups
Scenario 1 —H— Scenario 2 —A—Scenario 3
Source: Appendix 8.1.
The VAT burden on rural household consumption expenditure under scenarios 2 
and 3 would be higher with higher incomes. However, under scenario 3, the VAT 
burden on low income rural households at 7.5 per cent would be substantially below 
that of higher income households.
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Figure 8.7 Rural areas: value-added tax burden on households by income 
classes
Rural Areas
Upto 1500 1501-2500 2501-3500 3501-5000 5001-7000 > 7000
Income Groups
Scenario 1 —0 — Scenario 2 —A— Scenario 3
Source: Appendix 8.1.
VAT impact on household welfare
Household welfare under the VAT system is measured through the use of the 
welfare index presented in Table 8.4. The table shows that with the implementation of 
VAT, rural and urban households would be worse off. At the national level, the loss 
of welfare would be higher under scenario 1. The welfare index under scenario 1 
would reduce from 1.00 in the pre-VAT situation to 0.662. Under scenarios 2 and 3 
the relative household welfare position would improve, but would remain below the 
pre-VAT position. On welfare grounds, scenario 2 is preferable as it implies less 
welfare loss.
In both rural and urban areas there would be a welfare loss under scenario 1. 
Households in both sectors would be better off under scenarios 2 and 3 relative to
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scenario 1, but their welfare position would remain below the pre-VAT level (Table 
8.4).
Table 8 4 Impact of value-added tax on households’ welfare under 
alternative scenarios
Case Income base
National
Welfare index1 
Urban Rural
Case 1 Pre-value-added stage 1.000 1.000 1.000
Case 2 With a 15 per cent flat value-added tax 0.662 0.632 0.651
Case 3 With zero-rate for necessities and 
15 per cent standard rate 0.772 0.752 0.749
Case 4 With multiple value-added tax rates 0.766 0.754 0.751
Note: 'Computed on the basis of per capita post-VAT average income times (1-Gini).
Source: Author’s computation.
Conclusions
Because of its perceived regressive nature, the VAT has been criticised as not 
equitable to low income groups. For this reason almost all countries with VAT have 
designed their system to protect lower income groups from the VAT burden.
The distributional impact of VAT evaluated through the Lorenz-curve, Gini- 
coefficients, and a welfare index it was found that VAT substitution for a sales tax 
would be regressive with respect to income in Pakistan. Without an adjustment in 
their income, the VAT would cause low income individuals and families to incur 
substantial tax liability. This aspect will likely limit its political acceptability. The 
analysis shows that a flat rate VAT system would be more regressive than a multiple 
rate VAT system. The welfare index shows that under the VAT system, households at 
the national, rural and urban levels would be worse off compared with their pre-VAT 
position. However, VAT impact on income distribution under the three scenarios, vis- 
a-vis as measured through Lorenz-curve analysis, has been found to be insignificant.
183
Cross-national and cross-income group analysis has focused entirely upon the 
equity aspects of VAT with the principle objective being to rearrange the tax burdens 
among households so that a more “equitable” distribution of the VAT burden is 
achieved. The results of this chapter, however, should be interpreted with important 
qualifications as they are based exclusively on the VAT impact. Other important 
aspects such as increased public expenditure deriving from the VAT system on 
education and health, general public services, housing and other community amenities, 
and public sector transfers have not been incorporated in the analysis.
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9Taxpayer Compliance and Administrative Feasibility of the
Value-Added Tax
Studies undertaken by Groves (1958), Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Srinivisan 
(1973), Yitzhaki (1974), David (1981), Clotfelter (1983), Cox (1984), Slemrod 
(1985) and Reinganum and Wilde (1985) have analysed variables that influence tax 
compliance, including age, sex, educational background, income level, occupation, 
fairness of the tax system, political environment, cultural and religious influence. The 
outcome of these studies has been contradictory. In Pakistan, many social and 
psychological factors have contributed to low tax compliance. One major factor is 
taxpayers’ belief that the tax system is unfair, that is., taxpayers feel that they pay more 
tax than others or receive inadequate government goods and services for the value of 
tax they pay. Other factors which have contributed to low compliance are:
(i) Defiance and violation of laws: these were among the major means employed 
in the struggle for independence from the colonial administration. The 
psychological environment has not undergone a significant change, and citizens 
continue to perceive manifestations of virtually the same class difference between 
the ruler and the ruled as in the colonial days (Zaman, 1989:8);
(ii) The Islamisation of the economy has influenced tax paying attitudes. Those 
who pay Zakat (an Islamic tax, compulsory after certain wealth) feel no 
obligation to pay any other tax to the government; and
(iii) The tax system is unable to distinguish or unwilling between the honest and 
the dishonest. Those taxpayers who attempt to pay honestly are invariably 
treated as dishonest by the tax functionaries (NTRC, 1986:107). Taxpayers 
often find themselves harassed and humiliated and subjected to taxes higher than 
those due, while a tax evader who is willing and has the financial resources to 
distribute to the tax functionaries, often has a much lower tax burden imposed. 
This treatment discourages honesty (NTRC, 1986:99).
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A field survey was undertaken in January-April 1994 (see chapter 6) to assess 
responses of various social groups to the taxation structure and major taxes, especially 
the introduction of the VAT, and the influence of the socio-political and administrative 
infrastructure on domestic resource mobilisation efforts. In-depth interviews with 
legislators, politicians, senior policy-makers, representatives of the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries, industrialists, business persons, politicians and the general 
public were conducted to solicit their views on the above issues. Despite its limited 
coverage, the field survey provided valuable information on the administrative 
strengths and structural weaknesses of the implementation of the VAT.
The field survey benefited from discussions with eight focus groups -  two 
groups of business community representatives, three groups of grass-roots politicians 
and three groups of members of the general public. On average each group consisted 
of six to eight persons. The focus group discussions provided a device for obtaining 
in-depth information on a specific topic. The advantage of focus group discussions is 
that individuals who share common experiences and problems are willing to discuss 
their interests in a group atmosphere (Kumar, 1987:12-14; Knodel, 1988:47). The 
informal group situation encourages participants to give opinions freely which might 
not be possible in formalised individual interviews. The topics in the focus group 
discussions and the in-depth interviews are normally similar, but a major difference 
between the focus groups and the in-depth interview is that, in the focus group, an 
attempt is made to develop a form of group dynamics, whereas the in-depth interview 
attempts to acquire more personal interpretations of the topics under discussion. 
These two techniques were together provide in-depth responses to the issues under 
discussion.
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The respondents were asked to reply to a series of closed and open-ended 
questions relating to the weaknesses of the taxation system, and to give their views as 
to how to overcome the current fiscal crisis. The conventional approach to measuring 
public opinion on tax and spending issues has been followed. The respondents of the 
field survey were asked whether they are paying too much, the right amount or too 
little in taxes, and whether they favour either an increase or decrease in government 
expenditure. In order to assess their perceptions about a VAT system, the 
respondents were asked to give their opinion on the feasibility of the introduction of 
VAT in Pakistan. The same topics were pursued in every interview, but the precise 
wording of the questions, and the order in which they were considered, varied from 
one interview to the next on the basis of the characteristics of the respondents. The 
length of interview varied from 45 minutes to two hours. The average interview was 
one hour 15 minutes.
Because of the diverse nature of each group, the survey data analysis has been 
divided into five separate sections. The focus groups' discussions have not been 
analysed separately, but the individual interview responses have been matched with the 
focus group discussions on identical questions.
Policy-makers
This section presents an analysis of the responses gathered in a series of 26 
interviews with individuals associated with fiscal policy design and implementation. 
Respondents interviewed were senior bureaucrats, legislators and executives of 
various economic ministries and departments in the federal and the provincial
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governments. All the respondents were well-educated. Their average age was 
approximately 55 years.
On the question of the causes of the narrow tax base, the majority of the 
respondents (92 per cent) indicated that many socio-political and economic factors 
impeded the growth of major taxes (Table 9.1). Respondents indicated that certain 
constitutional and statutory requirements limited the government’s ability to expand 
the tax base. Political influence has derailed efforts made to enlarge the tax base. The 
federal and provincial legislative assemblies, historically regulated by the “Landed 
Aristocracy”, have domination over the social, economic, political and religious life of 
the people. Any proposal to tax property or agricultural incomes for example, 
threatens the vested interests of this pressure group.
The pressure of interest groups not only weakens the domestic resource base, 
but also poses many questions for taxpayers who feel that the country’s taxation 
system is not just. In the last few years, uncertainty, associated with a weak political 
climate has put further pressure on public resources through increased public 
expectations for certain facilities and services, while private investment in non­
commercial activities has remained limited. All these factors have adversely affected 
improvement in the domestic resource base.
On the question of taxation procedures and laws, 77 per cent of respondents 
indicated that complicated tax laws and procedures impeded the smooth 
implementation of various tax policies. The excessive discretionary power of tax 
officials and ambiguous language of tax laws has weakened resource mobilisation
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efforts. Also, increased smuggling and lack of coordination between tax departments, 
tax officials and taxpayers have weakened the taxation system (Table 9.1).
Table 9.1 Percentage distribution of policy-makers’ responses: by
suggested causes of weakness of the tax structure
Agree Not agree Neither agree 
nor disagree
1 . Narrow tax base 92 - 8
2. Complicated tax laws and procedures 77 15 8
3. Excessive discretionary tax officers’ power 73 - 27
4. Political and social impediments 69 19 12
5. Weaknesses of the tax agency 35 46 19
6. Other weaknesses (training, tax officers’
education, smuggling, bureaucratic controls) 69 “ 31
Note: Respondents were 26 policy-makers associated with the federal and the provincial 
governments, researchers and academics.
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
The respondents were asked to rank their choice of major taxes in order of 
preference. Seventy-three per cent of those who responded favoured the introduction 
of a European Union type broad-based consumption tax (VAT), while 27 per cent of 
the respondents opposed the introduction of such a tax on grounds o f equity and 
administrative complications. The main reason for their opposition was that in a cash 
economy with a large non-monetised sector, implementation difficulties o f the VAT 
would outweigh its benefits. In their opinion, VAT successes, mostly in OECD 
countries would be difficult to replicate in Pakistan, because of weak administrative 
infrastructure and lack of general education on taxation issues. Nineteen per cent 
indicated their preference for taxes on income. However, views were divided on the 
taxation of agricultural incomes. Excessive reliance on import duties was rejected by 
the majority of respondents on the grounds of its potentially deleterious effects on the 
country’s competitive position and the likely increase in smuggling in Pakistan (Table 
9.2).
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Table 9.2 Percentage distribution of policy-makers’ responses: by type of 
tax preference
Type of tax Tax preference 
(%)
1. Taxes on income 19
2. Customs duties 4
3 Excise duties 4
4. V alue-added tax 73
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
Approximately three-quarters (73 per cent) of the policy makers favoured a 
uniform VAT rate, while eight per cent favoured a multiple rate structure -  lower rates 
for necessities and higher rates for luxury items. Nineteen per cent of those who 
responded to the question presented views which are best be described as ‘mixed’ -  
favouring efficiency and at the same time protecting lower income groups.
Respondents were asked to give their opinion on a 15 per cent VAT rate. 
Thirty-nine per cent of respondents thought that a 15 per cent rate was high, 46 per 
cent supported the rate, while 15 per cent considered it low (Table 9.3).
Table 9.3 Distribution of policy-makers’ responses: by opinion on a 15% 
VAT rate
Opinion Responses
(%)
Low 15
Right 46
High 39
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
On the question of the organisational structure of VAT, 58 per cent of the 
respondents thought that departments presently administering sales tax should 
implement the VAT. Twenty-three per cent indicated that an independent 
administrative body was likely to be more efficient, while 19 per cent ‘neither agreed 
nor disagreed’ or thought it was not relevant. Approximately 89 per cent favoured a 
separate VAT training centre (Table 9.4).
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Table 9.4 Percentage distribution of policy—makers’ responses: by type of 
opinion on VAT organisational structure
Agree
(%)
Not agree 
(%)
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
(%)
1 . Need to establish a separate VAT Division 23 58 19
2. Present departments implement VAT 58 23 19
3. Separate sections for VAT law, rules, and regulations 81 - 19
4. Need for a separate VAT training centre 89 - 11
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
Respondents were asked to give their opinion on staff requirements for the 
implementation of the VAT. Fifty-four per cent indicated that VAT success would be 
largely dependent on the qualified staff trained in VAT administration, while 38 per 
cent did not see any problem with staffing. Eighty-eight per cent indicated the need 
for additional staff for VAT implementation, while 46 per cent indicated that the 
additional staff needs would be met through transfers from other tax departments and 
government organisations (Table 9.5).
Table 9 5 Percentage distribution of policy-makers’ response: by type of 
VAT staff requirements and structure of incentives
Problem and extent Agree
(%)
Not agree 
(%)
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
(%)
1. Staff requirements for VAT implementation
a) Qualified staff 54 38 8
b) Additional staff 88 8 4
c) Staff transfer from other tax departments 46 54 -
2. Pay scale and incentive structure
a) Higher pay scale for VAT personnel 73 27 -
b) System of incentives and rewards 88 - 12
c) Regular on-the-job training 92 - 8
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
On the question of higher pay scale and incentive structure, about 80 per cent 
indicated that since the scope of the VAT would be much larger and its 
implementation would require substantial efforts on the part of tax administrators, the 
existing pay-scales would not provide sufficient stimulus for them to work hard or
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devote themselves to the success of a new tax. Higher pay and a system of cash 
awards and appreciation for outstanding performance, on the other hand, would 
encourage staff and attract qualified and committed workers to the VAT department. 
Twenty-seven per cent of the respondents opposed the idea of a different pay structure 
for VAT staff. In their opinion, higher pay for a particular tax department would 
likely lead to a deterioration in the performance of other departments and would lead 
to overall inefficiency (Table 9.5). However, respondents strongly supported regular 
on-the-job training for VAT officials. Ninety-two per cent of the respondents viewed 
regular training of tax officials as vital for the success of the VAT system.
In response to open-ended questions for suggestions on how to improve the tax 
administration, the majority of respondents were of the opinion that development of 
the tax administrative infrastructure was as important as developing any other 
infrastructure. In their opinion, efforts were required to simplify tax laws, reduce the 
discretionary power o f the tax officials, and introduce a system of accountability 
leading to severe punishment for corrupt officials. Mass education of taxpayers and 
tax officials was considered by the respondents as an important element for the 
improvement of the tax environment in the country (Table 9.6).
Table 9.6 Percentage distribution of policy-makers’ responses: by type of 
suggestion for improvement in the tax administration
Agree
(%)
Not agree 
(%)
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
(%)
1. Control corruption 96 - 4
2. Simplify tax laws 100 - -
3. Broaden tax base 96 - 4
4. Mass education for tax personnel 81 - 19
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
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Field-level tax administration
The role of field-level organisations has traditionally been perceived as important 
for the success of the implementation of tax polices. Since VAT implementation 
requires a considerably higher rate of participation, its success or failure also depends 
on the competency of the field-level organisations, among other factors. The survey 
interviewed tax administrators at the field-level with a view to assessing staff 
awareness of the VAT system and identifying structural bottlenecks which might 
hamper smooth implementation of the VAT. A range of questions were asked to 
ascertain information on staff working conditions, incentives for excellence, the system 
of career development and the relationship between supervisors and subordinate staff.
The field-level respondents were field tax office supervisors (cadre officers 
selected through competitive examinations) and subordinate staff -  superintendents, 
deputy superintendents and tax inspectors. Both groups have different career and 
incentive structures. The supervisors were in the age group of 30-40 years with a 
university degree, whereas the subordinate staff were, on average, between 40-50 
years of age and the majority had college-level education. Both groups were asked the 
same questions. Replies were largely consistent across province and cadre.
Structure of rewards and incentives
Recognition of outstanding performance has been a fundamental means of 
conveying appreciation for past actions, support for continued efforts and 
encouragement. Salary incentives, promotion, a range of monetary and non-monetary 
rewards attracts and retains staff with appropriate skills and abilities, and provides 
inducement for satisfactory service and high achievement (OECD, 1988:12; PSC,
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1992:65; JCPA, 1992:S-667). The staff members were asked questions on the use of 
their skills. Sixty-four per cent of those who responded indicated that their 
responsibilities allow them to make a good use of their skills and abilities. Eighteen 
per cent strongly agreed. However, 25 per cent of the respondents neither agreed nor 
disagreed, and 11 per cent disagreed. Of the 13 supervisors interviewed, 77 per cent 
strongly agreed or agreed that good use was made of their abilities, whereas 53 per 
cent of the subordinate staff strongly agreed or agreed that their jobs made good use 
of their skills (Table 9.7).
Table 9.7 Distribution of field-level respondents: by type of staff believing 
their jobs make good use of their skills and abilities
Number of 
respondents
Strongly
agree
(%)
Agree
(%)
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
(%)
Disagree
(%)
Overall 28 18 46 25 11
Supervisors 13 23 54 15 8
Subordinate staff 15 13 40 30 17
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
Staff members were asked questions on job satisfaction. Of the total 
respondents, 32 per cent indicated that they were very satisfied or satisfied. Twenty- 
five per cent who responded were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and the majority 
(43 per cent) was dissatisfied. The supervisory staff in 62 per cent of cases indicated 
that they were very satisfied or satisfied, however, 30 per cent were neither satisfied 
nor dissatisfied. The level of job satisfaction among the subordinate staff was fairly 
low. Approximately three-fourth who responded indicated that they were dissatisfied. 
Only seven per cent indicated that they were satisfied (Table 9.8).
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Table 9.8 Distribution of field-level respondents: by staff rating by 
satisfaction of job
Number of 
respondents
Very
satisfied
(%)
Satisfied
(%)
Neither satisfied 
nor dissatisfied 
(%)
Dissatisfied
(%)
Overall 28 11 21 25 43
Supervisors 13 22 40 30 8
Subordinate staff 15 - 7 20 73
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
On the question of promotion, 46 per cent of the field-level respondents 
indicated that they had received promotion to the next higher grade. Of these, 92 per 
cent were supervisors, while only eight per cent were from the subordinate staff 
(Table 9.9). The majority of the subordinate staff indicated that the system of reward 
and incentives worked in favour of the few and encouraged patronage or favouritism. 
For example, cadre officers (supervisors) during their service career receive three to 
four promotions, whereas during their service career the subordinate staff receive one 
or two promotions.
Table 9.9 Percentage distribution1 of field-level respondents: by type of 
work incentive
Overall
(%)
Supervisors
(%)
Subordinate staff 
(%)
1. Training
- On the job training 54 53 47
- Professional training 54 67 33
- Educational training 14 100 -
2. Work incentive
- Promotion 46 92 8
- Cash award 43 83 17
Note: ’Percentage of 28 respondents who replied ‘yes’ to the questions.
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
Staff response on preferences for rewards for doing an out-standing job varied 
significantly by classification. The most popular selection was personal recognition 
from senior management (36 per cent). This was closely followed by more career 
development options (29 per cent). Twenty-five per cent who responded identified 
tangible benefits (financial benefits or cash payments) and a further 14 per cent
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identified greater job responsibility (Table 9.10). Responses from the two groups of 
staff varied considerably. The supervisory staff were more in favour of personal 
recognition (38 per cent), whereas subordinate staff (40 per cent) were in favour of 
more career options (Table 9.10).
Table 9.10 Distribution of field level respondents: by staff rating for doing 
an outstanding job
Number of 
respondents
Personal
recognition
(%)
Greater job 
responsibilities 
(%)
More career 
options 
(%)
Tangible
rewards
(%)
Overall 28 36 14 29 21
Supervisors 13 38 23 31 8
Subordinate staff 15 13 27 40 20
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
Structure of training
Training encompasses a wide array of individual, group and team-based schemes 
designed to improve the competence and skills of staff and thereby organisational 
effectiveness. It serves a number of important functions including as a mechanism for 
management improvement. The field-level respondents were asked questions about 
the extent of training they receive in their service career, their impression of it and the 
impact of training in their career development. Responses to each question varied 
significantly by staff classification. Of the total respondents, 54 per cent indicated that 
they have received on-the-job training. Of these, 53 per cent were from the 
supervisory cadre and 47 per cent from subordinate staff. Nearly one-quarter (23 per 
cent) of all subordinate staff indicated that they have received only four to five weeks’ 
formal training, while one in five indicated that they have received between seven to 
eight weeks’ professional training. The educational training to improve qualifications 
was taken up by the supervisory staff in all cases (see Table 9.9 above).
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The field-level respondents rated training as a significant factor which could 
improve the quality of their work. Of the 13 supervisors who responded to the 
question, 69 per cent indicated that they considered training an important part of their 
career development. Approximately three-quarters (73 per cent) of the subordinate 
staff believed that training would improve their skills (Table 9.11).
Table 9.11 Distribution of field-level respondents: by staff believing that 
training helps in the improvement of overall efficiency
Number of 
respondents
Strongly
agree
(%)
Agree
(%)
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
(%)
Disagree
(%)
Overall 28 21 72 7 . -
Supervisors 13 23 69 8 -
Subordinate staff 15 20 73 7 -
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
Relations between supervisors and subordinates: field-level staff
In Pakistan, organisational relationships have traditionally been typified as 
involving an authoritative order where the discourse for tasks and directions is 
essentially top-down. The environment is one where employees do not act for 
themselves, but receive formal approval prior to taking action. Compliance with 
authority is the operative norm. This environment has restricted individual 
development, innovation and organisational performance. The survey asked a series of 
questions about the relationships between individuals and their supervisors. 
Approximately two-thirds of staff felt comfortable discussing a work-related grievance 
with their immediate supervisor (35 per cent strongly agreed), although one-fifth did 
not. The supervisory staff indicated close relationships with their supervisors. Eighty- 
two per cent of those who responded indicated that their working relations with their 
supervisors were good (69 per cent strongly agreed). By contrast, 53 per cent of
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subordinate staff strongly agreed or agreed that they had good working relations with 
their supervisors. However, one-third of respondents did not agree (Table 9.12).
Table 9.12 Distribution of field-level respondents: by relationship between 
supervisors and subordinate staff
Number of 
respondents
Strongly
agree
(%)
Agree
(%)
Neither agree 
nor- disagree 
(%)
Disagree
(%)
Overall 28 35 35 12 18
Supervisors 13 69 23 8 -
Subordinate staff 15 7 46 14 33
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
Awareness of the VAT system: field-level staff
On the question of familiarity with the VAT system, its laws and procedures, 
only 11 per cent of field-level respondents indicated that they have this knowledge. 
The supervisors were more informed. The respondents also had limited knowledge of 
the organisational infrastructure of the VAT (Table 9.13).
Table 9.13 Percentage distribution1 of field-level respondents: by type of 
VAT knowledge
staff
Overall
(%)
Supervisors
(%)
Subordinate
(%)
1 . Familiarity with VAT law and regulations 11 15 7
2. Familiarity with VAT work load 50 61 40
3. Familiarity with VAT organisational set-up 11 15 13
Note: 'Percentage of the 28 respondents who replied ‘yes’ to the questions.
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
The field-level respondents were asked to identify problems they might face with 
the introduction of VAT in terms of taxpayer identification, registration, assessment 
and tax collection. Those who responded indicated that a VAT covering all stages of 
production and distribution up to the retail trade level would demand substantial 
resources from the field-level tax administration. The majority of those who 
responded (81 per cent) believed that they were already over-burdened and
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implementation of the VAT would likely increase their workload. The increased 
workload was also perceived as having a significant effect on their morale: potentially 
it would reduce service effectiveness and divert resources to deal with resistance to 
change, rather than pursue improvement. From the field-level perspective, a decision 
on VAT implementation, therefore, needed to be matched with major structural 
changes.
A 15 per cent uniform VAT rate was viewed by 21 per cent of the field-level 
respondents as appropriate, 43 per cent indicated the rate was high, and 36 per cent 
viewed it as low (Table 9.14).
Table 9.14 Distribution of field-level respondents: by type of opinion on a 
15% VAT rate
Opinion Overall
(%)
Supervisors
(%)
Subordinate staff 
(%)
Low 36 31 40
Appropriate 21 23 20
High 43 46 40
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
The field-level respondents were asked about the need and type of training for 
efficient implementation of the VAT. Of the 28 respondents, approximately 90 per 
cent indicated that they would like to have training on VAT audit, VAT returns 
assessment, taxpayer education campaigns, VAT concepts and VAT computation 
(Table 9.15).
Table 9.15 Distribution1 of field-level respondents: by type of need for 
training on the VAT
Overall
(%)
Supervisors
(%)
Subordinate staff 
(%)
1. Audit of VAT returns 93 92 93
2. Preparation of management reports 21 31 13
3. On taxpayers education campaign 96 100 93
4. VAT concept 86 92 80
5. VAT computation 96 100
C ’ x xL x
93
Note: 'Percentage of the 28 respondents who replied ‘yes’ to the questions.
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
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Separate questions in the survey asked respondents to indicate means of 
identifying potential VAT-taxpayers. Eighteen per cent of the field-respondents 
supported a door-to-door campaign. Fifty-seven per cent were in favour of identifying 
taxpayers from income and other tax returns. The majority of the respondents (82 per 
cent) indicated that identification of the potential taxpayers should be through a 
detailed trade establishment survey (Table 9.16).
Table 9 16 Distribution1 of field-level respondents: by source of assessment 
of potential VAT-taxpayers
Overall Supervisors Subordinate
staff
(%) (%) (%)
1 . Through “door-to-door” campaigns 18 15 20
2. Assessment from income and other tax returns 57 46 67
3. Surveys 82 85 80
4. Records of suppliers 36 38 33
Note: 'Percentage of the 28 respondents who replied ‘yes’ to the questions.
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
Business entities
The business segment of the field survey included manufacturing, wholesale and 
retail business establishments. Twenty-seven (50 per cent) survey respondents were in 
the retail business, 15 (28 per cent) were in the wholesale business and 12 (22 per 
cent) were in the manufacturing sector - four were large industrialists and the 
remaining eight were owners of small manufacturing units. The respondents from the 
wholesale business sector were also drawn from large wholesale business 
establishments, including bonded warehouses and small wholesale establishments. The 
majority of the sample establishments (or respondents) was single proprietorship’s (68 
per cent). In 73 per cent of cases owners were the managers of the business. Of the 
total business respondents, 33 (61 per cent) were educated, whereas 21 (39 per cent) 
had some or no education (Table 9.17).
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Table 9.17 Percentage distribution of business entity respondents: by level of 
education and by type of business establishment
Overall total Manufacturing
business
Wholesale
business
Retail
business
Total respondents 54 12 15 27
Percent 100 100 100 100
Educated 61 92 87 33
Some education or no education 39 8 13 67
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
Among the establishments surveyed, maintenance of business accounts by 
qualified accountants varied considerably by economic activity. Of the total 
establishments, 14 business establishments (26 per cent) employed full-time 
accountants on a regular basis, whereas five (17 per cent) of the business-entity 
respondents indicated that business accounts were maintained by part-time 
accountants. In 15 establishments, business accounts were maintained by the owners. 
A large number of business establishments (16) provided no details on the question 
(Table 9.18).
Table 9.18 Percentage distribution of business-entity respondents: by
person maintaining VAT 
establishment
accounts and by type of business
Overall total Manufacturing
business
Wholesale
business
Retail
business
Total respondents 54 12 15 27
Percent 100 100 100 100
1. Full-time accountant 26 58 33 7
2. Part-time accountant 17 8 47 4
3. Owner 28 33 20 30
4. No response 29 - - 59
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
By type of economic activity, 58 per cent of the manufacturing establishments 
employed regular full-time accountants, eight per cent part-time accountants and in 33 
per cent of cases, business accounts were maintained by the owners/managers 
themselves. The ratio of full-time accounts was higher in large scale manufacturing 
establishments, while accounts of most of the small scale manufacturing establishments
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were maintained by the owners. The wholesale business accounts were largely 
maintained by part-time accountants (47 per cent), followed by full-time regular 
accountants (33 per cent), while 20 per cent of respondents indicated that they 
maintained business accounts. In the retail trade, 59 per cent of those who responded 
did not reply to the question. Of the remaining 41 per cent, 31 per cent indicated that 
they themselves maintained accounts, and in only 11 per cent of cases did respondents 
employ full-time or part-time accountants (Table 9.18).
The business entity respondents were asked about their preferences for taxes. 
Twenty-three (43 per cent) of those who responded preferred to pay a fixed tax. The 
main supporters of the fixed tax were respondents from retail businesses; seven of the 
27 who responded from this group preferred to pay fixed tax. Only two (seven per 
cent) of the retail business respondents preferred to pay income tax and four (17 per 
cent) consumption tax, while 17 per cent indicated no response to the question. The 
wholesale business respondents were also divided on their preference for tax. Five (33 
per cent) of the 15 respondents preferred to pay a fixed tax, three (15 per cent) 
preferred income tax and six (40 per cent) preferred a consumption tax (Table 9.19). 
The large-scale manufacturing respondents overwhelmingly supported a consumption 
tax. Of the 12 respondents, eight (67 per cent) supported a tax on consumption (the 
majority supported a consumption tax as a substitute for income tax), 17 per cent 
supported a tax on income, and eight per cent supported a fixed tax. Only one 
respondent did not respond (Table 9.19). Preference for a consumption tax across 
establishments varied considerably. The respondents from large business 
establishments preferred a consumption tax, whereas respondents from small business 
establishments were in favour of a fixed tax (Table 9.19).
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Table 9.19 Percentage distribution of business entity respondents: by type of 
tax preference, and by business establishment
Overall total Manufacturing
business
Wholesale
business
Retail
business
Total respondents 54 12 15 27
Percent 100 100 100 100
1. Fixed tax 43 8 33 63
2. Tax on income 13 17 20 7
3. Tax on consumption 33 67 40 15
4. No response 11 8 7 15
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
On the question of the preferred tax payment period, the majority of business 
entities (37 per cent) preferred the present quarterly payment period, while 33 per cent 
preferred to pay tax annually. The preference of the remaining 30 per cent of 
respondents was for payment of taxes semi-annually (11 per cent) or monthly (two per 
cent). Seventeen per cent of respondents did not express their preference (Table 
9.20).
Table 9 20 Percentage distribution of business entity taxpayer respondents: 
by preferred filing/payment period and by type of business 
establishment
Overall total Manufacturing
business
Wholesale
business
Retail
business
Total respondents 54 12 15 27
Percent 100 100 100 100
1. Annually 37 8 13 56
2. Semi- annually 11 17 13 7
3. Quarterly 33 67 67 7
4. Monthly 2 - - 4
5. No response 17 8 7 26
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
No significant differences in preferences for the quarterly filing/payments period 
were noted in manufacturing and wholesale business establishments (Table 9.20). 
Differences in the tax payment period, by economic category, are mainly due to retail 
trade respondents who preferred to pay tax annually. The majority of the retail trade 
respondents indicated that because of the size of their business it would not be feasible 
for them to submit tax returns on a quarterly basis. Their argument was consistent
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with international practice (see chapter 5). The majority of countries with the VAT 
have either exempted small businesses below a certain threshold level, or small 
businesses are permitted to submit tax returns annually.
Familiarity with the VAT system was low across business establishments. Thirty 
per cent of business entity respondents did not have knowledge of the VAT laws, 
regulations and infrastructure. Of the 54 who responded, 11 (20 per cent) favoured 
the VAT, whereas 24 (44 per cent) did not (Table 9.21). The majority of the 
manufacturing sector respondents favoured a VAT, whereas the majority of the 
respondents from wholesale and retail businesses did not.
Table 9.21 Percentage distribution of business entity respondents: by type of 
business preference on a VAT system and by type of business 
establishment
Overall total Manufacturing
business
Wholesale
business
Retail
business
Total respondents 54 12 15 27
Percent 100 100 100 100
1. In favour 20 50 13 11
2. Not in favour 44 33 47 48
3. No response 5 - 7 7
4. Don’t know 31 17 33 34
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
Approximately two-thirds of the business entity respondents indicated that the 
implementation of a VAT would increase their bookkeeping requirements (69 per 
cent). Eighty-five per cent of the respondents indicated that their workload to process 
receipts/invoices would increase. Approximately three-quarters (74 per cent) of those 
who responded indicated that it would be difficult for them to maintain accounts 
separately for exempt/zero-rated and standard rate goods and consequently, 
computing VAT accurately would be difficult (Table 9.22).
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Table 9.22 Percentage distribution1 of business entity respondents: by type 
of problems in filling VAT returns and by business establishment
Overall total Manufacturing Wholesale 
Retail
business business
business
1 . Increased bookkeeping requirements 69 42 67 82
2. Voluminous receipts/invoices to process 85 67 80 96
3. Difficulty in computing the VAT 74 67 67 82
4. Difficulty in accounting exempt/zero 
rate goods 65 42 60 78
Note: ’Percentage of the 54 respondent.
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
On the question of a 15 per cent VAT rate, out of 54 business entity 
respondents, 50 (93 per cent) regarded that rate as high, while only four (seven per 
cent) believed the 15 per cent was reasonable. No business entity respondent 
indicated that the rate was low (Table 9.23).
Table 9.23 Distribution of business entity respondents: by type of opinion on 
a 15% VAT rate
Overall total Manufacturing
business
Wholesale
business
Retail
business
Total respondents 54 12 15 27
Percent 100 100 100 100
Low - - - -
Right 7 25 7 -
High 93 75 93 100
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
The majority of business entity respondents were of the view that the VAT 
system should be based on a simplified method of record keeping, return filing, refund 
and payment methods (Table 9.24).
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Table 9.24 Percentage distribution1 of business entity respondents: by type
of suggestion on the 
establishment
VAT system and by type of business
Overall total Manufacturing Wholesale Retail
business business
business
Of the Total respondents
1 . Simplified method of record keeping 85 83 87 85
2. Simplified method of VAT return filling 83 75 93 82
3. Simplified method of tax credit claim 87 92 87 85
4. Simplified method of VAT payments 89 92 93 85
Note: 1 Percentage of the 5 4 respondents.
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
The business entity respondents’ views were sought on how the Pakistan 
government’s financial position could be improved. The survey respondents indicated 
that the government should control corruption, tax agricultural sector income, reduce 
public expenditure and control the massive inflow of smuggled goods. However, 
suggestions varied across businesses. Forty-two per cent of the respondents from 
manufacturing establishments suggested that income from the agricultural sector 
should be taxed, while the majority of the wholesale and retail business respondents 
suggested control of corruption (Table 9.25).
Table 9.25 Percentage distribution of business entity respondents: by type of 
suggestions on improvement of the government’s financial 
position and by type of business establishment
Overall total 
business
Manufacturing
business
Wholesale
business
Retail
Total respondents 54 12 15 27
Percent 100 100 100 100
1. Control corruption 43 25 53 44
2 Reduce government expenditure 17 17 13 19
3 Tax agricultural sector 
4. Control massive inflow of
24 42 27 15
smuggled goods 11 8 7 15
5. Tax business and individuals fairly 5 8 - 7
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
It was observed that corruption in maintaining business accounts was significant 
across businesses. Various methods were used to avoid tax. The majority of business
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establishments, for example, maintained two sets of books, one for public use and the 
other secret, and such establishments paid bribes if tax collectors expressed curiosity 
about the ‘real books’. Also use of “hundi” (promissory notes) to avoid proof of 
business transactions was found to be common in wholesale business. In the majority 
of cases, the respondents indicated that the tax department functionaries were fully 
aware of illegal practices and often were partners in support of the system. Some of 
the respondents indicated that they paid “monthly bathcT (fixed amounts) to tax 
functionaries for their collusion.
Collusion between tax collectors and taxpayers was found to be the most 
established form of corruption. A newly established distributor indicated that he 
honestly paid tax to the government, but his returns were not accepted by the tax 
department; instead the tax department calculated his tax liability as being five times 
more than the actual liability. He indicated that after spending substantial resources, 
including waiting long hours outside the tax officer room and facing humiliation and 
harassment, he eventually paid a fixed amount, not to the government, but to a tax 
inspector who comes regularly to collect monthly hatha. One of the respondents was 
asked why he was keeping a double set of account books; he explicitly answered: 
“My day and night’s hard earnings were not for government officials’ extravagant 
living” (pers. comm. 14-01-1994).
Grass-roots politicians
The respondents of the survey belonging to this section were grass-roots 
politicians. The majority of them (approximately two-thirds) were educated. Of this, 
approximately one-third were lawyers by profession. They were in the age group of
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40-65 years, and as elected members of district councils were actively involved in area 
oolitics and socio-economic and cultural activities. The respondents were asked a 
series of questions on the role of the government in the provision of public services. 
They were asked to assess the availability of basic services in the areas they were 
representing, and the future demand for these services, the community’s willingness to 
pay user charges, and their preference for various taxes, including the VAT.
The majority of grass-roots politicians who responded held government in low 
esteem. Two main reasons were identified for their disenchantment: (i) the resources 
allocated by the government for social sector development, for example, primary 
education, primary health, water supply and sanitation, were poorly funded; and (ii) 
there was wastage of resources in delivery of public services.
The majority of respondents viewed centralised policy direction as inefficient. 
Although local development projects/programs were undertaken for the benefit of the 
community, the communities were not greatly involved in policy design and 
implementation. As a result, many policies lacked proper direction and incentives for 
acceptance, and ultimately failed in implementation. A number of examples were 
given by the respondents where centralised policy implementation lacked fit and 
resulted in wastage of resources. The development of high cost curative health 
facilities in the rural areas without supporting medical staff and medicines, for 
example, resulted in substantial wastage of resources. The large rural health centre 
buildings, in the majority of cases, were used for purposes other than providing 
medical facilities to the people of the area. Similarly, the policy of promoting 
secondary and higher education, instead of developing primary education facilities, 
created an imbalance; students in the primary school age group were not admitted to
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schools because of lack of infrastructure, while the capacity of institutions providing 
higher education was not fully utilised. The majority of those who responded 
indicated that public expenditure was likely to be more worthwhile if it involved 
intended beneficiaries in planning, preparation, execution and supervision of new and 
existing facilities in the social sectors.
The respondents indicated that most local development does not need intensive 
capital investment and sophisticated technology. In the past, when local 
representatives were involved in development activities, the majority of the projects 
were completed with substantially low costs. The grass-roots politicians suggested 
that the existing arrangements needed to be revamped to devolve primary 
responsibility and administrative powers to the local representatives.
The respondents were asked to assess the availability of basic social amenities, 
such as schools, health services, public transport, electricity, piped water and sewerage 
in their areas. Nearly, 80 per cent of respondents indicated that these facilities were 
grossly deficient (Table 9.26).
Table 9.26 Percentage distribution1 of grassroots politicians’ responses: by 
type of availability of basic public services by province
Overall Punjab Sindh NWFP2 Baluchistan
1 . School facilities 19 20 22 17 14
2. Hospital facilities 16 10 11 17 14
- Outdoor health facilities 16 10 11 33 14
- Indoor health facilities 22 30 22 17 14
3. Public transport facilities 22 30 22 17 14
4. Electricity facilities 25 30 33 17 14
5. Telephone facilities 19 20 22 17 14
6. Piped water facilities 13 10 11 17 14
7. Sewerage facilities 13 20 22 17 14
N otes: 1 Percentage of the 3 2 respondents.
2North West Frontier Province.
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
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On the question of the community sharing the cost of publicly provided services, 
27 (84 per cent) of those who responded indicated that these costs should be borne in 
full by the federal and provincial governments. Only five (16 per cent) of the 
respondents indicated that local taxes should be raised for financing public services 
(Table 9.27).
Table 9 27 Percentage distribution of grassroots politicians’ responses: by 
type of financing of public services and by province
Overall Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan
Total respondents 32 10 9 6 7
Percent 100 100 100 100 100
1. Local taxes 16 20 11 17 14
2. Federal and provincial grants 84 80 89 83 86
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
On the question of raising funds and their allocation for area development, of the 
32 respondents, eight (25 per cent) indicated that it was both appropriate and possible 
to exact the users’ charges necessary to support the provision of social services. This 
ratio varied across provinces. The majority of the respondents, 17 (53 per cent) 
stressed that the community should collect funds which should then be spent according 
to the needs of the community without interference from the federal and provincial 
governments. Only seven (22 per cent) of respondents supported the notion that 
federal/provincial governments should collect and invest taxes for local area 
development (Table 9.28).
Table 9.28 Percentage distribution of grassroots politicians’ responses: by 
type of mode of future financing of public services by province
Overall Punjab 
Baluchistan
Sindh NWFP
Total respondents 32 10 9 6 7
Percent 100 100 100 100 100
1. Community contribution to the
provision of public services 25 30 22 34 14
2. Community collects and spends fund 53 50 56 33 72
3. Government collects and spends fund 22 20 22 33 14
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
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The respondents were asked to indicate their preference for taxes. Five (16 per 
cent* of those who responded preferred taxes on income and four (12 per cent) 
preferred taxes on consumption; 23 (72 per cent) preferred not to pay any tax. Mixed 
responses were received on a province basis. Respondents from Punjab preferred 
taxes on income, while respondents from Sindh and NWFP favoured income and 
consumption taxes equally; respondents from Baluchistan preferred not to pay any tax 
(Table 9.29).
Table 9.29 Percentage distribution of grassroots politicians respondents: by 
type of tax preference and by province
Overall Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan
Total respondents 32 10 9 6 7
Percent 100 100 100 100 100
1. Taxes on income 16 20 22 17 -
2. Taxes on consumption 12 10 22 17 -
3. No tax 72 70 56 66 100
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
After being introduced to the main elements of the VAT system, the respondents 
were asked to give their opinion on its introduction. Only five (16 per cent) 
respondents favoured the introduction of the tax, while 84 per cent did not support its 
intoduction (Table 9.30).
Tade 9.30 Percentage distribution of grassroots politicians’ responses: by 
type of preference for the VAT system and by province
Overall Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan
Toal respondents 32 10 9 6 7
Percent 100 100 100 100 100
1. In favour 16 10 22 17 14
2. Not in favour 84 90 78 83 86
3. No response - - - - -
Soiree: Based on data collected during the field survey.
The field survey observed a dichotomy in the respondents' responses. The 
maority of respondents did not favour the introduction of the VAT or payment of any 
otler tax, yet urged that government should satisfy the demand for public services.
211
Approximately 90 per cent of those who responded indicated that pressure for 
additional schools, hospitals, public transport, drinking water and sewerage facilities 
was likely to intensify and the government should allocate additional resources to 
satisfy these growing demands (Table 9.31).
Table 9.31 Percentage distribution of grassroots politicians’ responses: by 
type of assessment of future needs of public services by province 
(per cent)
Overall Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan
1 . School facilities 91 90 89 83 100
2. Hospital facilities 91 100 89 83 86
- Outdoor health facilities 88 90 100 50 100
- Indoor health facilities 94 100 100 67 100
3. Public transport facilities 84 90 89 67 86
4. Electricity facilities 88 90 89 83 86
5. Telephone facilities 72 60 78 67 86
6. Piped water facilities 94 90 100 83 100
7. Sewerage facilities 91 90 89 83 100
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
On the question of suggestions for the improvement of the Pakistan 
government’s financial position, 41 per cent of the respondents emphasised the control 
of corruption. Forty-one per cent indicated that the government was likely to save 
significant resources by devolving powers to grass-roots institutions. Community 
participation in area development activities was seen as an effective way for gaining 
efficient use of resources. Eighteen per cent of the respondents, however, suggested a 
reduction in government expenditure and a tax on agricultural incomes (Table 9.32).
Table 9.32 Percentage distribution of grassroots politicians’ responses: by 
type of suggestion for improvement of the government’s financial 
position and by province
Overall Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan
Total respondents 32 10 9 6 7
Percent 100 100 100 100 100
1. Control corruption 41 50 44 33 29
2. Reduce government expenditure 9 10 11 - 14
3. Tax agricultural sector 9 10 11 17 -
4. Community participation 41 30 33 50 57
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
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Individuals/general public
The final category of the survey was a series of interviews and discussion groups 
Mth individuals with no particular affiliation. Ninety-two interviews and three focus 
group discussions were conducted. The respondents were in the age group of 26-60 
years. Eighty per cent of the survey respondents were educated - 57 per cent had 
education above the primary level, and 23 per cent had primary education; while 20 
per cent had no education. Eighty-nine per cent of the respondents were employed - 
^6 per cent in the public sector. In 51 per cent of cases, respondents had more than 
tiree adult members in their households. Fifty per cent of the respondents had less 
tian three children, while in 41 cases respondents had more than three children. 
Twenty per cent of the respondents indicated fewer than two children in their 
household attended school, while 40 per cent indicated that more than two children of 
their household attended school. Forty per cent of the respondents indicated that their 
children were not going to school. Ninety-five per cent of the respondents indicated 
that they spent more than 90 per cent of their monthly income on food, house rent, 
utility (electricity, gas, and transportation) charges and school fees for their children 
(Appendix 9.1).
The majority of the respondents believed that the tax system was inequitable. 
According to the respondents government wasted money on frivolous programs and 
the cost of government programs far outweighed the benefits in many cases. The 
respondents claimed that in Pakistan many successfully cheat the government and that 
the government provides unequal opportunities to reduce the tax burden to different 
income groups. The complexities of the tax laws leave even the better educated 
taxpayers confused and bewildered. The common instances of intentionally violating
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tax laws identified by the respondents were: (i) not reporting full income; (ii) padding 
business expenses and other deductions; (iii) falsifying supporting documents in tax 
returns; and (iv) not filing tax returns.
Three-quarters of the respondents were of the view that some or most people 
pad business expenses and other deductions, and 64 per cent believed that some or 
most people do not report all of their taxable income. One in three of the respondents 
believed some or most people falsify supporting documents and/or lie to tax auditors 
during audits. Most of the respondents were of the view that failing to file a tax return 
was too obvious a violation of the law, but not reporting all taxable income and 
padding deductions were practised by many without any fear of exposure.
On the question of provision of public services, such as education, health, public 
transport, 95 per cent of the respondents emphasised that the government should 
provide these services. This behaviour was consistent across provinces (Table 9.33). 
On the question of users' charges, 47 per cent favoured paying charges for the use of 
public services, while forty per cent did not. Thirteen per cent of the respondents 
neither agreed nor disagreed. Fifth-two per cent of the 29 respondents interviewed in 
Punjab agreed to pay users’ charges for the use of public services, followed by Sindh -  
48 per cent of 27 respondents; NWFP -  48 per cent of 23 respondents; and 31 per 
cent o f 13 respondents in Baluchistan (Table 9.33).
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Tcble 9 33 Percentage distribution1 of individual/general public 
respondents: by type of government provision for public services 
and by province
Overall Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan
Total respondents 92 29 27 23 13
Percent
1. Public Services
100 100 100 100 100
- Education 94 86 93 100 100
- Health 94 90 93 96 96
- Public transport 96 90 100 96 100
- Piped water 96 96 93 96 100
- Sewerage facilities 88
2. Willing to pay for public services
96 93 78 77
- Agree 47 52 48 48 31
- Disagree 40 27 44 48 46
- Neither agree nor disagree 13 21 8 4 23
Notes: 'Percentage of the 92 respondents.
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
The majority of the survey respondents indicated that they preferred a tax 
system in which the burden was fairly distributed according to the ability to pay. 
Aparoximately two-thirds of the respondents emphasised that ‘a person’s tax liability 
shculd be determined by his/her ability to pay, rather than the benefits he/she receives 
fro tv the government’.
On the question of tax preference, 77 per cent of the 92 respondents indicated 
tha: they did not want to pay tax. Of the remaining 23 per cent of the respondents, 19 
per cent preferred to pay income tax, while only four per cent indicated their choice 
for taxes on consumption. The majority of the respondents categorically indicated that 
unless a tax system was introduced in which every citizen according to his/her income 
was treated equally, they were obliged to refrain from paying tax to the government 
(Table 9.34). These findings, of course, may appear unique and because of limited 
sample size cannot be used as representative for the whole society, but they do suggest 
increasing public disenchantment with the taxation system in the country.
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Table 9 34 Percentage distribution of individuals/general public responses: 
by type of tax preference and by province
Overall Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan
Total respondents 92 29 27 23 13
Percent 100 100 100 100 100
1. Taxes on income 19 14 33 13 8
2. Taxes on consumption 4 3 7 4 -
3. No tax 77 83 59 83 92
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
On suggestions for the improvement of the government’s financial position, 42 
per cent indicated that increasing corruption was the main cause of government’s 
financial difficulties. According to the respondents, unless the government took action 
to curb corruption there would be little improvement in its financial position. Twenty 
per cent indicated that government should reduce its expenditure. Exemptions of 
agricultural incomes from tax and the increased inflow of smuggled goods were seen 
by nearly a quarter of the respondents as major causes of weakness in the 
government’s financial position (Table 9.35).
Table 9.35 Percentage distribution of individuals/general public responses: 
by type of suggestions for improvement of the government’s 
financial position and by province
Overall Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan
Total respondents 92 29 27 23 13
Percent 100 100 100 100 100
1. Control corruption 42 45 37 48 39
2. Reduce government expenditure 20 14 30 17 15
3. Tax agricultural income 12 7 18 13 8
4. Control inflow of smuggled goods 12 14 4 13 23
5. Tax business and individuals fairly 14 20 11 9 15
Source: Based on data collected during the field survey.
It was observed, during both the focus group discussions and individual 
interviews that the general public does not have sufficient knowledge on taxation 
issues. Given their extractive nature and technical complexity, fiscal and tax-related 
policies rarely gain public affection or raise sustained curiosity. Only a few 
interviewers knew about the budget deficit. The limited proportion of the respondents
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who were aware of the budget deficits were unable to answer questions about the 
possible effects of the deficit on business conditions and personal income. These 
indings were consistent with Mueller (1963) and Song and Yarbough’s (1978) 
indings on public attitudes towards fiscal programs.
Conclusions
The field survey has identified several areas of administrative reforms. Because 
of its small sample size, the results of the field survey may not be representative, 
revertheless its findings clearly suggest that for the successful implementation of the 
VAT the government should address issues adversely affecting taxpayer compliance 
End weakening the administrative infrastructure. Some of the issues, like control of 
corruption and simplification of tax laws and procedures, are important and need 
attention. Equally important is the question how much discretionary power a tax 
cfficer should possess.
The poor service conditions and pay prospects of the tax office are not 
conducive to the attraction of the highly qualified and highly motivated officers/staff 
needed for the implementation of the VAT. Also, tension between field-level 
supervisors and subordinate staff on service matters, such as promotion and rewards, 
also need to be reduced before implementation of the VAT.
The majority of the respondents indicated that fiscal policies were implemented 
without consultation and education of those for whom the policies were designed. 
Consequently, there has been limited success in implementation. The survey found 
some apparent resurgence of the belief that more public spending, and less taxes. The
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survey respondent demonstrated strong support for the public sector involvement in 
the provision of social infrastructure, but were generally less willing to accept large 
levels of public taxation. Nearly, two-thirds of the respondents indicated that before a 
decision on VAT implementation is made, a favourable environment for its acceptance 
should be created. The taxpayers and tax administrators should be educated on 
various aspects of the tax. The experience of New Zealand and the Philippines 
supports their point of view. In New Zealand there was intensive education before the 
implementation of the Goods and Service Tax (GST) which resulted in gains both to 
the taxpayers and the tax administration, whereas in the Philippines a half hearted 
implementation of the VAT without sufficient groundwork resulted in socio-political 
resistance and administrative crisis.
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Summary and Conclusions
Pakistan’s fiscal system does not appear consistent with the needs of a 
developing society. Past state efforts to mobilise domestic resources in amounts 
adequate to satisfy development needs have been ineffective because of the inherent 
inflexibility of a system which is the result of years of ill-conceived and contradictory 
fiscal policies. Many changes, additions, modifications and amendments made in 
attempts to improve the system have in total adversely affected the fiscal base. In the 
1980s, government revenue as a percentage of GDP fluctuated on an annual average 
basis by approximately 17 per cent. Discretionary changes in the tax structure and/ or 
improvements in tax administration, which were costly in terms of the administrative 
effort and the political resistance involved, were required each year to keep the 
proportion of the taxes in national income from falling. On the other hand, public 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP has risen from 23.9 per cent in 1977-78 to 26.2 
per cent in 1992-93. Non-development expenditure has increased sharply from 60 per 
cent of total expenditure in 1977-78 to 74 per cent in 1992-93, while, in proportionate 
terms, development expenditure has decreased considerably (Appendix 3.1 and 3.3).
The rapid increase in non-development expenditure and the slow growth of 
revenues in the early 1980s has changed the current account from surplus into deficit. 
Further, increasing levels of public sector borrowing requirements for financing the 
growing fiscal gap, especially borrowings from non-bank sources, have pre-empted 
significant government resources for servicing the accumulated debt stock. Moreover,
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the increasing reliance on borrowed resources from the private sector at high interest 
rates has crowded out private investment. The government’s strategy of addressing 
the problem of growing fiscal deficits by reducing public sector development 
expenditure has affected the maintenance of physical and social infrastructure 
particularly since the latter part of the 1980s.
The deficiencies of the tax structure have not only limited the Pakistan 
government’s capacity to generate revenues, but they have also resulted in significant 
distortion in the allocation of resources and an unfair distribution of the tax burden. 
The inefficiency in resource allocation has resulted from an excessive reliance on the 
taxation of imports and a narrow coverage of domestic production for the purposes of 
sales and excise taxation. The tax system is widely believed to be unfair, with erosion 
of the income base by concessions given to different types of income and business 
activities, and the exploitation of loopholes (Naqvi, 1992:195). Revenue sharing 
arrangements between the central and the provincial governments have also been 
partly responsible for the evolution of the inefficient tax structure as the federal 
government has tended to impose taxes which are not part of the divisible pool. These 
failings of the taxation system have created many problems and abuses in the fiscal 
system, such as massive tax evasion, corruption, and the development of a large 
informal sector.
Various studies and reviews in the 1980s and early 1990s have argued the need 
for comprehensive reform of Pakistan’s fiscal system in order to mobilise resources in 
amounts adequate to finance public expenditure in a non-inflationary manner, eliminate 
distortions and inequalities, and lower the administrative costs of compliance and 
collection. However, no comprehensive tax reform has so far been initiated by the
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government. Instead, further ad hoc management of fiscal affairs has aggravated the 
fiscal position.
The main objective of this thesis was to analyse policy options which could 
provide a buoyant new source(s) of revenue to the Pakistan government. Of the 
varous policy options studied, the status quo policy scenario, entailing major 
restructuring of the fiscal system in Pakistan through increased taxation measures, was 
argued to be politically infeasible: therefore, no change of this sort is seen as desirable. 
The adjustment policy scenario assumed that the status quo policy option was 
inappropriate. Forecasts of government revenue and expenditure under the status quo 
scenario indicated that resource pressure on the government budget will continue to 
increase. The fiscal deficit is expected to widen from eight per cent of GDP in 1992- 
93 to more than 10 per cent of GDP in 1997-98. Clearly, this situation is not 
sustainable and would adversely affect “nation building” activities. Policy measures 
involving a very substantial program of resource mobilisation and restraint on non­
development expenditure will therefore be required to reduce the fiscal gap to 
approximately five per cent of GDP, a ceiling presumed prudent by policy-makers in 
Pakistan and the international financial development institutions. The adjustment 
policy scenario investigated different policy options to help to improve the 
government’s financial position.
It was found that the various policy options evaluated under the adjustment 
policy scenario cannot individually or collectively reduce the fiscal deficit to the 
desired level. Most of the options investigated under the adjustment scenario would 
be difficult to implement because of political resistance. For example, a tax on 
agricultural incomes could be a potent source o f revenue - the tax would help the
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government to close many loopholes and inefficiencies in the taxation system, 
particularly through removing the de facto exemption for capital gains, and preventing 
the possibility of disguising other incomes as if they come from agriculture. However, 
implementation of this option is not feasible because of political resistance.
Fiscal arguments in favour of privatisation of public sector corporations are also 
weak. There is empirical evidence to show that changing the locus of ownership from 
public to private is not a sufficient condition for improvement in fiscal management 
(Naqvi and Kemal, 1991:107). Similarly, it was argued that recourse to users’ charges 
and a cap on defence spending is also politically and strategically unacceptable because 
these measures are frequently successfully opposed by pressure groups and the voting 
public.
The VAT is a policy option available to the government of Pakistan which is 
viable. Use of a broad-based consumption type VAT in both developed and 
developing countries has achieved considerable success in terms of coverage, 
generating increased revenue and being administratively simple. The tax is a multi­
stage, destination-based tax which includes all goods and services in its base (except 
those explicitly exempted). The tax is more comprehensive than a single-stage sales 
taxes, and is more product-neutral and factor-neutral than other forms of taxes on 
sales. In its ideal form, the tax represents simply a proportionate levy on personal 
consumption. The tax is neutral regarding the production techniques that a business 
adopts, and provides a considerable economic and administrative advantage. 
However, the VAT’s regressive effects on income distribution have proven to be a 
significant barrier to its political acceptability. In many countries the tax has created 
resentment and perpetuated the “politics of envy”. In a cash economy like Pakistan
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where record keeping is weak, it may be difficult to acquire the VAT’s perceived 
benefits. The tax imposes added administrative and compliance costs on the tax 
collecting agency and taxpayers. Furthermore, shortages of physical and human 
capital are likely to impede the tax administration’s ability to deal effectively with a 
large number of VAT taxpayers in a comprehensive manner.
The study through descriptive, analytical and evaluative methods investigated 
the impact of the introduction of VAT in Pakistan on government revenue, its 
distributional consequences, taxpayer compliance, and administrative convenience 
under three scenarios. Scenario 1 assumes a uniform VAT structure without any 
exemptions. Scenario 2 assumes zero-rating of various household consumption items 
and a standard rate of 15 per cent for the remaining consumption items. Scenario 3 
assumes a multiple VAT rate system. The study has assessed potential political 
support or opposition to the VAT system through the analysis of the distributional 
consequences of the VAT burden on various income groups. The Lorenz-curve 
technique has been used to observe the intensity of income concentration across 
income groups during the pre-VAT and post-VAT levels of income inequality. Gini- 
coefficients have been computed to assess the VAT impact on income distribution at 
the national, rural and urban levels. The Attickson welfare index has been constructed 
to assess the effect of VAT implementation at the national, rural and urban levels. 
However, the study has focused on concepts of equity, or fairness, from the point of 
view of how regressive the tax might be, not whether regressivity is acceptable. The 
administrative feasibility of the VAT has been assessed on the basis of other countries’ 
experiences with VAT. These experiences differ, but clearly suggest that a country 
considering VAT implementation should have reasonable political support for VAT
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and an efficient tax administration. The experiences of the governments of Italy and 
the Philippines suggest that a country must be able and willing to administer the VAT 
effectively. If this is not the case, tax evasion may become “pervasive and large” and 
reduce VAT revenue significantly.
Field research through a survey in eight districts within the four provinces of 
Pakistan, and in New Zealand and the Philippines, was undertaken to assess the 
behavioural responses of key policy makers, legislators, business entities, industrialists, 
grass-roots politicians, field level tax organisation staff and the general public to 
identify the problems and obstacles affecting domestic resource mobilisation efforts. 
The field survey in Pakistan sought the opinions of most of the major groups in society 
with respect to social needs, taxation structure, and feasibility of the introduction of a 
VAT. The survey provided an in-depth insight into people’s perceptions of a 
particular tax, as well as of the taxation structure as a whole.
A review of 23 countries with VAT finds that in the majority of countries, a 
consumption type VAT with liability determined by the credit method has been used 
effectively to reduce fiscal deficits and to rationalise direct and indirect tax 
arrangements. In most cases the regressivity of the tax has been mitigated through a 
well targeted system of compensation and public transfers. Analysis suggests that the 
macroeconomic consequences of VAT, measured in terms of various macroeconomic 
variables such as growth in consumer prices, economic growth, investment and 
improvement in international competitiveness, are difficult to isolate because of the 
concurrent interaction of various economic factors. Notwithstanding, the study 
suggests that in the majority of countries surveyed, the introduction of the VAT has 
not created any adverse economic consequences of a severe nature.
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The study finds that implementation of VAT in Pakistan would provide a strong 
basis for a long-term expansion in government revenue. Within five years of 
implementation the government would be able to reduce fiscal deficits substantially, 
while maintaining public sector development expenditure at a moderate level. The 
results of simulation exercises on scenario 1 indicate that a 15 per cent uniform VAT, 
without exemptions and zero-rating, could reduce the fiscal deficit from eight per cent 
of GDP in 1992-93 to less than two per cent of GDP in 1997-98. On primary 
accounts (government expenditure less interest payments minus government revenue), 
the budget on an annual average (1993-98) basis would have surpluses equal to 
approximately three per cent of GDP. The fiscal deficit remaining would be due to the 
interest payment liability on outstanding debt stock. Assuming that scenario 1 would 
not be acceptable to politicians and the voting public, scenario 2 investigated the 
impact of zero-rating for various household consumption items and a standard VAT 
rate. Under these conditions, the fiscal deficit would average approximately 5.9 per 
cent of GDP during 1993-98. The primary deficit would be less than one per cent. 
Again most of the remaining deficit would be as a result of debt servicing payments. 
Recourse to a multiple VAT rate system (scenario 3) would also result in a reduction 
of the fiscal deficit - from eight per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to an average 5.8 per cent 
of GDP over the five year period (1993-98). Approximately 90 per cent of deficits 
under this scenario would be because of debt servicing liability.
The study finds that the distributional impact of the VAT in Pakistan would be 
regressive with respect to current income. Lorenz-curve analysis shows that under a 
flat rate VAT system income inequality would increase marginally. Under scenarios 2 
and 3 the VAT impact would be identical on all income groups. Gini-coefficients
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computed on the basis of the distribution of incomes also indicate that VAT 
mplementation in Pakistan would result in an increase in income inequality. The 
mpact of a uniform rate VAT would be higher. On national average incomes, the 
Grini-coefFicient would increase from a 0.4011 pre-VAT level to 0.4977. However, 
income inequality would be less under scenario 2 (Gini-coefficient 0.4546) and 
scenario 3 (Gini-coefficient 0.4548), but would remain higher than the pre-VAT level. 
Urban households would experience the largest increase in income inequality.
The welfare index shows that with the implementation of VAT, rural and urban 
households would be worse off in terms of welfare, relative to pre-VAT levels. Urban 
households would face a larger welfare loss compared to their counterparts in rural 
areas.
Because lower income groups would pay a higher percentage of their income 
than those earning higher incomes, a mechanism of public transfers and compensation 
would be needed to protect low-income households. However, the study recognises 
that the issue of compensation for low-income households under a VAT system is by 
no means straightforward. Compensation measures cannot be applied separately to 
each and every individual or household. It is difficult to design a comprehensive 
compensation mechanism across demographic groupings such as age, family size and 
its composition, housing status, labour status and so on. Unavoidably, a transfer 
mechanism may benefit some people more than others.
The most frequently used techniques to mitigate the regressivity of the VAT in 
the majority of countries with VAT have been lower or zero rates on products 
regarded as “necessities”, that is, commodities and services which form basic items of
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low-income household consumption, and to tax “luxuries” at higher rates. The 
analysis suggests that zero-rating and exemptions of certain commodities, transactions 
and types of activities from the tax base would reduce tax regressivity, but low income 
households would still bear the highest tax burden. Since approximately one-third of 
the population lives below the poverty line (UNDP, 199lb .87), implementation of a 
broad-based consumption tax in Pakistan, in the absence of a social security system, 
would further increase the incidence of poverty. Under this situation, resistance to the 
introduction of VAT in Pakistan would likely be strong. One way to make the VAT 
politically acceptable in terms of VAT burden distribution would be to adjust the 
disposable income of low-income households and this would be phased out as income 
rose above the poverty level.
The study recognises that improvement in tax revenue collection in Pakistan will 
depend largely on voluntary compliance. However, both survey data and field survey 
observations suggest that this is correlated with taxpayers’ perceptions of the tax 
system’s fairness. The field survey suggests that in the present environment, the public 
perception of the tax system presents a serious threat to taxpayer compliance. Most of 
the survey respondents had little faith in the ability of the tax system to operate 
equitably. On the question of which tax system would be fairer to them, the majority 
o f the survey respondents indicated that they would prefer a tax system which attached 
no tax liability to them!
The field survey outcome clearly suggests that if most of the practices 
influencing taxpayer confidence in the taxation system in Pakistan are not reversed 
quickly, taxpayer dissatisfaction will gain further momentum and there will be further 
erosion of integrity of the existing system. It is, therefore, important to politicians,
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policy-makers and tax functionaries that they understand the causes of non-compliance 
and develop new tools to combat it. As pointed out by the survey respondents, 
additional efforts seem to be necessary to facilitate compliance through simplified 
legislation and procedures, improved cooperation with taxpayers via better 
information and services, and reinforced attention to taxpayer rights. In order to 
obtain wide voter support, the introduction of VAT in Pakistan should clearly be 
linked to relevant expenditure which provides benefits to those paying VAT through 
community level development programs and projects, especially projects for social 
sector development. Also necessary is reform of the expenditure system, as well as 
the taxation system, to ensure that the revenue raised is spent efficiently. The field 
survey suggests that if government expenditure is not wisely utilised to produce social 
benefits, then it is less likely that such a taxation system will be widely supported by 
the voters.
It is concluded from the field survey that policy-makers perceive the VAT as a 
rational opportunity for the government of Pakistan to reduce substantially the fiscal 
deficit and maintain public sector development activities. Tax administrators surveyed 
at the executive level were in favour of the tax, whereas a majority of the field 
administrators surveyed were lacking theoretical and operational knowledge of a 
VAT. The business community support was conditional. To the business community, 
if  the VAT reduces the burden of other taxes, it might be good for them, provided the 
increased documentation requirements do not put too much of a compliance cost 
burden on them. The grass-roots politicians surveyed initially saw no need for a new 
tax. Instead, they argued that the existing tax administration should be improved. 
According to them, the government could generate substantial revenue from
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improvements in tax administration and in the control of corruption. They would, 
however, be willing to support the VAT if they were allowed to spend taxes according 
to their own priorities, without much central government intervention. The field 
survey found that a majority of the general public respondents was ignorant of tax 
natters.
It follows from the field survey data analysis that a favourable environment for 
VAT acceptance in Pakistan will need to be created. Taxpayers, as well as tax 
idministrators, should be educated on the various aspects of the tax. The field survey 
bund that the majority of small business entities were ignorant of how to switch from 
i sales tax to a system of VAT. The experiences of other countries with VAT suggest 
hat administration of the VAT is complex and depends on each taxpayer maintaining 
iccounts in sufficient detail. In an economy such as Pakistan, where the level of 
naintenance of accounts is generally poor, it will require considerable effort to 
educate people to understand VAT and to move from cash transactions to 
documented transactions. The study, therefore, emphasises that unless extensive 
education is imparted to educate the general public, as well as the business community, 
fuccessfiil implementation of the VAT in Pakistan is unlikely to be achieved.
The survey revealed that there is a need to improve the environment in the tax 
(flfices and behavioural attitudes of the tax functionaries with a view to providing 
nore facilities to taxpayers. Enhanced staff morale through greater participation in 
cecision making and information sharing would improve the tax office work 
(nvironment substantially. Existing bureaucratic tendencies discourage the taxpaying 
public from paying their tax honestly. In a broad-based VAT system it is, therefore, 
recessary that centralisation of power should be minimised in a manner such that
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ssues are decided at the respective stations without orders having to be sought from 
lbove.
In Pakistan, the poor service conditions and pay prospects of tax office staff are 
not conducive to the attraction of highly qualified or highly motivated officers/staff 
needed for the implementation of VAT. A system of incentives for competence, 
efficiency and honesty (for example, advance increments and accelerated promotions 
for tax staff) has been used by many countries for improvement in work efficiency. 
The field survey also found tension between field level supervisors and subordinate 
staff on service matters, especially on promotion issues. The success of VAT 
implementation in Pakistan will depend on field level tax functionaries having equitable 
service prospects. In-service training on VAT’s theoretical and operational aspects, 
both inside and abroad, will help to improve the skills of tax functionaries.
The thesis has recapitulated the major substantive results of this study, and it 
now concludes by placing these results in a more general context. Specifically, the 
thesis discusses the qualifications that should be placed on the conclusions from the 
present investigations, as well as the related question of their implications for future 
research. The study should be viewed as part of an on-going research process. On the 
one hand, it represents an attempt to integrate comprehensive policy analysis on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the VAT system. On the other hand, it suggests a clear 
direction to policy-makers and politicians and others involved in government finance. 
But the results should not be regarded as “final” in any absolute sense: instead these 
are intended to stimulate further research.
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The results of the study should be taken as only a careful approximation and 
interpreted with caution because most of them are based on the Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey (which did not cover the entire income-receiving population) 
and a small field survey which may be subject to errors of sampling and measurement. 
Further avenues of research suggested by this study are: to include other important 
factors disregarded by this study, including regional factors and behavioural responses, 
as well as compliance problems in estimating the revenue, equity and administrative 
implications of the VAT. Finally, all the reform proposals discussed in this study have 
political and administrative implications. Without political will and administrative 
motivation, no reform package will escape manipulation or abuse.
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Appendix 2.1 Consolidated budget: fifth five-year plan 1978-83 (current billion 
rupees)
1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 Total
5th plan
(1978-83)
A v .1 
growth 
rate (%)
Total revenue 27.7 32.4 40.9 49.0 53.7 61.4 237.4 17.3
Total taxes 21.6 25.1 32.5 38.8 42.9 51.4 190.7 18.9
- Direct taxes 3.2 4.0 5.9 7.6 9.0 9.9 36.4 25.2
. Income tax 2.8 3.3 5.2 7.0 8.8 8.8 33.1 25.4
. Other 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.3 1.1 3.3 23.0
- Indirect taxes 18.4 21.1 26.6 31.2 33.9 41.5 154.3 17.7
. Import duties 8.0 9.8 12.1 13.6 14.7 18.1 68.3 17.6
. Export duties 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.4 2.2 3.3
. Excise duties 6.4 7.0 9.7 10.5 11.8 15.6 54.6 19.7
. Sales tax 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.9 3.3 3.5 14.0 17.0
Domestic 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.7 2.8 11.2 15.6
Imports 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 2.8 23.6
. Surcharges 0.9 1.1 0.7 1.7 1.8 2.4 7.7 22.1
. Other 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.9 1.9 1.5 7.5 5.6
Non-tax revenue 5.5 6.3 6.8 8.2 8.9 7.8 38.0 7.0
. T&T/PO profits2 0.3 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.7 5.4 41.5
. Intr. & dividents3 1.91 2.2 2.5 3.1 1.9 3.7 13.4 14.1
. Other 3.3 3.3 3.6 4.1 5.9 2.4 19.2 -6.6
Self-financing by AB4 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 1.9 2.3 8.7 34.5
Total expenditure 42.1 49.6 56.0 64.5 72.4 87.1 329.6 15.6
- Current expenditure 25.0 29.1 34.2 38.7 46.0 57.7 205.7 18.2
. Govt, administration 3.5 3.9 4.3 4.9 5.8 6.9 25.8 14.5
. Defence 9.7 10.2 12.7 15.3 18.6 23.2 80.0 19.1
. Community services 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.1 7.7 21.4
. Social services 3.3 3.4 4.2 4.9 5.6 7.0 25.0 16.4
. Economic services 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.4 2.0 2.2 9.1 -1.3
. Subsidies 1.8 3.7 3.7 2.4 2.5 2.8 15.1 9.5
. Interest payments 3.4 4.0 5.2 5.9 7.7 11.0 33.8 26.6
- Domestic 1.7 2.0 2.9 3.6 4.9 6.6 20.0 32.0
- Foreign 1.7 2.0 2.4 2.3 2.8 4.4 13.8 20.5-
. Other 0.3 1.1 1.1 2.4 2.1 2.6 9.3 56.8
- Development expenditure 17.1 20.5 21.8 25.8 26.5 29.4 123.9 11.4
Overall deficit 14.5 17.2 15.1 15.5 18.7 25.7 92.2 12.1
Financing:
- Non-bank borrowing 3.0 2.0 1.9 5.4 7.5 14.4 31.2 36.9
- Bank borrowing 5.4 8.5 6.3 2.4 5.5 6.1 28.8 2.7
- External borrowing 6.1 6.7 6.9 7.7 5.7 5.2 32.2 -3.4
Memorandum items:
GDP (market prices) 176.3 194.9 234.2 277.4 321.8 364.4 1392.7 15.6
As percentage of GDP
Total revenue 15.7 16.6 17.4 17.7 16.7 16.9 17.1
Total expenditure 23.9 25.5 23.9 23.3 22.5 23.9 23.7
- Current 14.2 14.9 14.6 14.0 14.3 15.8 14.8
- Development 9.7 10.5 9.3 9.3 8.2 8.1 8.9
Overall deficit 8.2 8.8 6.46 5.6 5.8 7.0 6.6
Non-bank borrowing 1.7 1.0 0.8 1.9 2.3 3.9 2.2
Bank borrowing 3.0 4.4 2.7 0.9 1.7 1.7 2.1
External borrowing 3.5 3.4 3.0 2.8 1.8 1.4 2.3
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Nrtes: ’Annual average. 2Telephone, Telegraph and Post Office departments profits.
’Interest and dividends. 4Public sector autonomous bodies under the budget. 
^Government administration.
Soirees: Government of Baluchistan, Annual Budget Documents, Finance Department, Quetta: 
Government of Baluchistan (various issues).
Government of NWFP, Annual Budget Documents, Finance Department, Peshawar: 
Government of NWFP (various issues).
Government of Pakistan, 1981. Pakistan Economic Survey 1980-81, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, 1986. Pakistan Economic Survey 1985-86, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, 1988. Public Finance Statistics 1987-88, Ministry of 
Finance, Budget Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, 1990. Pakistan Economic Survey 1989-90, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, 1992. Pakistan Economic Survey 1991-92, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser's Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, 1994. Pakistan Economic Survey 1993-94, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, Annual Budget Documents, Ministry of Finance, Budget 
Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan (various issues).
Government of the Punjab, Annual Budget Documents, Finance Department, Lahore: 
Government of the Punjab (various issues).
Government of Sindh, Annual Budget Documents, Finance Department, Karachi: 
Government of Sindh (various issues).
Revenue Division, 1992. CBR Yearbook 1988-89 -  1990-9, Revenue Division, Central 
Board of Revenue, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
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Appendix 2.2 Consolidated budget: sixth five-year plan 1983-88 (current billion 
rupees)
1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 Total Av.1
6th plan growth 
(1983-88) rate (%)
Total revenue 61.4 74.9 80.0 92.8 105.7 122.8 476.2 14.9
Total taxes 51.4 58.4 61.2 72.4 82.9 93.5 368.4 12.7
- Direct taxes 9.9 9.2 9.7 10.3 11.1 12.5 52.8 4.8
. Income tax 8.8 8.6 9.1 9.6 10.4 11.5 49.2 5.7
. Other 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 3.6 -3.5
- Indirect taxes 41.5 49.2 51.5 62.2 71.8 81.0 315.6 14.3
. Import duties 18.1 21.1 22.9 • 28.4 33.1 34.7 140.1 13.9
. Export duties 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.3 3.3 5.5 52.4
. Excise duties 15.6 15.8 15.4 15.6 15.5 17.6 79.9 2.4
. Sales tax 3.5 4.6 4.7 4.9 6.4 8.7 29.4 20.2
Domestic 2.8 3.7 3.5 3.6 4.6 5.2 20.5 13.3
Imports 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.8 3.6 8.9 37.7
. Surcharges 2.4 4.7 5.3 9.3 13.3 13.0 45.5 40.3
. Other 1.5 2.5 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.7 15.3 19.4
Non-tax revenue 7.8 13.9 16.2 17.5 21.0 23.6 92.1 24.9
. T&T/PO profits2 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.8 4.1 4.1 15.4 19.3
. Intr. & dividents3 3.7 4.2 5.0 5.3 7 5 6.4 28.3 11.6
. Other 2.4 7.7 8.8 9.4 9.4 13.1 48.4 40.7
Self-financing by AB4 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.9 1.8 5.8 15.8 20.4
Total expenditure 87.1 100.0 116.8 134.5 152.4 180.4 684.0 15.7
- Current expenditure 57.7 71.9 83.8 94.7 116.3 133.6 500.3 18.3
. Govt: Administration5 6.9 9.7 10.6 10.9 16.1 14.6 61.7 16.2
. Defence 23.2 26.8 31.9 35.6 41.3 47.0 182.6 15.2
. Community services 2.1 2.7 3.0 3.6 4.5 4.2 18.0 15.0
. Social services 7.0 9.8 10.5 12.37 15.5 17.3 65.4 19.9
. Economic services 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.0 5.2 4.6 18.1 15.4
. Subsidies 2.8 4.7 5.4 5.7 5.8 8.0 29.5 23.5
. Interest payments 11.0 14.1 16.5 19.7 24.2 32.3 106.9 24.1
- Domestic 6.6 9.0 10.7 13.4 16.8 24.1 73.9 29.6
- Foreign 4.4 5.2 5.9 6.4 7.4 8.2 33.0 13.5
Other 2.6 1.9 2.8 3.9 3.8 5.7 18.0 17.4
- Development expenditure29.4 28.1 33.1 39.8 36.2 46.7 183.8 9.7
Overall deficit 25.7 25.2 36.8 41.6 46.7 57.6 207.8 17.6
Financing:
- Non-bank borrowing 14.4 12.3 12.9 27.0 27.4 30.9 110.4 16.6
- Bank borrowing 6.1 7.9 18.7 6.1 10.9 13.9 57.6 17.9
- External borrowing 5.2 5.0 5.2 8.6 8.4 12.7 39.9 19.7
Memorandum items:
GDP (market prices) 364.4 419.8 472.2 514.5 572.5 675.4 2654.4 13.1
As percentage of GDP
Total revenue 16.9 17.8 17.0 18.0 18.5 18.2 17.9
Total expenditure 23.9 23.8 24.8 26.1 26.7 26.7 25.8
- Current 15.8 17.1 17.8 18.4 20.4 19.8 18.9
- Development 8.1 6.7 7.0 7.7 6.3 6.9 6.9
O verall deficit 7.0 6.0 7.8 8.1 8.2 8.5 7.9
N on-bank borrowing 3.9 2.9 2.7 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.2
B;ank borrowing 1.7 1.9 4.0 1.2 1.9 2.1 2.2
External borrowing 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.5
N otes: As per Appendix 2.1. 
Sources: As per Appendix 2.1.
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Afpendix 2.3 Consolidated budget: seventh five-year plan 1988-93 (current billion 
rupees)
1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 Total
7th plan
(1988-93)
Av.1
growth
rate (%)
Tctal revenue 122.8 144.3 165.6 171.8 231.5 244.0 957.1 14.7
Tctal taxes 93.5 110.3 119.4 129.6 164.3 179.8 703.6 14.0
- Direct taxes 12.5 14.6 15.7 20.8 29.8 37.8 118.7 24.9
. Income tax 11.5 13.4 14.3 19.1 27.9 35.0 109.7 24.9
. Other 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.8 9.0 25.1
- Indirect taxes 81.0 95.8 103.7 108.9 134.5 142.1 584.9 11.9
. Import duties 34.7 37.9 44.4 46.4 61.8 63.2 253.7 12.7
. Export duties 3.3 4.5 5.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 13.6 ■100.0
. Excise duties 17.6 20.2 23.3 25.0 30.7 35.5 134.8 15.1
. Sales tax 8.7 14.7 15.6 16.9 20.8 23.6 91.6 22.0
Domestic 5.2 7.5 7.3 7.8 10.0 11.2 43.7 16.6
Imports 3.6 7.2 8.3 9.1 10.8 12.5 47.9 28.4
. Surcharges 13.0 14.5 11.1 12.3 14.8 13.1 65.7 0.1
. Other 3.7 4.0 4.4 4.1 6.4 6.6 25.5 12.2
- Non-tax revenue 23.6 28.8 39.4 34.2 52.3 62.5 217.1 21.5
T&T7 PO profits2 4.1 5.3 6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.9 •-100.0
Intr. & dividents3 6.4 10.0 12.3 9.5 17.5 18.0 67.3 23.0
Other 13.1 13.5 20.5 24.7 34.7 44.5 138.0 27.7
- Self-financing by AB4 5.8 5.2 6.8 7.9 14.9 1.6 36.4 -22.7
Toial expenditure 180.4 201.2 221.6 261.0 321.5 351.9 1357.1 14.3
- Current expenditure 133.6 153.1 165.6 195.7 230.1 265.4 1009.8 14.7
Govt: administration 14.6 20.0 17.5 19.2 30.1 31.1 118.0 16.4
Defence 47.0 51.1 58.7 64.6 75.8 87.8 337.9 13.3
Community services 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.6 6.4 8.2 28.1 14 4
Social services 17.3 19.3 20.2 28.1 32.1 38.7 138.5 17.4
Economic services 4.6 5.1 3.9 3.6 9.3 10.2 32.1 17.4
Subsidies 8.0 13.3 9.0 10.7 7.9 7.3 48.3 -1.6
Interest payments 32.3 38.1 46.7 49.3 62.4 75.2 271.7 18.4
- Domestic 24.1 28.7 35.3 36.3 47.8 58.7 206.7 19.5
- Foreign 8.2 9.4 11.4 13.0 14.6 16.5 65.0 14.9
. Other 5.7 1.8 5.1 15.5 6.2 6.9 35.4 3.8
- Development expenditure46.7 48.1 56.1 65.3 91.4 86.5 347.3 13.1
Overall deficit 57.6 56.9 56.1 89.2 90.0 107.9 400.0 13.4
Financing:
- Non-bank borrowing 30.9 37.9 29.6 23.7 -0.5 21.0 111.6 -7.5
- Bank borrowing 13.9 0.8 3.5 43.4 72.5 62.6 182.8 35.0
- External borrowing 12.7 18.2 23.0 22.1 18.0 24.3 105.6 13.9
Memorandum items:
GDP (market prices) 675.4 769.8 855.9 1020.6 1211.4 1342.0 5199.6
As percentage of GDP
Total revenue 18.2 18.7 19.3 16.9 19.1 18.2 18.4
Total expenditure 26.7 26.1 25.8 25.6 26.5 26.2 26.1
- Current 19.8 19.9 19.3 19.2 19.0 19.8 19.4
- Development 6.9 6.3 6.5 6.4 7.5 6.4 6.7
Overall deficit 8.5 7.4 6.5 8.7 7.4 8.0 7.7
Non-bank borrowing 4.6 4.9 3.5 2.3 0.0 1.6 2.1
Bank borrowing 2.1 0.1 0.4 4.2 6.0 4.7 3.5
External borrowing 1.9 2.4 2.7 2.2 1.5 1.8 2.0
Notes: As per appendix 2.1. 
Sources: As per appendix 2.1.
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Appendix 2.4 Comparative statement of marginal tax rates on personal income
Income brackets 
1979-80 to 1985-86 
Exemption limit:
Rupees 12,000 until 1984-85 
Rupees 18,000 for 1985-86 
Taxable income does not exceed rupees 10,000 
Between rupees 10,001 and rupees 15,000 
Between rupees 15,001 and rupees 20,000 
Between rapees 20,001 and rupees 25,000 
Between rupees 25,001 and rupees 30,000 
Between rupees 30,001 and rupees 60,000 
Between rupees 60,001 and rupees 100,000 
Income exceeds rupees 100,000
Marginal tax rates (%)
0
0
15
20
25
35
40
50
55
60
1986-87 to 1987-88
Exemption limit rupees 24,000 0
Taxable income does not exceed rupees 25,000 5
Between rupees 25,001 and rupees 50,000 15
Between rupees 50,001 and rupees 100,000 25
Between rupees 100,001 and rupees 200,000 35
Income exceeds rupees 200,000 45
1988-89 to 1991-92
Where income is below rupees 100,000 10
Exemption limit:
Rupees 40,000 for salary 
Rupees 30,000 for other income
Where income exceeds rupees 100,000
Exemption limit rupees 24,000 0
- Where taxable income is rupees 76,000 15
- Between rupees 76,001 and rupees 100,000 25
- Between rupees 100,001 and rupees 200,000 35
-Where taxable income exceeds rupees 200,000 45
1988-89 to 1991-92
Where income is below rupees 100,000 10
Exemption limit:
Rupees 40,000 for salary 
Rupees 30,000 for other income
Where income is rupees 100,000 or more
Exemption limit rupees 30,000 0
- Where taxable income is up to rupees 100,000 10
- Between rupees 100,001 and rupees 200,000 20
- Between rupees 200,001 and rupees 300,000 30
-Where taxable income exceeds rupees 300,000____________ 35
Source: Revenue Division, Central Board of Revenue’s official record on Marginal Tax Rates 
on Personal Income from 1979 to 1944, Revenue Division, Central Board of Revenue, 
Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
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Appendix 2.5 Revenue sharing arrangements between the federal government and 
the provincial governments
N ie m e y er
A w ard
1937
R a ism a n
A w ard
1951
N a tio n a l
F inancp
C om m
1962
N a tio n a l
F in an cp
C o m m
1964
N a tio n a l
F in an cp
C om m
1970
N a tio n a l
F in an cp
C o m m
1974
N a tio n a l
F in an cp
C om m
1991
Taxes on income2 and 
corporate profits 50 50 50 65 80 80 80
Sales tax - 50 60 65 80 80 80
Central excise on tea, 
tobacco and betel nut 50 60 65 80 80
Central excise on sugar - - - - - - 80
Export duty on jute 
and cotton 2.653 62.53 100 65 804 80 80
Estate and succession 
Duties on agricultural 
Land 100 100 100
Taxes on the capital 
value of immovable 
property 100 100 100
Surcharges on natural gas' 
Surcharges on electricity6
IV I ______  1
100 100
100
Commission.
2 Excluding income tax on emoluments of federal government employees.
^Confined to jute only.
4Confmed to cotton only.
On the basis of wellhead.
6Hydro power.
Sources: Government of Pakistan, 1978. Statutory Orders Regulating Allocation o f Revenues 
between Federal and Provincial Government 1978, Ministry' of Finance: Islamabad: 
Government of Pakistan.
National Finance Commission, 1991. Report on the Distribution o f Shareable Taxes 
between Federal Government and the Provinces, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad: 
Government of Pakistan.
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Appendix 4.1 Developed and developing countries on value-added tax
Country Date of VAT 
introduction 
or proposed
VAT rates1
Introduction As on January 1, 1993
Algeria Jan. 1992 7, 13,21,40
Argentina Jan. 1975 16 13
Austria Jan. 1973 8, 16 6, 10, 20
Bangladesh July 1988 15 15
Belgium Jan. 1971 6, 14, 18 1, 6, 12, 19.5
Belorussia Jan. 1992 28
Benin Apr. 1991 18 18
Bolivia Oct. 1973 5, 10. 15 10, 13
Brazil^ Jan. 1967 15 7, 12
Brazil^ Jan. 1967 15 17
Bulgaria Mid. 1992 10
Canada Jan. 1991 7 7
Czechoslovakia 1992
Chile Mar. 1975 8, 20 18
Colombia Jan. 1975 4, 6, 10 14
Costa Rica Jan. 1975 10 11
Cote d'Ivoire Jan. 1960 8 11.11,25, 35.13
Denmark July 1967 10 25
Dominican Republic Jan. 1983 6 6
Ecuador July 1970 4, 10 10
Estonia Jan. 1992 10 10
Fiji July 1992 10 10
Finland Oct. 1990 17 19.05
France Jan. 1968 6, 4, 13.6, 20, 25 2.1, 5.5, 18.6
Germany Jan. 1968 5, 10 7, 14
Greece Jan. 1987 6, 18, 36 4, 8, 18
Grenada April 1986 20 20
Guatemala Aug. 1983 7 7
Haiti Nov. 1982 7 10
Honduras Jan. 1976 3 7, 10
Hungary Jan. 1988 15,25 15,25
Iceland Jan. 1990 14, 24.5 14, 24.5
Indonesia Apr. 1985 10 10
Ireland Nov. 1972 5.26, 16.37, 30.26 2.7, 10, 12.5, 16,21
Israel July 1976 8 18
Italy Jan. 1973 6, 12, 18 4, 9, 12, 19, 38
Ivory Coast^ Jan. 1960 8 5.26, 11,25,35.13
Japan Apr. 1989 5 3,6
Kenya Jan. 1990 17, 20, 40,50, 270 5, 18, 30,50, 75
South Korea July 1977 10 10
Luxembourg Jan. 1970 2, 4 ,8 3, 12, 15
Madagascar Jan. 1969 6, 12 15
Malawi May 1989 10, 35,55,85 10, 35, 55, 85
Malaysia
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C o u n try D a te  o f  V A T  
in tro d u c tio n  
o r  p ro p o se d
V A T  ra te s 1
In tro d u c tio n  A s o n  J a n u a ry  1, 1993
Mali Jan. 1991 10, 17 10,17
Mexico Jan. 1980 10 6,15,20
Morocco Apr. 1986 7, 12, 14, 19,30 7,12,14,19,30
Netherlands Jan. 1969 4, 12 6,17.5
New Zealand Oct. 1986 10 12.5
Nicaragua Jan. 1975 6 5,6,10
N ig e r Jan. 1986 8, 12, 18 10,17,25
Norway Jan. 1970 20 20
Pakistan July 1994 15 15
Panama Mar. 1977 5 5
Paraguay Jan. 1992 12 10
P e r u July 1976 3, 20, 40 15
Philippines Jan. 1988 10 10
Poland 1991/2 5, 18
Portugal
Republic of China
Jan. 1986 8, 16, 30 5,16,30
(Taiwan) Apr. 1986 5 5,15
Romania 1992/3 10
Russia Jan. 1992
Senegal Mar. 1961 7,10,15,20,30
Singapore
South Africa Sept. 1991 10
Spain Ja n .1986 6, 12, 33 6,13,28
S w e d e n Jan. 1969 2.04, 6.38, 11.1 18,22
Tanzania 7
Thailand Jan. 1992 7 1.5,2.5,7
Trindad and Tobago Jan. 1990 15 15
Tunisia July 1988 6, 17, 29 6,17,29
Turkey Jan. 1985 10 12,15
Ukraine Jan. 1992 35
United Kingdom Apr. 1973 10 17.5
Uruguay Jan. 1968 5,14 14,22
Venezuela 1992
Yugoslavia 1994
Notes: ..Information not available.
’Rates shown in bold type are the standard rates applied to goods and services not 
covered by other especially high or low rates. Most countries use a zero-rate for a few 
goods, and Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom use it extensively to ensure that 
substantial amounts of goods and services are free of VAT.
2On interstate transactions depending on region.
’On intra-state transactions.
4 These are effective rates. The statutory rates are computed on prices including tax. 
Sources: Tait, A. A., 1988, Value Added Tax: International Practice and Problems, 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund:Table 1:3.
Tait, A. A., 1992. ‘Introducing Value-added Taxes’, in V. Tanzi (ed.), Fiscal Policies 
in Economies in Transition, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund:Table 
1:190.
Purohit, M. C., 1993. Principles and Practices o f Value-added Tax: Lessons for  
Developing Countries, Delhi: Gayatri Publication:Table 1.1:3.
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Appendix 4.2 Value-added tax rates applicable on basic items -  selected countries 
(percent)
Basic
Foodstuffs
Clothing Passenger
Transport
Education 
Services ^
Health
Services^
Austria 10 20 103 Exempt Exempt^
Belgium 6 6 63 Exempt Exempt
Canada 0 7 Exempt Exempt Exempt
Denmark 22 22 Exempt Exempt Exempt
Finland 22 22 Exempt Exempt Exempt
France 5.5 18.6 5.53 Exempt Exempt
Germany 7 14 7 or 14 Exempt Exempt
Greece 8 18 Exempt Exempt Exempt
Hungary 6 12 Exempt Exempt Exempt
Ireland 0 0 or 12.5  ^ Exempt3 Exempt Exempt
Italy 4 9 or 19 Exempt Exempt Exempt
Luxembourg 3 12 6 Exempt Exempt
Netherlands 6 18.5 0 or 63 Exempt Exempt
New Zealand 12.5 12.5 0 or 12.5 12.5 12.5
Norway 20 20 Exempt Exempt Exempt
Portugal 0 17 83 Exempt Exempt
South Africa^ 12 12 12 Exempt Exempt
Spain 6 12 6 or 123 Exempt Exempt
Sweden 25 25 Exempt Exempt Exempt
Turkey 8 12 12 Exempt Exempt
United Kingdom 0 Oor 17.5 5 Exempt Exempt
Notes: ' Most countries treat education services provided by government bodies or other 
recognised bodies as exempt and "education" services provided by others as taxable. In 
Austria, education services provided by government bodies are not taxable while 
education services provided by others are exempt without credit for input tax.
^In most countries, such services must be provided by members of recognised bodies, to 
qualify. In Austria, services rendered by Social Security are exempted with credit for 
input tax. Health services rendered by hospitals are liable at 10 per cent and health 
services provided by doctors directly are liable at 20 per cent.
3 Domestic passenger transport is liable at 5.5 per cent in France, 6 per cent in the 
Netherlands, 8 per cent in Portugal and 6 per cent (overland) or 12 (sea or air) in Spain. 
In the United Kingdom, zero-rate is applied to passenger transportation in vehicles 
designed or adapted to carry 12 or more passengers. In Ireland, passenger transport is 
exempt, but suppliers of international passenger transport services can recover input 
VAT. In Austria, cross-border passenger transportation services by ship and aircraft are 
exempt.
4 Also, in some cases 10 per cent and 20 per cent.
5 In Ireland and the United Kingdom, children's clothing is zero-rated.
^Tax rates and exempted status of various goods and services anticipated.
Source: Ernst & Young, 1991. International VAT: A Guide to Practice and Procedures in 21 
Countries, London: Kogan Page:Appendix A:357.
240
Appencix 4.3 Value-added tax registration limits - selected countries
Annual turnover limits ^  VAT Reporting Annual Reporting
Goods Services Periods Available^
Austria AS 40,000 AS 40,000 Monthly, quarterly^ No
Belgiun No limit No limit Monthly or quarterly yes
Canada $ 30,000 $ 30,000 Monthly, quarterly^ yes
Denmark DKK 10,000 DKK 10,000 Quarterly No6
Finland Fim 75,000 Fim 75,000 Monthly No
France FF 70,000 FF 70,000 Monthly or quarterly No
Germary No limit No limit Monthly, quarterly Yes
Greece No limit No limit Monthly, bi-monthly^ Yes
Hungary No limit No limit Quarterly and annually Yes
Ireland IRL 25,000 IRL 25,000 Monthly, bi-monthly^ No
Italy No limit No limit Monthly or quarterly^ Yes
Luxembourg No limit No limit Monthly, quarterly^ Yes
Netherlands No limit No limit Monthly or quarterly No
New Zealand NZ$ 30,000 NZ$ 30,000 One, two or six-monthly No
Norway Nok 12,000 Nok 12,000 Bi-monthly No
Portugal No limit No limit Monthly or quarterly No
South Africa^ R 50,000 R 50,000 Monthly, bi-monthly No
Spain No limit No limit Monthly or quarterly No
Swedenö SEK 200,000 SEK 200,000 Monthly, or bi-monthly No
Turkey No limit No limit Monthly and annually Yes
United Kingdom L 35,000 L 35,000 Monthly or quarterly Yes
Notes: ^Sorne countries apply different limits to specific services: small retailers and
professionals.
2 Annual reporting is normally only available for certain types of entrepreneurs (for 
example, small traders) with the consent of the authorities. In Germany, every 
entrepreneur must file preliminary and annual returns.
^and annually.
^or quarterly and annually.
In Italy VAT is payable monthly or quarterly, but it is reported annually.
Income less than SED 200,000 is to be reported separately in ordinary income tax 
returns.
Source: Ernst & Young, 1991. International VAT: A Guide to Practice and Procedures in 21 
Countries, London: Kogan Page:358.
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Appencx 5.1 Taxable persons and registration requirements under value-added 
tax - selected countries
OEC1 countries 
- Bepum A taxable person in the VAT system is any person whose activities 
contribute to effecting, in a regular and independent manner, supplies 
of goods or services, with or without a profit motive. Government 
bodies are not considered taxable persons. "Groups" or "Fiscal Unity" 
concepts do not exist. Registration rules generally apply to resident 
entrepreneurs. Non-resident entrepreneurs who have a permanent 
establishment are treated equally. But those who do not have a 
permanent establishment are required to appoint a resident member in 
their Board. Voluntary registration is permitted.
- Demark Individuals, partnerships, companies, foundations, clubs, associations, 
and charities are registered for VAT or are required to register, whether 
profitable or profit-making or not. An entrepreneur who is taxable 
must apply to the Customs authorities for registration. When two or 
more companies resident in Denmark are under common control they 
may elect to be registered as a single group for VAT purposes. 
Companies which are not liable to be registered can apply for 
registration. Government bodies’ obligation to VAT is limited.
- Neuerlands A taxable person in the VAT system is any one whose activities 
contribute to effecting, in a regular and independent manner, supplies 
of goods or services, with or without a profit motive. All
entrepreneurs, including permanent establishment or non-Dutch 
companies carrying on business in a regular and independent manner, 
with or without a profit motive are required to register for VAT 
purposes. Government bodies are not taxable. However, the 
Government's commercial activities are treated for VAT purposes in 
the same manner as private business entities. Group concepts are not 
permitted.
- Fraice A taxable person in the VAT system is any person whose activities 
contribute to effecting, in a regular and independent manner, supplies 
of goods or services, with or without a profit motive. Government 
bodies not engaged in commercial activities are not considered taxable 
persons. Anyone who is making taxable supplies above 1,350 FFr per 
year, in a regular and independent manner, with or without a profit 
motive is required to register. No group treatment is permitted, 
therefore, all transactions taking place between members of groups are 
subject to VAT. Voluntary registration is permitted.
- Ital' An entrepreneur carrying on an independent business activity on a 
continuous basis is a taxable person. Artists, and professional persons 
or partnerships are considered to be taxable persons. Government 
bodies are considered as taxable persons. A group concept is allowed. 
In 1989 there were 5.416 million total VAT return filers.
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- Luxembourg
- Norway
- New Zealand
Any person regularly supplying goods and services whether for profit 
or not is a taxable person. An entrepreneur engaged in an industrial, 
commercial or professional activity must register with the VAT 
authority. The concept of fiscal unity does not exist. Each taxable 
person (individual or legal body) must account for the tax 
independently.
Any physical or legal person engaged in taxable activity is a taxable 
person and liable to VAT and needs to register for VAT when their 
taxable sales exceed ND 12,000 in the last 12 month period. 
Government bodies, except for commercial activities, are not treated as 
taxable persons. Group registration is permitted. Registered VAT 
persons are liable for special investment tax, which is levied on durable 
items of business equipment. Voluntary registration is permitted.
All persons regularly supplying goods and services, whether for profit 
or not, are taxable persons. This includes ordinary business, traders, 
professions, public authorities, club, societies, charities, whose supply 
of goods and services in any twelve month period exceeds or is likely to 
exceed NZ$30,000 are required to register. Group and voluntary 
registration is permitted.
- Sweden The liability to pay tax arises from a commodity or services used in
commercial activity. Any person associated with commercial activity is 
liable to pay VAT. VAT is applied on Government bodies. Special 
rules apply for group concept.
- Germany Any entrepreneur who is resident in Germany and who makes taxable
supplies within Germany has to register for VAT at the local tax office. 
Government bodies not engaged in commercial activities are not 
considered taxable persons and need not register for VAT. The VAT 
system permits all resident groups of companies to file one return. 
Voluntary registration is permitted.
- United Kingdom A taxable person is any person (individual, partnership, company,
trustee, club, association, charity) who makes taxable supplies above 
35,000 Pounds in a year. Group may register as a single business. 
Voluntary registration is permitted
- Turkey A taxable person can be any person who carries on a commercial,
industrial, agricultural and professional activity in an independent 
manner and is liable to VAT, including small entrepreneurs and 
certain retailers.
Asian and Pacific countries
- South Korea Anyone who is independently engaged in the supply of goods and
services, regardless of whether or not the supply is made to earn profit, 
is a taxable person and must register at the tax office in the district of 
business. This includes individuals, corporations (including the state, 
local authorities, and association of local authorities) and any bodies of 
persons, foundations or any other organisations. Separate registration 
is required for each type of business. Voluntary registration is 
permitted.
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- Indonesia The VAT is extended to cover all deliveries of taxable goods carried 
out in the customs area by wholesalers or retailers in the course of 
business. All importers, manufacturers, real estate dealers, and 
distributors with annual turnover above 60 million Rupiah and who are 
independently engaged in the supply of gods and services, regardless of 
whether or not the supply is made to earn profit, are required to register 
for VAT. VAT also applies to governmental bodies engaged in 
commercial activities.
- Philippines All persons whose sales of taxable goods and services exceed 200,000 
Pesos annually are required to register for VAT regardless of whether 
or not the supply is made for profit. Voluntary registration is 
permitted, with conditions.
- Taiwan Any profit-seeking enterprise which is privately owned, owned by the 
government or jointly owned by the government and a private entity, 
any non-profit seeking enterprise, institute, organisation or association 
which sells goods and services, and has a permanent business 
establishment within the territory of the Taiwan is required to register 
for VAT. However, foreign enterprises, organisations, institutes or 
associations which have no permanent business establishment within 
the country are required to appoint a local agent, and the local agent is 
treated as a VAT taxpayer.
- Fiji Every person who carries on any taxable activity independently for the 
supply of goods and services regardless of whether or not the supply is 
made for profit purposes is a taxable person under the VAT regime. 
Groups and voluntary registration are permitted.
African and Latin American countries
- Kenya Anyone whose activity consists in effecting the supply of goods and
services, in a regular and independent manner, with or without a profit 
motive is considered a taxable person and is required to be registered 
with the tax authorities.
- Guatemala Anyone who is independently engaged in the supply of goods and 
services regardless of whether or not the supply is made for profit 
purposes needs to register for VAT purposes.
- Argentina The 1974 VAT system was revised in 1992. In the new VAT set-up, 
the scope and coverage of the tax has been changed substantially. 
Information on the new system is not available.
- Uruguay
- Morocco
Information not available. 
Information not available.
- Mexico The VAT is levied on individuals, legal entities and economic units 
independently engaged in the supply of goods and services, regardless 
of whether or not the supply is made for profit purposes, and that entity 
is liable for VAT registration.
Sources: Belgium Information and Documentation Institute, 1979. VAT in Belgium, Brussels: 
Government Printers.
Buckett, A., 1990. VAT in the European Community, London: Butterworths.
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New Zealand, 1993. Goods and Services Tax Legislation, Seventh Edition, 
Auckland:CCH New Zealand Limited.
Commission of the European Communities, 1992. Value-Added Tax Collection and 
Control Procedures Applied in Member States, Report from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, Brussels: Commission of the European 
Communities.
Directorate General of Taxation, 1991. Tax Laws o f the Republic o f Indonesia, 
Jakarta: Ministry of Finance.
Ernst & Young, 1991. International VAT. A Guide to Practice and Procedures in 21 
Countries, London: Kogan Page.
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 1987. Value-Added Taxation in 
Europe, Volume 4, Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 1993. Value Added Tax in Turkey, 
Supplement No. 78., Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. 
Internal Revenue Department, 1991. GST Guide, Wellington: Internal Revenue 
Department.
Ministry of Finance, 1979. Value-Added Tax in the Netherlands, Hague: Ministry of 
Finance.
Ministry of Finance, 1992a. The Swedish Budget 1992, Stockholm: Ministry of 
Finance.
Ministry of Fiscal Affairs, 1987. Tax on Value-Added in Denmark, (translation), 
Copenhagen: Government Printer.
Mexican Investment Board, 1992. The Mexican Tax System, Mexico: Government 
Publisher.
M&M Bomchil, 1990. Tax Reform in Argentina, Buenos Aires: M & M Bomchil. 
National Tax Board, 1991. Value Added Tax in Sweden, Second Edition, Stockholm: 
National Tax Board.
Republic of Fiji, 1991. Value-Added Tax Decree 1991, Suva: Government Printer. 
Republic of Philippines, 1988. Value-Added Tax Law, Executive Order No 273, 
Revenue Regulations No 5-87, Manila: Ministry of Finance.
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Finance and Customs, 1992. The Value-Added Tax 
System in Norway: Acts and Regulations, Oslo: Ministry of Finance.
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Appendix 5.2
OECD countries
- Belgium
- Denmark
- Netherlands
- France
- Italy
- Luxembourg
- Norway
- New Zealand
- Sweden
Record-keeping under value-added tax - selected countries
A number of account books and documents such as invoices, journals for the 
entry of the day-to-day transactions, annual inventory registration records and 
maintenance of assets and liabilities records are necessary for all VAT 
registered persons. Maintenance of records for all incoming and outgoing 
invoices is compulsory. Each VAT registered business is required to keep 
records for five years.
Registered taxpayer purchases and sales of taxable goods and services must be 
recorded in accounts which can serve as a basis for the calculation and control 
of the VAT system for each taxation period. Both registered enterprises and 
exempt enterprises must retain books and records including details of invoices 
with invoice copies for five years.
Entrepreneurs are obliged to keep a number of account books and documents 
such as invoices, journals for the entry of the day-to-day transactions, annual 
inventory registration records and maintenance of assets and liabilities records 
and this is necessary for all VAT registered persons. Each VAT registered 
business is required to keep records for ten years.
Entrepreneurs who are subject to VAT must keep adequate accounting books to 
justify all their transactions. Maintenance of records for all incoming and 
outgoing invoices is compulsory.
Maintenance of a number of account books and documents by all VAT 
registered persons is necessary. Maintenance of records for all incoming and 
outgoing invoices is compulsory. Records of all supply invoices must be 
accounted for in a specific book. Similarly, invoices received from suppliers 
must be recorded in another book. Transactions without invoices must be 
recorded in another book. These books must be "validated" by a VAT officer or 
a public notary.
An entrepreneur is obliged to keep accounts in sufficient detail to permit 
application of the VAT and inspection by the tax authority. The records must 
be kept for ten years.
A VAT registered person is required to organise his/her book-keeping in such a 
manner that the VAT authorities may at any time check records.
A number of account books and documents such as invoices, journals for the 
entry of the day-to-day transactions, annual inventory registration records and 
maintenance of assets and liabilities records are necessary for all VAT 
registered persons. Maintenance of records for all incoming and outgoing 
invoices is compulsory. Each VAT registered business is required to keep 
records for ten years.
A number of account books and documents such as invoices, journals for the 
entry of the day-to-day transactions, annual inventory registration records and 
maintenance of assets and liabilities records are necessary for all VAT 
registered persons. Maintenance of records for all incoming and outgoing 
invoices is compulsory. Each VAT registered business is required to keep 
records for ten years. If no books and records are kept as per requirements, a 
severe penalty is likely to be imposed.
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- Germany Has strict book-keeping requirements. An entrepreneur who supplies goods and 
services is obliged to keep adequate records for the purpose of determining the 
tax and basis of its computation. Maintenance of records for all incoming and 
outgoing invoices is compulsory. Each VAT registered business is required to 
keep records for six years. Small entrepreneurs may keep simplified records.
- United Kingdom A number of account books and documents such as invoices, journals for the 
entry of the day-to-day transactions, annual inventory registration records and 
maintenance of assets and liabilities records is necessary for all VAT registered 
persons. Maintenance of records for all incoming and outgoing invoices is 
compulsory. Each VAT registered business is required to keep records for six 
years.
- Turkey Taxable persons are obliged to keep records in such a way as to enable 
computation and control of the VAT. Small entrepreneurs and small farmers 
under the special regime in VAT Law are required to maintain simple account
documents related to their purchases and business expenses.
Asian and Pacific countries
- South Korea A VAT registered trader must keep books of accounts where purchases and
sales of goods and services must be recorded. Uniform invoices are used and 
maintenance of records for all incoming and outgoing invoices is compulsory. 
Each VAT registered business is required to keep records for five years.
- Indonesia Every taxable firm is required to record the total price of all purchases and 
deliveries of taxable goods and services in the books of the firm. Account 
records must fully and clearly include goods and services not subject to tax or 
zero-rated. . Maintenance of records for all incoming and outgoing invoices is 
compulsory. Each VAT registered business is required to keep records for five 
years.
- Philippines Maintenance of a number of account books and documents is necessary in the 
format laid down by the government. In addition to the normal accounting 
requirements, all VAT-registered persons are required to keep control 
subsidiary sales and purchases journals in the place of business. The Bureau of 
Internal Revenue checks the accounting system and ensures that the taxpayer 
maintains the needed records properly, in line with tax office requirements. 
Account books and documents such as invoices and maintenance of assets and 
liabilities records are necessary for all VAT registered persons. Each VAT 
registered business is required to keep records for three years.
- Taiwan A number of account books and documents such as invoices, journals for the 
entry of the day-to-day transactions, annual inventory registration records and 
maintenance of assets and liabilities records is necessary for all VAT registered 
persons. Maintenance of records for all incoming and outgoing invoices is 
compulsory. The tax authority may give approval to business entities to use 
cash registers, to issue uniform invoices or to use the receipts from a cash 
register as a substitute for issuing uniform invoices.
- Fiji It is necessary for all VAT registered business entities to the keep records of tax 
invoices with other accounting records for at least seven years, and make them 
available to Inland Revenue auditors, as and when required.
African and Latin American countries
- Kenya Information not available.
- Guatemala Information not available.
- Argentina Information not available.
- Uruguay Information not available.
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- Morocco Information not available.
- Mexico Registered VAT taxpayers must keep accounting books and records as
stipulated in the VAT regulation. A special records-keeping regime is 
applicable to individuals. Small taxpayers are permitted to keep simplified 
records covering only those transactions specified by the tax office. The small
__________________________ taxpayers are exempt from submitting monthly tax returns._______________
Sources: As per Appendix 5.1.
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Appendix 5.3 Tax refund procedure under value-added tax - selected countries 
OECD countries
- Belgium Right of deduction of input tax is immediate (except for motor cars). The 
input tax during a tax period, including tax on investment can be credited 
when the tax due for the period is calculated. 50 per cent of the VAT on 
motor cars can be reclaimed and VAT incurred on certain specified goods 
and services such as entertainment expenses, alcoholic beverages and so 
on is non-deductible. A refund must be made within six months. Tax 
invoices are necessary for any input tax refund claims.
- Denmark The right of deduction for input tax is full and immediate, including 
investment. Enterprises selling taxable and non-taxable services are 
entitled to a partial deduction on a pro-rata basis. Tax invoices are 
necessary for any input tax refund claims.
- Netherlands Full input tax credits are generally available to registered taxpayers for 
all tax paid on purchases that reflect exclusively commercial activity on a 
period-by-period basis. Tax invoices are necessary for any input tax 
refund claims.
- France The right to deduct input tax is based on the possession of invoices. A 
distinction is made between capital assets and other expenses. Refunds 
on expenses are recoverable after the deferment of one calender month. 
Tax invoices are necessary for any input tax refund claims.
- Italy Taxable persons have the right to deduct input tax from the output tax. 
VAT is not recoverable on a number of expenses; i.e. VAT at the 
increased rate of 38 per cent is not deductible, unless the activity relates 
to the trade or manufacturing of such goods.
- Luxembourg Generally, VAT paid on goods and services by an entrepreneur within the 
course of business is recoverable. Any overpayment can either be 
claimed, or a credit can be obtained for adjustment to future tax 
liabilities. Tax invoices are necessary for any input tax refund claims.
- Norway Full input tax credits are generally available to VAT registered 
entrepreneurs for all the tax paid on purchases for taxable business. This 
reflects exclusively commercial activity on a period-by-period basis. Tax 
invoices are necessary for any input tax refund claims.
- New Zealand VAT registration enables a business to reclaim input tax from the taxable 
supplies of goods and services. Tax invoices are necessary for any input 
tax refund claims.
- Sweden A VAT registered person can claim a deduction in his/her tax return for 
tax paid on inputs for business. Tax invoices are necessary for any input 
tax refund claims.
- Germany Full input tax credits are generally available to registered taxpayers for 
all tax paid on purchases that exclusively reflect commercial activity on 
a period by period basis. Tax invoices are necessary for any input tax 
refund claims.
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- United Kingdom The person to whom the supply is made is entitled to claim input tax 
deductions. Excess tax paid normally is repaid within 14 days of the 
submission of tax refund application or VAT returns. Tax invoices are 
necessary for any input tax refund claims, input tax refund claims.
- Turkey The claim for tax credit is made on the basis of periodic tax returns. The 
excess tax paid by the taxpayer is carried forward to the following 
period(s) and is not refunded, except tax credits for basic food-stuffs.
Asian and Pacific countries
- South Korea Self-assessed system of input tax refund. The taxpayer computes the
VAT by deducting the input tax on purchases of goods or services, or on 
the importation of goods to be used in business from the output tax. The 
excess tax paid is refundable or can be claimed as a tax credit. Tax 
invoices are necessary for any input tax refund claims.
- Indonesia Input tax in a tax period may be credited against the output tax. If, in a 
tax period, input tax exceeds output tax, the excess refund is first 
adjusted against other taxes due. However, on the written request of the 
taxable entrepreneur, the excess tax payment can be reimbursed within 
the stipulated time. An excess of tax payment on exported goods is 
reimbursed within one month. Tax invoices are necessary for any input 
tax refund claims.
- Philippines A VAT registered business engaged in taxable transactions can deduct 
full input tax from the output tax. If, at the end of any taxable quarter, 
the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess tax will be carried over to 
the succeeding quarters, or can be credited against other internal revenue 
taxes.
- Taiwan Full input tax credits are generally available to VAT registered 
taxpayers. However, the input tax cannot be claimed if invoices or 
receipts for goods and services purchased are not maintained according to 
the prescribed regulations. The business entity which sells goods and 
services is required to issue a uniform invoice. The business may apply 
to the Ministry of Finance for approval for the sales amount over-paid to 
be refunded. The over-paid tax can be refunded after verification by the 
tax authority.
- F iji The input tax incurred for making taxable supplies is deductible in full 
for VAT registered taxpayers. Tax invoices are necessary for any input 
tax refund claims.
African and Latin American countries
- Kenya Full input tax credits are generally available to VAT registered
taxpayers for all the tax paid on purchases that exclusively reflect 
commercial activity on a period by period basis. The input tax in excess 
of the output tax is refundable. For refund claims, tax invoices are 
necessary.
- Guatemala Information not available.
- Argentina Information not available.
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- Uruguay Information not available.
- Morocco Information not available.
- Mexico Input tax paid by the VAT registered business entrepreneurs on their 
purchases is fully deductible from the output tax. Excess tax is 
refunded or adjusted from the following period’s tax liability.
Sources: As per Appendix 5.1
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Appendix 5 .4 Value-added tax treatment of small business, farmers, banking and 
other financial services -  selected countries
OECD countries 
- Belgium
- Denmark
- Netherlands
Small business Farmers Banking Insurance
services services
Small entrepreneurs 
normally located in retail 
businesses are taxed at a 
fixed VAT rate.
Small enterprises selling 
goods and taxable 
services up to an amount 
of DK 10,000 a year are 
not liable to pay VAT or 
to be registered.
Small entrepreneurs 
whose annual turnover is 
less than Dfl 4,150 are 
exempt from VAT.
Farmers have a Exempt
special regime. When 
they are supplying 
services or goods, they 
need not apply for 
VAT formalities.
However, a taxable 
person who supplies 
farmers must refund to 
the farmer the VAT 
amount included in the 
VAT price.
Enterprises registered Exempt 
as farming, fishing (however,
and related activities hiring of
submit VAT returns bank lockers, 
twice a year. Tax for safe keeping 
each six month period and 
is paid in two equal management
instalments. shares are
taxable).
Totally exempt from Exempt
VAT. They are not
entitled to input credit
tax. However, in
certain cases, some
portion of the VAT
tax paid is refundable.
Exempt
Exempt
Exempt
- France Business below The term farmer Generally Exempt
FFr70,000 is exempt includes all the exempt, but
from VAT. Business less activities relating to in certain 
than FFr50,000 (supplies agricultural as well as cases 
of goods) or less than livestock production, conditions
FFr150,000 (supplies of Farmers are subject to apply, 
services ) is taxed under VAT if their average 2 
simplified method. year income is greater
than FFr300,000.
They are not liable to 
a VAT refund, but in 
some cases a refund is 
allowable.
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Italy Business whose total Taxed at reduced Exempt Exempt
supplies do not exceed rates. Agricultural 
360 million Lire in a producers with 
calendar year, are exempt supplies less than 10 
from VAT. They are, million Lire are 
however, entitled to excluded from the
simpler formalities to VAT formalities,
issue invoices and 
records. Pay VAT 
quarterly instead of on a 
monthly basis.
Luxembourg Entrepreneurs whose Agricultural and Most of the Generally
annual turnover is less forestry enterprises financial exempt, but
than Flux200,000 are are excluded entirely sector in most
subject to VAT. Small from VAT. They activities are cases
tax reductions are given cannot claim credit or exempt. conditions
to other small input tax. However, However, in apply. In
entrepreneurs whose they can register most cases some cases
annual turnover is less 
than Fluxl,000,000.
voluntarily. conditions 
apply. In 
some cases 
input VAT 
may be 
claimed.
input VAT 
may be 
claimed.
Norway Any business less than 
NKR 12,000 need not be 
registered and is exempt 
form VAT. Voluntary 
registration is not 
permitted to these 
enterprises.
On the fisherman’s 
sales of raw fish, a 
lower VAT rate is 
charged. The 
fisherman is required 
to submit annual VAT 
returns, and tax 
assessed should be 
paid within three 
months. Returns 
which show an excess 
of input tax are 
refunded.
Exempt Exempt
New Zealand Registration of small 
business below 
NZ$24,000 annual 
taxable transactions is 
optional.
Same treatment as for 
small businesses.
Exempt 
(other than 
consultancy 
services 
provided by 
the financial 
institutions).
Exempt
Sweden Registration of small 
business below 
SEK200,000 annual 
taxable transactions is 
optional.
Any farmer above 
small business 
threshold is taxable.
Exempt Exempt
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- Germany Small entrepreneurs A special tax Exempt
whose turnover plus tax treatment with reduced 
during the current rates applies to certain
calender year is not transactions. Often 
expected to exceed these supplies are
DM100,000, are exempt taxed at zero-rates, 
during the current System of deductions
calender year. They are effectively exempts 
not obliged to keep books farmers from VAT. 
and prepare regular 
financial statements based 
on annual inventory.
- United Kingdom Businesses with less than Farm products zero- Exempt 
35,000 Pounds annual rated. However, VAT
turnover are exempt from registration is 
VAT, but can apply for compulsory if sales 
VAT voluntarily. exceed the small
business threshold 
level.
- Turkey Certain small retailers Small farmers who are Exempt
come under compensatory either exempt from
taxation. Such retailers income tax or taxed
are not required to under the special
register for VAT. They regime in the
are taxed on “Lump Sum individual income tax
Yearly Basis of VAT”. law, are exempt from
VAT. Big 
agriculturists are 
subject to VAT in 
accordance with the 
general rules.
Asian and Pacific countries
- South Korea Businesses less than 24 A special provision is Exempt 
million Won or 6 million followed for VAT- 
Won for proxy agents are registered traders 
treated as special VAT using agricultural, 
taxpayers. They are marine or forest 
liable for 2 per cent tax products, or other 
(3.5 per cent for proxies). VAT exempt goods 
Small firms are allowed a for inputs on a pro­
credit of 5 per cent of 
their input tax against 
their output tax.
rata basis by 
multiplying exempt 
rate materials by 
5/105.
Exempt
Exempt
Exempt
(however,
services
rendered by
banks,
bankers and
insurance
companies
are subject
to a banking
and
insurance
transaction
tax).
Exempt
254
- Indonesia
- Philippines
- Taiwan
Business firms with less The production and Exempt
than 120 million Rupiah delivery of
annual turnover from unprocessed
taxable goods, or less agricultural goods is
than 60 million Rupiah exempt from VAT.
from taxable services, or
with capital investment of
10 million or less are
exempt from VAT.
A gross receipt tax for 
business less than 
200,000 Pesos in gross 
sales in 12 months is 
applicable. The business 
pays VAT at the rate of 
two per cent.
The production and 
delivery of 
unprocessed 
agricultural goods, 
such as agricultural 
and marine food 
products, livestock 
and poultry, are 
exempt from VAT.
Exempt
Small business entities The agricultural, Exempt
below a prescribed forest, ranch, and (conditions
threshold level pay VAT fisheries products are apply) 
at the rate of one per cent, exempt from VAT.
- Fiji Small businesses with The supply of sugar Exempt
annual revenues from cane is zero-rated.
taxable goods and
services of Fiji $10,000
or less (or $20,000 if
dealing solely in goods)
do not have to register
and are exempt from
VAT.
African and Latin American countries
- Kenya Information not available.
- Guatemala Information not available.
- Argentina
- Uruguay
- Morocco
Information not available. 
Information not available. 
Information not available.
- Mexico Special regime is only Small farmers are
applicable to individuals, exempt.
Sources: As per Appendix 5.1.
Exempt
(conditions
apply)
Exempt
Exempt
Exempt 
(provided 
that this 
does not 
include 
income and 
other
benefits and 
return on 
termination 
of life 
insurance).
Exempt
Exempt.
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Appendix 5.5 Right of appeals under value-added tax - selected countries
OECD countries
- Belgium
- Demnark
- Netherlands
- France
- Italy
- Luxembourg
- Norway
- New Zealand
- Sweden
- Germany
- United Kingdom
- Turkey
Any disputes over VAT ruling can be settled by the ordinary courts. 
There are not specific courts.
VAT appeals are heard by independent VAT Tribunals in the first 
instance, but may then proceed to the judiciary.
VAT disputes are discussed and reviewed by the local tax office. 
Appeals can be made to the Court of Appeal (Tax Courts), in case the 
dispute is not settled at the local tax office and can further proceed to the 
Supreme (Tax) Court.
VAT appeals can be made in administrative courts, which are totally 
independent. A final appeal can be made to the Supreme Court.
Appeals in the first instance are heard by the Independent tax tribunals. 
If not settled at this stage, can proceed to the Central Tax Commission 
and the Supreme Court.
An appeal against an assessment of tax must be made within 90 days of 
receipts of the notice of assessment. Further appeals can be made to the 
District Court and the Supreme Court.
Information not available.
VAT appeals in the first place are reviewed by the Commissioner, 
Internal Revenue Department, then by the Taxation Review Authority 
and finally by the High Court.
VAT appeals can be made to the Country Fiscal Court of Appeal and 
then to the Fiscal Court of Appeal. Verdicts of the junior courts can be 
appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court.
A taxpayer may lodge an appeal against an assessment with the fiscal 
office within one month of receipt of the notice of assessment. There is a 
right of further appeal to the finance court in the first instance, which can 
further be lodged with the Federal Finance Court and may further be 
processed to the Federal Constitutional Court.
Independent VAT Tribunals hear VAT appeals in the first instance, then 
the High Court and finally the Court of Appeal and House of Lords.
A taxpayer may lodge an appeal against an assessment or a penalty to a 
tax court within 30 days after notification of the tax or penalty. A further 
appeal can be made before the Regional Administrative Court and the 
Supreme judicial authority in tax jurisdiction in the Council of State.
Asian and Pacific countries
- South Korea Information not available.
- Indonesia
- Philippines
- Taiwan
The right of appeal to submit objection and appeal to the Tax Appeal 
Council is protected under the Law on the general provision and 
procedures.
Right of appeal of initial tax assessment is available and can be lodged 
with higher judicial courts.
Information not available.
- Fiji Any VAT registered taxpayer dissatisfied with an assessment may within
twenty eight days lodge an appeal with the Commissioner Inland 
Revenue. If not satisfied with the Commissioner’s review of appeal, an 
appeal can be made to the Value-Added Tax Tribunal and afterwards to 
the High Court.
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African and Latin American countries
- Kenya Information not available.
- Guatemala Information not available.
- Argentina Information not available.
- Uruguay Information not available.
- Morocco Information not available.
- Mexico Information not available.
Sources: As per Appendix 5.1.
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Appendix 5.6 Value-added tax administrative establishment -  selected countries 
OECD countries
- Belgium VAT is administered by the Customs and Excise. VAT taxpayers with 
a pennanent establishment come under the VAT control authority for the 
area in which their establishment is located. VAT taxpayers without a 
permanent establishment come under the central VAT office (mostly 
foreigners).
- Denmark VAT is administered by the Customs and Excise authorities. Day-to- 
day administration is handled by 30 regional branches of the Customs 
and Excise Authority’s regional offices.
- Netherlands The VAT is administered by the Customs and Excise and some 
specialised VAT offices.
- France VAT on domestic goods and services is administered by the Directorate 
General des Imports, and VAT on imports by the Custom Authorities.
- Italy VAT on domestic goods and services is administrated by separate VAT 
offices, located in each Italian Province, under the Ministry of Finance, 
while VAT on imported goods and services is administered by the 
Customs Department.
- Luxembourg VAT is administered by the “Adm inistration de l ’ Emregistrement et 
des Domaines,\
- Norway VAT on domestic goods and services is administrated by the regional 
county Inspector of Taxes, while VAT on imported goods and services 
is collected by the Customs Department.
- New Zealand GST on domestic goods and services is administrated by the Inland 
Revenue Department and GST on imported goods and services is 
collected by the Customs Department.
- Sweden VAT on domestic goods and services is administrated by the regional 
tax authority, one in every county. VAT on imported goods and services 
is administered by the Customs Department.
- Germany VAT is collected by the Tax Authority which is also responsible for 
collecting all direct and indirect taxes.
- United Kingdom
- Turkey
VAT is administered by the Customs and Excise department.
VAT on domestic goods and services is administered by the Local Tax 
Office, and on imports by the Customs Authorities.
Asian and Pacific countries
- South Korea VAT is administered by the National Tax Administration and Special
- Indonesia
Excise Division in the Head and Regional offices. In the District Offices 
a VAT section has been added in the tax administrative structure. The 
national Tax Administration is in overall charge of VAT implementation 
in the country.
The VAT is administered by the Directorate General of Taxation. A 
separate body under the Head Office has been established with the name 
of Directorate of VAT for VAT administration.
- Philippines Bureau of Internal Revenue is in overall charge of the implementation of 
the VAT. A VAT Division within the Bureau at district, regional and 
national levels has been established. VAT on imports is collected by the 
Bureau of Customs.
- Taiwan Information not available.
- Fiji VAT on domestic goods and services is collected by the Inland Revenue 
Department and on imports by the Customs Department in the same 
manner as customs duty.
258
African and Latin American countries
Kenya
Guatemala
Argentina
Uruguay
Morocco
Mexico
Information not available 
Information not available 
Information not available 
Information not available 
Information not available 
Information not available
Sources: As per Appendix 5.1.
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Appendix 5.8 Consumer prices -  selected countries (percentage change from 
previous year)
Date of VAT 
introduction
One Year 
before VAT 
introduction
Year of 
VAT
introduction
One year 
after VAT 
introduction
Five years Consumer 
after VAT prices 
introduction in 1991
OECD countries
- Belgium Jan. 1971 3.9 4.3 5.4 9.2 3.2
- Denmark July 1967 7.1 8.2 8.0 6.6 2.4
- Netherlands Jan. 1969 3.7 7.4 3.7 9.6 3.7
- France Jan. 1968 2.8 4.6 6.1 7.3 3.2
- Italy Jan. 1973 5.8 10.8 19.1 12.4 6.5
- Luxembourg Jan. 1970 2.3 4.6 4.7 10.7 3.1
- Norway Jan. 1970 3.1 10.6 6.3 11.7 3.4
- New Zealand Oct. 1986 15.4 13.3 15.7 2.6 2.6
- Sweden Jan. 1969 1.9 2.7 7.0 9.9 9.3
- Germany Jan. 1968 1.6 1.6 1.9 7.0 3.5
- United Kingdom Apr. 1973 7.1 9.2 15.9 8.3 5.9
- Turkey Jan. 1985 48.4 45.0 34.6 60.3 66.0
Asian and Pacific countries
- South Korea July 1977 15.3 10.2 14.5 7.2 9.7
- Indonesia Apr. 1985 10.5 4.7 5.9 7.5 9.2
- Philippines Jan. 1988 8.8 12.2 14.1 8.9 18.7
- Taiwan Apr. 1986 0.0 0.7 1.2 3.6 3.6
- Fiji July 1992 6.5 4.9 6.5 6.5
African and Latin American countries
- Kenya Jan. 1990 12.9 15.6 19.8 15.6
- Guatemala Aug. 1983 0.3 4.5 3.4 10.8 33.2
- Argentina Jan. 1975 23.5 182.9 444.0 100.8 171.7
- Uruguay Jan. 1968 89.3 125.3 21.0 97.0 102.0
- Morocco Apr. 1986 7.7 8.7 2.7 8.0 8.0
- Mexico Jan. 1980 18.2 26.4 27.9 57.7 22.7
Notes: ..Information not available.
Sources: Asia Pacific Economics Group, 1993. Asia-Pacific Profiles 1993, Canberra: The 
Australian National University.
Central Bank of China, 1994. Financial Statistics: Taiwan District, Taipei: Republic 
of China.
Council of Economic Planning and Development, 1993. Taiwan Statistical Data Book 
1993, Taipei: Republic of China.
IMF, 1994. International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1994, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
OECD, 1985. OECD Economic Outlook NO. 37, Paris: OECD:Table R4.
OECD, 1990. OECD Economic Outlook No. 47, Paris: OECD Table R13.
OECD, 1992. Historical Statistics 1960-1990, Paris: OECD.
OECD, 1993b. OECD Economic Outlook No. 33, Paris: OECD:Table R 13.
OECD, 1994. OECD Economic Outlook No 55, Paris: OECD:Annex Table 25:A28 
Republic of Kenya, 1993. Economic Survey 1993, Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Nairobi: Ministry of Planning and National Development.
World Bank, 1989b. World Tables 1988-89, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
World Bank, 1992a. World Tables 1992, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
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Appendix 5.9 Real gross domestic growth rate -  selected countries
Percentage change from previous period 
Date of VAT One year One year Five years Growth
introduction before VAT after VAT after VAT rates
introduction introduction introduction in 1991
OECD countries
- Belgium Jan. 1971 6.5 5.5 5.8 3.2
- Denmark July 1967 2.2 3.8 5.4 1.0
- Netherlands Jan. 1969 6.5 5.7 4.0 2.1
- France Jan. 1968 4.7 7.0 5.4 0.8
- Italy Jan. 1973 4.3 -2.7 3.6 1.2
- Luxembourg Jan. 1970 11.0 2.7 -6.6 3.1
- Norway Jan. 1970 3.6 4.6 4.2 1.6
- New Zealand Oct. 1986 -1.1 -1.7 -3.3 -3.3
- Sweden Jan. 1969 3.6 6.6 3.2 -1.1
- Germany Jan. 1968 -0.2 7.6 4.8 4.5
- United Kingdom Apr. 1973 3.5 -1.7 3.5 -2.2
- Turkey Jan. 1985 5.9 8.1 9.2 5.9
Asian and Pacific countries
- South Korea July 1977 12.9 9.7 7.3 8.5
- Indonesia Apr. 1985 7.0 5.9 7.1 6.6
- Philippines Jan. 1988 4.8 6.0 -0.7
- Taiwan Apr. 1986 5.0 7.3 7.2 7.2
- F iji July 1992 -0.1 1.9 -0.1
African and Latin American countries
- Kenya Jan. 1990 5.5 4.4 3.6
- Guatemala Aug. 1983 -3.5 0.5 3.9 3.2
- Argentina Jan. 1975 6.3 -0.2 1.6 8.9
- Uruguay Jan. 1968 -3.9 6.1 0.4 2.9
- Morocco Apr. 1986 6.3 0.2 5.1 5.1
- Mexico Jan. 1980 9.2 7.9 2.6 3.6
Notes: ..Information not available.
Sources: Asia Pacific Economics Group 1993. Asia-Pacific Profiles 1993, Canberra: The 
Australian National University:Table 62:110.
IMF, 1993b. International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1993, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
OECD, 1994. OECD Economic Outlook, Paris: OECD: Annex Table 1.
United Nations, 1976. Yearbook National Accounts Statistics 1976, Volume 1, 
(individual country data), New York: United Nations.
United Nations, 1987. National Accounts Statistics-Main Aggregates and Detailed 
Tables 1985, New York: United Nations.
United Nations, 1989. National Accounts Statistics-Main Aggregates and Detailed 
TablesJ986, Part II, New York: United Nations.
United Nations, 1992. National Accounts Statistics-Main Aggregates and Detailed 
Tables 1990, Part I and Part II, New York: United Nations.
World Bank, 1989b. World Tables 1988-89, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
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Appendix 5.10 National savings (as percentage of GDP) -  selected countries
D ate  o f  V A T  
in troduc tion
O ne year 
before V A T  
in troduc tion
O ne yea r 
a fte r V A T  
in tro d u c tio n
F ive years 
a fte r V A T  
in tro d u c tio n
N ationa l 
sav ings 
in  1991
OECD countries
Belgium Jan. 1971 27.1 24.9 22.5 21 .1
Denmark July 1967 22.9 22.3 24.5 17.4
Netherlands Jan. 1969 22.3 2 1 .8 27.1 24.7
France Jan. 1968 25.7 25.0 27.8 20.7
Italy Jan. 1973 2 2 .0 21.9 26.3 18.6
Luxembourg Jan. 1970 38.8 36.6 35.1 59.4
Norway Jan. 1970 25.8 27.5 27.0 23.6
New Zealand Oct. 1986 17.9 19.2 16.2 16.2
Sweden Jan. 1969 23.8 24.8 2 2 .8 16.0
Germany Jan. 1968 25.2 27.6 26.5 23.1
United Kingdom Apr. 1973 18.5 15.3 18.4 13.5
Turkey Jan. 1985 15.3 2 2 .6 23.1 2 1 .2
Asian and Pacific countries
South Korea July 1977 23.4 28.1 22.5 37.0
Indonesia Apr. 1985 25.1 23.3 32.8
Philippines Jan. 1988 17.8 19.4 17.0
Taiwan Apr. 1986 33.6 38.5 29.5 29.5
- Fiji July 1992
African and Latin American countries
Kenya Jan. 1990 17.2 19.4 19.4
Guatemala Aug. 1983 9.6 7.6 7.4 7.2
Argentina Jan. 1975 20 .1 30.0 18.9 10 .2
Uruguay Jan. 1968 13.5 10 .8 12.7 15.6
Morocco Apr. 1986 17.6 2 1 .0 23.6 23.6
Mexico Jan. 1980 18.9 2 0 .8 2 1 .6 16.9
Notes: ..information not available.
Sources: OECD, 1985. OECD Economic Outlook No. 37, Paris: OECD:Table R4.
OECD, 1990. OECD Economic Outlook NO. 47, Paris: OECD:Table R13.
OECD, 1993b. OECD Economic Outlook No. 53, Paris: OECD:Table R 13.
Republic of Kenya, 1993. Economic Survey 1993, Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Nairobi: Ministry of Planning and National Development.
World Bank, 1989b. World Tables 1988-89, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
World Bank, 1992a. World Tables 1992, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
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Appendix 5.11 Gross fixed capital formation (as percentage of GDP) -  selected 
countries
Date of VAT One year One year Five year GFCF1
introduction before VAT after VAT after VAT in 1991
introduction introduction introduction
OECD countries
Belgium Jan. 1971 22.5 20.9 21.5 19.7
Denmark July 1967 24.1 23.4 24.6 16.9
Netherlands Jan. 1969 26.7 25.9 22.0 20.8
France Jan. 1968 23.8 23.4 23.5 20.9
Italy Jan. 1973 23.1 25.9 22.7 19.8
Luxembourg Jan. 1970 21.9 28.3 27.8 25.2
Norway Jan. 1970 24.4 29.7 34.2 18.5
New Zealand Oct. 1986 25.8 21.5 16.4 16.4
Sweden Jan. 1969 23.7 22.1 21.6 19.3
Germany Jan. 1968 23.1 23.2 23.9 21.6
United Kingdom Apr. 1973 18.4 20.9 18.5 16.7
Turkey Jan. 1985
Asian and Pacific countries
South Korea July 1977 24.0 32.5 28.4 37.8
Indonesia Apr. 1985 26.2 28.3 36.6 35.1
Philippines Jan. 1988 17.0 20.9 20.9 19.7
Taiwan Apr. 1986 18.8 19.2 22.2 22.2
- Fiji July 1992
African and Latin American countries
Kenya Jan. 1990 19.2 18.8 0.0 18.8
Guatemala Aug. 1983 15.0 9.6 13.4 11.9
Argentina Jan. 1975 18.4 26.9 16.4 7.4
Uruguay Jan. 1968 13.4 11.1 9.0 11.3
Morocco Apr. 1986 23.1 • 20.2 22.3 22.3
Mexico Jan. 1980 23.4 27.4 19.1 24.5
Notes: 'GFCF = Gross Fixed Capital Formation.
..Information not available. 
Sources: As per Appendix 5.8.
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Appendix 5.12 Merchandise exports f.o.b1 
countries
(as percentage of GDP) - selected
Date of VAT One year One year Five year Exports
introduction before VAT after VAT after VAT in 1991
introduction introduction introduction
OECD countries
Belgium Jan. 1971 35.1 35.9 45.8 55.1
Denmark July 1967 21.8 20.7 20.1 28.2
Netherlands Jan. 1969 31.2 32.5 41.0 52.2
France Jan. 1968 9.7 11.2 13.8 17.3
Italy Jan. 1973 13.4 16.0 18.2 14.7
Luxembourg Jan. 1970 73.1 64.7 75.3 67.1
Norway Jan. 1970 22.9 20.4 25.6 32.3
New Zealand Oct. 1986 24.7 19.7 22.5 22.5
Sweden Jan. 1969 18.1 20.3 27.4 23.0
Germany Jan. 1968 17.6 19.0 19.0 24.0
United Kingdom Apr. 1973 14.6 19.4 20.8 18.0
Turkey Jan. 1985 14.3 12.8 12.0 12.1
Asian and Pacific countries
South Korea July 1977 27.0 25.3 28.0 24.5
Indonesia Apr. 1985 23.7 18.0 25.1 25.3
Philippines Jan. 1988 17.1 18.4 18.7 19.5
Taiwan Apr. 1986 49.0 52.6 43.1 43.1
- Fiji July 1992 28.7 28.7
African and Latin American countries
Kenya Jan. 1990 11.6 13.2 0.0 13.2
Guatemala Aug. 1983 13.4 12.0 13.7 13.2
Argentina Jan. 1975 8.5 10.3 3.8 6.3
Uruguay Jan. 1968 9.6 9.8 11.1 16.4
Morocco Apr. 1986 16.7 14.8 15.5 15.5
Mexico Jan. 1980 6.5 7.6 11.3 11.0
Note: 'f.o.b = free on board.
..Information not available. 
Sources: As per Appendix 5.8.
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Appendix 6.1 Field survey respondents - New Zealand, the Philippines and 
Pakistan at the tax policy level
Respondent Official position
NEW ZEALAND
A. Inland Revenue Department, Wellington
David Henry Commissioner
Graham Holland 
Bob Maleny 
Derek Howell 
Lenore Bamfield 
Mike Nutsford 
Martin Scott 
Allan Foubister 
Pol Novak 
Silvia Wilmshurst 
Fred Hutton 
Peter Joneleit 
Tony Bouzaid 
Colin Carson 
Bryan Kennerely 
Roz Jackson 
Tony Lester 
Bruce Cheeseman 
Rob Falk 
Bev Talbot
B. Price Waterhouse, Auckland
Deputy Commissioner 
Deputy Commissioner
Director: Human Resources and Support Services
Senior Tax Policy Analyst (Legislative Affairs)
Senior Tax Policy Analyst
Director: Taxpayer Services
Director: Revenue Assessment and Collection
Revenue Assessment and Collection
Revenue Assessment and Collection
Manager Output Centre Porirua
Director: Information Technology
Director: Taxpayer Audit
Manager Compliance
Director: Debt and Return Management
Acting Manager: FIRST Training
Manager IPT (Information Technology)
Research Analyst ITP
Project Director
Project Manager: Application
J. G. Todd Senior Partner and Consultant on New Zealand 
Goods and Services Tax
PHILIPPINES
A. Department of Finance
Ernest Leung
Professor Angel Q. Yoingco
Milwida M. Guevara
B. Bureau of Internal Revenues
Secretary Finance
Member, Ways and Means Committee of the 
Parliament and Chairman, Board of Governors, Asian 
Pacific Tax and Investment Research (APTIRC). 
Assistant Secretary Finance
Liwayway Vinzons - Chatto, 
Victor Deoferio 
Estelita Aguirre 
Delia Sarmineto
Commissioner 
Deputy Commissioner 
Chief, VAT Division 
Technical Assistant
Raezelle Veronica V. Havier Revenue Officer
C. Philippine Institute for Development Studies
Rosario Manasan Research Fellow
D. University of Philippines
Professor Ledivina Carino Chairman, College of Public Administration
E. Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Florecita P. Flores President
F. Asian Development Bank
Satesh, S. Jha 
Pradumna, B. Rana
Chief Economist 
Senior Economist
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PAKISTAN
Professor Kurshid Ahmad 
Munawar Ahmad Khan
Sabhia Khanum 
A. G. N. Kazi 
Arshad Zaman 
Syed Shaukat Kazmi
B. Prime Minister Secretariat
Senator and Director, Institute of Policy Studies 
Ex. Sindh Provincial Excise and Taxation 
Minister
and President of Sukkur Chamber of Commerce.
Ex. Provincial Member of NWFP Legislative Assembly 
Ex. Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission 
Ex. Chief Economist, Planning Commission 
Ex. Joint Chief Economist, Planning Commission
Waqar Masood Khan
C. Planning Commission
Additional Secretary, Economic and Finance Policy
Saeed A. Qureshi 
Fasihuddin
Muhammad Khan Achagzai 
Pervez Tahir 
Khalid Naeem Soofi 
Aslam Sial
D. Finance Division
Deputy Chairman 
Chief Economist 
Joint Chief Economist 
Chief, Policy Planning 
Chief, Projects 
Chief, Fiscal and Monetary
Mushtaq Ahmad Economic Adviser
E. Resource Division and Central Board of Revenues 
Alvi Abdul Rahim Member Sales Tax
Muhammad Zafarullah Khan 
Falak Sher 
Mir Faud
Member Tax Policy
Collector Customs, Karachi
Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax
F. Ministry of Commerce
Aqdas Ali Kazmi
G. Economic Affairs Division
Economic Consultant
Muhammad Mobin Ahsan
H. Tariff Commission
Additional Secretary
Akhtar Hassan Khan Chairman
I. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics
Professor Syed Nawab Hyder Naqvi Director 
Sarfraz Ahmad Qureshi Joint Director
Ashfaq Ahmad Khan
J. Finance Departments
Chief Research
Ajaz Ahmad Kazi 
Muhammad Ayub Kazi 
Masood Ahmad
Additional Secretary (Budget) 
Additional Secretary (Development) 
Deputy Secretary (Budget)
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Appendix 6.2 Simulation model of government revenue and expenditure for budget 
forecasting on the basis of time series analysis
Df  = TR - TExp (1)
Where:
D f = Budget deficit or surplus 
TR. =. Total government revenue
Texp =. Total government expenditure
Revenue Block
TR = T i + Ntr + Cab (2)
Ti = T d ir+ Tind (2.1)
The direct taxes are broken down into 2 categories:
Tdir = Ty + ^otdir .2)
Ty = ^(Ynang' pnang> Di,- D2) (2-3)
Where:
Ynang = Non-agricultural GDP
Pnang = Non-agricultural GDP price index
Dj and D2= Dummy variables taking the value of 1 for 1985-87 and 1988-93 and zero 
otherwise'.
Totdir
Where:
Ynag
pnag
f(Ynag • pnag)
= GNP
= GNP price index
(2-4)
Indirect taxes are broken down into eight categories:
Tind = ^m  + Tx + Texc + Tsa| + Surrey + Tmv + Ds m^p + T0^ ncj (2.5)
Tm = f(Mt . Pmi, D2) (2.6)
Where:
Mt = Total imports
p mi = Imports price index
Tx = f(Xi Pxi) (2.7)
Where:
Xj = Total exports
Pxi = Export price index
Yexc = p(Ymanl • pmanl > ^ l )  (2-8)
Where:
Ymanl = Value-added in large scale manufacturing 
Pmanl = Large scale manufacturing price index
1 Dummy variable Di is used to capture the influence of domestic socio-economic and political developments and 
dummy variable D 2 is used to assess the impact of worldwide recession on major components of government 
revenue and government expenditure during 1985-87 and 1988-93.
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(2.9)Tsai f(Ymanl • Pmanh • Pmi> Dp D2)
Where:
Tsai =  ^ d o m  + ^ tm
^dom = (^T"manl • Pmanl >^l) (2-10)
Where:
Ymanl = Value-added in large scale manufacturing 
Pmanl = Large scale manufacturing price index
Stm =f(M t,P mi .D p D2) (2.11)
Where:
Mt = Total imports
Pm[ = Imports price index
Surdev = f(Vmanl • Pmanl) (212)
Where:
Ymanl = Value-added in large scale manufacturing 
Pmanl = Large scale manufacturing price index
Tmv = f(Yg . P g n) 
Where:
Yg = GNP
Pgn = GNP price index
(2.13)
T^stmp = f(Vg • Pgn) 
Where:
Yg = GNP
Pgn = GNP price index
(2.14)
Totind = P(Yg Pgn) 
Where:
Yg = GNP
Pgn = GNP price index
(2.15)
Ntr = f(Yg . Ygn, D,)
Where:
Yg = GNP
Pgn = GNP price index
(2.16)
Expenditure Block
Texp = Curexp + Capexp (3)
T^urexp = Gio + P^ef + ^ub + P*eb + ^ersoc + ^ereco 
Glo = f(Y g .P gn,D 1,D 2)
Where:
Yg = GNP
Pgn = GNP price index
+ Sercom + Curoexp (3.1) 
(3.2)
P^Pexp — f(Yd • Pgd’ P^ O 
Where:
Yd = GDP
(3.3)
270
= GDP price index
Sub • Pgd> Di)
Where:
Yd = GDP
Pgd = GDP price index
InMom = f(Domdet,t)
Where:
Domdedt = Outstanding domestic debt
n^^ext f(Etdebt)
Where:
Etdebt = Outstanding external debt
Sersoc = f(^d  • Pgd)
Where:
Yd = GDP
Pgd = GDP price index
Sereco = f(Yd . Pgd)
Where:
Yd -  GDP
Pgd = GDP price index
Sercom = d • Pgd)
Where:
Yd = GDP
Pgd = GDP price index
Curoexp = P(^g • Pgm
Where:
Yg = GNP
Pgn = GNP price index
CaPexp = P(^d • Pgd’
Where:
Yd = GDP
Pgd = GDP price index_______
(3-4)
(3 .5)
(3 .6)
(3 .7)
(3 .8)
(3 .9)
(3 .10)
(3 .11)
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List of variables
D f = Budget deficit or surplus 
TR = Total government revenue
TEXp = Total government expenditures
Revenue block
Ty = Taxes on income and corporate profits
T0tdir = Other direct taxes
Tm = Import duties
Tx = Export duties
Texc = Excise duties
Tsal = Total sales tax
Sdom = Sales tax on domestic production
Stm = Sales tax on imports
Surrey = Development surcharges
Tmv = Motor vehicle tax
Dstmp = Stamp duties
T0tind = Other indirect taxes
N jj = Non-tax revenue
Expenditure block
Curexp -  Current expenditure
Capexp = Capital expenditure under the budget
G |0 = Expenditure on government administration and law and order
Defexp = Expenditure on defence
Sub = Subsidies (current)
Intdom = Interest on domestic outstanding debt 
Intext = Interest on external outstanding debt
Ssoc = Social services
272
= Economic servicesSeco
SCOm = Community services 
Curoexp = Other current expenditure
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A
irtransport 
9992 
0 
0 
0 
9992 
0.295 
2948 
0.295 
2948
W
ater transport 
1933 
0 
0 
0 
1933 
0.000 
0 
0.000 
0
Phone, telegraph and post _________
6198_______
1338___________0_________0________
4860________
0.122_______756_____
0122___________756______
Source: 
W
orld Bank, 1992b. 
C
hanges in Trade and D
om
estic Taxation for Reform
 of the Incentive Regim
e and Fiscal Adjustm
ent, V
olum
e II, R
eport N
o. 9828-
PA
K
, W
ashington, D
C: W
orld Bank: A
ppendix V
III.
P_
3
^  -S 
a  2
CO HP  CO <7>
I t - I f
p  Xfl
CTQ g- 
P  3  3 CL
-ri h
g: s
§ w
a .  3
« ' 1 1  
2, >8 TO
5- “3 B.cd Ct.SC o
S' gcrqCA
50 o  s*
O 3 I  §
s  5- i  s.
l i . ? *I—‘ • *— » M►‘ ^
(W 3’ &aq ^
03
I .
CTQ
j r o H E ?eg
» 8 q
C/5
°  o  3*
o °  g
3  Ä
1—* 00 4L VO to to to to VO to to o£ Oto as -o LA o U) 4L to 00 to s 4L to ON to o 00 VO o LALA 1—■vo 4L 4L o 4L 00 ►—* ON 4L ON e—» ONto 00 4L vo to vo vo to o "O
O
1^ 4L O sto LA to 4L vo U) VO O o 1— I—» ON to ON 00 ON to u> VO g C/5as to VO O LA ONVO U) to o to ON LA 00 to 4L o 1—1 1—1 ON to
to to toi— LA to -O tO LA o  tovl sj W Ul M O VO
to VO VOvl H OV Ov W M
4L  0 0  i—‘ 4l  0 0  t o©OOOOOOVOtOtOLA
H-• to to toUi S) 00 H 00 Ui vj 0\
A  Ov Ov LJ o  ' J  t o■4 Ul W M to ON 00 4L
o e o a > o o \ N i v c s i t J
o o o o o o o o o
to
on
4L.
00
4lO
ONto
>— VOo  oLA o  O  4* W
M
o  o 6  -  oo m o ooO  O  4L.
o o o o o o o o
Os 
00 o  
00 00 4L. O  
LA H-•
<1LA+Ltoas
<1to
LA
o  o  o  to o
4L. to as to 
O  H- 
>—  SO
LA
VO
I— -4 00 vo o  asUl w vj o  o  o  ©
~o4L. LA to to 
LA too  o
as(O4L.
ONLA4L
t o
© © © o  o  © o  © © © o  © © © © o  o  © o  © © © © ©
ON L/i Ö  Ö  H-* Ö  Ö  I—» Ö  Ö  Ö  to Ö  I—* Ö  Ö  Ö  Ö  m  ©  ’ll m  i i-L Mu i v o o o o t o o o o o v o o o v o v O ' J o o ^ L O O o o o t o ' o t U )  v 0 4 L K ^ O t o O O O O v o U ) 4 L O ' - 4 U ) O v < I O O O t O O v t O O )
as
VOas
VO
-O to -~J P“* VO O  o  la
too
VOo  o  o  o
o4L Oto too  o  o
toO to o to o -o oo
toas
© o  © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © o  © © © © © ©
Os la ©  ©  I—1 o  ©  >—1 O  h  ©  t o  t o  to  ©  !—» t o  ©  I—* I—» h i t o  ’ -j
L A < 0 © v O L A © 0 © © t - - i — O O O O O O ' J t O L A  
> 0 4 L h - * t O O O O t O O ' ~ J O v O t O t O O t o o < l
P—* *O to ON 4L O to
as to vo 00 as oo vo O
00 to  
vo 00 as I— 
o  oo o o 4L O  VO
P-^
COVOLA
to ON p—>
C\ H  M
Ui  t o  o  
VO to P—*
. LA 4L 4L to to 
L- VO 00to vo as
. S' to 4L 
VO LAto vo O I—
m
cdo
o
IL. hL
I  §
§ s
CL CD 
&
*eo3
w
•8o
a
cl T1 CD
3 gÖ3 >—p&
1  B 
& 8- 3 ?r
o’
HpX
8*
CD
HpX
8-
fr 1K)
3o
cd’
a
274
A
ppendix 6.3 
E
stim
ates of final sales of exem
pt goods using 1986-87 data (current m
illion rupees except for ratios and coe
Appendix 6.4 Pakistan - National Accounts summary (current billion rupees)
1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Gross Domestic Product (Y) 1342 1555 1776 2030 2320 2651
Resource Gap (M-X) 79 67 64 59 52 42
Imports (g+nfs) (M) 296 313 340 369 399 432
Export (g+nfs) (X) 217 246 276 310 347 390
Total expenditure 1421 1622 1841 2089 2372 2693
Consumption 1143 1310 1482 1676 1896 2144
Private 968 1118 1269 1441 1636 1857
Public 175 192 213 235 260 287
Investment 278 312 359 413 476 549
Gross fixed investment 257 287 330 380 438 505
. Private 135 152 179 211 248 291
. Public 122 135 151 170 190 213
Change in Stocks 21 25 29 33 38 45
Memorandum items:
Domestic Savings (Sd=Y-C) 199 244 295 354 424 507
Net factor income from abroad 15 15 13 12 11 10
National Savings 214 259 308 366 435 517
Foreign Savings 64 53 51 47 41 32
Sources: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1991b. Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1991, Statistics 
Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Government of Baluchistan. Annual Budget Documents, Finance Department, Quetta: 
Government of Baluchistan (various issues).
Government of NWFP, Annual Budget Documents, Finance Department, Peshawar: 
Government of NWFP (various issues).
Government of Pakistan, 1994. Pakistan Economic Survey 1993-94. Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Adviser's Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, Annual Budget Documents, Ministry of Finance, Budget 
Wing, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan (various issues).
Government of the Punjab, Annual Budget Documents, Finance Department, Lahore: 
Government of the Punjab (various issues).
Government of Sindh, Annual Budget Documents, Finance Department, Karachi: 
Government of Sindh (various issues).
Pakistan - Local Councils, Local Bodies Budget Documents, Governments of the 
Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan (various issues selected local councils in each 
province).
Planning Commission, 1994. The Eighth Five-Year Plan (1993-98), Planning 
Commission, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
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Appendix 6.5 Private final consumption expenditure by type and purpose during 
1990-91 (current million rupees)
1990-91 
per capita 
rupees
All Pakistan
1. Food, beverages and tobacco 2525 287295
A. Food 2329 264994
- Cereals 484 55070
- Baked & fried products 37 4210
- Pulses, split and whole 84 9558
- Milk and milk products 604 68723
- Edible oils and fats 172 19570
- Meat and fish 199 22642
- Poultry 54 6144
- Fruits and dry fruits 102 11606
- Vegetables 250 28445
- Condiments and spices 80 9102
- Sugar and sugar preparations 181 20594
- Ready-made food products 54 6144
- Other foods 28 3186
B. Tea, coffee and soft drinks 89 10126
- Tea 68 7737
- Coffee 1 114
- Soft-drinks 20 2276
C. Tobacco and chewing products 107 12174
2. Fuel and Power 295 33565
- Fire wood 103 11719
- Kerosene oil 35 3982
- Coal 1 114
- Dung-cakes 24 2731
- Gas (piped & cylinder) 22 2503
- Electricity, including bulbs 95 10809
- Match box 6 683
- Others 9 1024
3. Clothing and footwear 404 45967
- Clothing 301 34248
- Footwear 84 9558
- Others 19 2162
4. Housing and rent 691 78622
- House rent 52 5917
- Imputed house rent 563 64058
- Other housing expenses 76 8647
5. Medical care and health 149 16953
- Medicines purchase 97 11037
- Hospital, doctor fees 50 5689
- Other medical costs 2 228
6. Recreational, entertainment, education, 
and cultural services 96 10923
- Educational expenses 80 9102
- Recreational expenses 16 1820
7. Transport and travelling 16 1820
276
1990-91 
per capita 
rupees
All Pakistan
8. Furniture, furnishing and household 
equipment and household operation 92 10468
- Kitchen equipment 14 1593
- China ware 19 2162
- Furniture 24 2731
- Laundry equipment 5 569
- Others 30 3413
9. Durable goods 29 3300
- Radio, television, VCR, refrigerator etc. 14 1593
- Recreation equipment 1 114
- Transport vehicles 14 1593
10. Other non-durable 82 9330
11. Jewellery 416 47332
12. Miscellaneous goods & services 636 72364
- Personal care articles & services 190 21618
- Personal transport 189 21504
- Housing cleaning items 79 8989
- Other items of personal care 178 20253
13. Other consumption expenditure 165 18774
Total Household Consumption Expenditure 5596 636713
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1993. Household Integrated Economic Survey 1990-91, 
Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Karachi: Government of Pakistan.
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Appendix 7.1 Government revenue and expenditure projections1 under the status 
quo scenario 1993-98 (current billion rupees)
Actual2 Projected Total Gr.Rate’
1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1993-98 (%)
Total revenue 244.0 283.0 322.8 368.1 417.7 477.9 1869.6 14.4
Total taxes 179.9 217.5 246.9 280.1 315.8 359.8 1420.0 14.9
- Direct taxes 37.8 42.9 51.0 59.7 69.8 81.6 305.1 16.6
. Income tax 35.0 40.7 48.6 57.0 66.8 78.3 291.4 17.5
. Other 2.8 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.4 13.7 3.6
- Indirect taxes 142.1 174.6 195.9 220.4 246.0 278.1 1115.0 14.4
. Import duties 63.2 77.8 84.3 91.3 99.0 107.3 459.6 11.2
. Export duties 0.0 4.7 5.2 5.7 6.3 7.0 28.8 0.0
. Excise duties 35.5 40.4 45.7 51.8 59.8 67.7 265.4 13.7
. Sales tax 23.7 27.1 31.5 36.9 42.8 52.0 190.2 17.0
- Domestic 12.5 14.8 17.8 21.7 26.7 33.4 114.4 21.7
- Imports 11.2 12.3 13.6 15.2 16.1 18.6 75.8 10.7
. Surcharges 13.1 18.3 22.2 26.8 29.4 34.5 131.2 21.5
. Motor vehicle tax 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.5 10.0 13.7
. Stamp duties 3.0 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.5 5.0 20.2 10.8
. Other 2.3 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 9.5 -0.6
- Non-tax revenue4 64.1 65.6 75.9 88.0 101.9 118.1 449.5 13.0
Total expenditure 351.9 413.1 479.8 557.4 648.5 754.6 2853.4 16.5
- Current expenditure 265.4 313.6 366.1 427.5 500.0 584.9 2192.1 17.1
. Govt: administration1^  1.1 36.2 42.1 49.0 57.0 66.3 250.7 16.3
. Defence 87.8 104.8 120.6 138.8 159.7 183.8 707.7 15.9
. Community services 8.2 10.0 11.7 13.6 15.9 18.5 69.7 17.6
. Social services 38.7 44.9 52.7 62.0 72.9 85.7 318.3 17.2
. Economic services 10.2 7.9 8.8 9.7 10.7 11.9 49.0 3.1
. Subsidies 7.3 9.6 10.6 11.6 12.7 13.9 58.4 13.6
. Interest payments 75.2 90.0 107.8 129.0 155.1 186.3 668.2 19.9
- Domestic 58.7 70.5 84.8 102.1 123.7 149.7 530.8 20.6
- Foreign 16.5 19.5 23.0 26.9 31.4 36.6 137.4 17.3
. Other 6.9 10.2 11.8 13.7 16.0 18.5 70.2 21.9
- Development^ 86.5 74.3 81.1 88.5 96.6 105.4 445.9 4.0
- Development6 86.5 99.5 113.7 129.9 148.5 169.7 661.2 14.4
Overall deficit7 107.8 130.1 157.0 189.3 230.8 276.7 983.9 20.7
- Primary deficit 32.6 40.1 49.2 60.3 75.7 90.4 315.7 22.6
- Interest payments 75.2 90.0 107.8 129.0 155.1 186.3 668.2 19.9
Financing: 107.8 130.1 157.0 189.3 230.8 276.7 983.9
- Non-bank8 21.0 71.0 89.5 112.2 142.6 176.0 591.3 53.0
- Bank 62.5 31.1 35.5 40.6 46.4 53.0 206.6 -3.3
- External 24.3 28.0 32.0 36.5 41.8 47.7 186.0 14.4
Memorandum items:
GDP (market prices)9 1342.0 1555.0 1776.0 2030.0 2320.0 2651.0 10332.0 14.6
Total revenue 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.1 18.0 18.0 18.1
Total taxes 13.4 14.0 13.9 13.8 13.6 13.6 13.7
- Direct taxes 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.0
. Income tax 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.8
. Other 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
- Indirect taxes 10.6 11.2 11.0 10.9 10.6 10.5 10.8
. Import duties 4.7 5.0 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.4
. Export duties 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
. Excise duties 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
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. Sales tax 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.8
- Domestic 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.1
- Imports 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
. Surcharges 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
. Motor vehicle tax 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
. Stamp duties 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
. Other 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- Non-tax revenue4 4.8 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.4
Total expenditure 26.2 26.6 27.0 27.5 28.0 28.5 27.6
- Current expenditure 19.8 20.2 20.6 21.1 21.6 22.1 21.2
. Govt, administration 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.4
. Defence 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.8
. Community services 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
. Social services 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1
. Economic services 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5
. Subsidies 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
. Interest payments 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.4 6.7 7.0 6.5
- Domestic 4.4 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.3 5.6 5.1
- Foreign 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3
. Other 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
- Development5 6.4 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.0 4.3
- Development6 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4
Overall deficit7 8.0 8.4 8.8 9.3 9.9 10.4 9.5
- Primary deficit 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.1
- Interest payments 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.4 6.7 7.0 6.5
Financing: 8.0 8.4 8.8 9.3 9.9 10.4 9.5
- Non-bank8 1.5 4.6 5.0 5.5 6.1 6.6 5.7
- Bank 4.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
- External 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Notes: ’Model forecasts.
2Actual budgetary accounts.
'Average annual growth rate for the period 1992-93 and 1997-98. 
includes contribution by the public sector autonomous bodies.
5ModeFs predicted values.
’Development expenditure assumed at the 1992-93 level.
7On the basis of assumed development expenditure.
XN on-bank borrowing has been taken as residual of financing requirements by assuming 
fixed (as % of GDP) bank and external borrowing.
9Based on the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1993-98) GDP growth assumption.
"Government administration.
Sources: Appendix 2.3 and Authors’ computation.
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Appendix 7.2 VAT rate structure under alternative scenarios
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3
VAT Rate Structure VAT Rate Structure VAT Rate Structure
0% 2% 15% 30% 0% 2% 15% 30% 0% 2% 15% 30%
1 .Food, beverages and tobacco
A. Food
- Cereals X X X
- Baked and fried products X X X
- Pulses, split and whole X X X
- Milk and milk products X X X
- Edible oils and fats X X X
- Meat and fish X X X
- Poultry X X X
- Fruits and dry fruits X X X
- Vegetables X X X
- Condiments and spices X X X
- Sugar and sugar preparations X X X
- Ready-made food products X X X
- Miscellaneous food items X X X
B. Tea, coffee and soft drinks
- Tea X X X
- Coffee X X X
- Soft-drinks X X X
C. Tobacco and chewing products X X X
2.Fuel and power
- Fire wood X X X
- Kerosene oil X X X
- Coal X X X
- Dung-cakes X X X
- Gas (piped & cylinder) X X X
- Electricity, including bulbs X X X
- Match boxes X X X
- Other fuel and power items X X X
3.Clothing and footwear
- Clothing X X X
- Footwear X X X
- Other X X X
4.Housing and rent
- House rent X X X
- Imputed house rent X X X
- Other housing expenses X X X
5. Medical care and health
- Medicine purchases X X X
- Hospital, doctor fees X X X
- Other medical costs X X X
6.Recreational, entertainment,
education and cultural services
- Educational expenses X X X
- Recreational expenses X X X
7.Transport and travelling X X X
8.Furniture, furnishing and household
equipment and household operation
- Kitchen equipment X X X
- China ware X X X
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- Furniture X X X
- Laundry equipment X X X
- Other X X X
9. Durable goods
- Television, VCR, refrigerator etc., X X X
- Recreation equipment X X X
- Transport vehicles X X X
10. Other non-durable X X X
11. Jewellery X X X
12. Miscellaneous goods and services
- Personal care articles and services X X X
- Personal transport X X X
- Housing cleaning items X X X
- Other items of personal care X X X
13. Other consumption expenditure X X X
Note: x = VAT rate in specific column.
Source: Author’s computation.
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Appendix 7.3 Value-added tax revenue under scenario l 1 (current billion rupees)
19901-91 Projected3
HIES2 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
1. Food, beverages and tobacco 43.1 69.0 78.4 89.0 101.1 114.7
A. Food 39.8 63.7 72.3 82.1 93.2 105.8
Cereals 8.3 13.2 15.0 16.9 19.1 21.1
Baked and fried products 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6
Pulses, split and whole 1.4 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.7
Milk and milk products 10.3 16.5 18.7 21.0 23.8 26.3
Edible oils and fats 2.9 4.7 5.3 6.0 6.8 7.5
Meat and fish 3.4 5.5 6.2 7.0 7.9 8.7
Poultry 0.9 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3
Fruits and dry fruits 1.7 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.4
Vegetables 4.3 6.8 7.7 8.7 9.8 10.9
Condiments and spices 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.5
Sugar and sugar preparations 3.1 5.0 5.6 6.3 7.1 7.9
Ready-made food products 0.9 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3
Miscellaneous food items 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
B. Tea, coffee and soft drinks 1.5 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.9
Tea 1.2 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.9
Coffee 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Soft-drinks 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
C. Tobacco and chewing products 1.8 2.9 3.3 3.7 4.2 4.7
2. Fuel and power 5.0 8.1 9.1 10.3 11.6 12.8
Fire wood 1.8 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.5
Kerosene oil 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dung-cakes 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Gas (piped & cylinder) 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Electricity, including bulbs 1.6 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.7 4.1
Match boxes 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Other fuel and power items 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
3. Clothing and footwear 6.9 11.1 12.6 14.1 15.9 17.6
Clothing 5.1 8.2 9.3 10.5 11.8 13.1
Footwear 1.4 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.7
Others 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8
4. Housing and rent 11.8 18.9 21.4 24.1 27.2 30.0
House rent 0.9 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.3
Imputed house rent 9.6 15.4 17.5 19.6 22.2 24.5
Other housing expenses 1.3 2.1 2.3 2.6 3.0 3.3
5. Medical care and health 2.5 4.1 4.6 5.2 5.8 6.5
Medicine purchases 1.7 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.8 4.2
Hospital, doctor fees 0.9 1.4 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.2
Other medical costs 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
6. Recreational, entertainment,
education and cultural services 1.6 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.8 4.2
Educational expenses 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.5
Recreational expenses 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
7. Transport and travelling 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
8. Furniture, furnishing and household
equipment and household operation 1.6 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.6 4.0
Kitchen equipment 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
China ware 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8
Furniture 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Laundry equipment 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Others 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3
9. Durable goods 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3
Radio, television, VCR, refrigerator 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
Recreation equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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T ra n sp o r t veh ic le s 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
10. O th e r  n o n -d u rab le 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.6
11. Jew elle ry 7.1 11.4 12.9 14.5 16.4 18.1
12. M isce llan eo u s goods and  services 10.9 17.4 19.8 22.2 25.0 27.7
P erso n a l ca re  artic les an d  services 3.2 5.2 5.9 6.6 7.5 8.3
P erso n a l tran sp o rt 3.2 5.2 5.9 6.6 7.4 8.2
H o u sin g  c lea n in g  item s 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.4
O th e r  item s o f  p ersona l care 3.0 4.9 5.5 6.2 7.0 7.8
1 3 .O th e r  co n su m p tio n  expend itu re 2.8 4.5 5.1 5.8 6.5 7.2
14. P o ten tia l v a lu e -ad d ed  tax  revenue 95.5 153.0 173.7 196.0 221.9 248.2
15. V alu e -ad d ed  ta x  revenue @ 80% * 24 76.4 122.4 139.0 156.8 177.5 198.6
Notes: 'VAT revenue calculation on the basis of household consumption expenditure estimates 
as in appendix 6.5 and scenario 1 assumptions as in Appendix 7.2.
2Household Integrated Economic Survey 1990-91 estimates.
’Projected values are on the basis HIES consumption ratios to private consumption 
estimates of the eighth five-year plan.
4Value-added tax revenue have been assumed at 80% of the potential VAT base.
Sources: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1993. Household Integrated Economic Survey 1990-91, 
Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Karachi: Government of Pakistan. 
Planning Commission, 1994. The Eighth Five-Year Plan, 1993-98, Planning 
Commission, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan.
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Appendix 7.4 Government revenue and expenditure projections under scenario l 1 
1993-98 (current billion rupees)
Actual2
1992-93 1993-94 1994-95
Protected 
1995-96 1996-97
Total Gr.Rate3 
1997-98 1993-98 (%)
Total revenue 244.0 373.8 425.2 482.3 546.1 617.6 2445.0 20.4
Total taxes 179.9 308.2 349.3 394.3 444.2 499.5 1995.5 22.7
- Direct taxes 37.8 42.9 51.0 59.7 69.8 81.6 305.1 16.6
. Income tax 35.0 40.7 48.6 57.0 66.8 78.3 291.4 17.5
. Other 2.8 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.4 13.7 3.6
- Indirect taxes 142.1 265.3 298.3 334.6 374.4 417.8 1690.4 24.1
. Import duties 63.2 77.8 84.3 91.3 99.0 107.3 459.6 11.2
. Export duties 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
. Excise duties 35.5 40.4 45.7 51.8 59.8 67.7 265.4 13.7
. Value-added tax 23.7+ 122.4 139.0 156.8 177.5 198.6 794.3 52.9
. Surcharges 13.1 18.3 22.2 26.8 29.4 34.5 131.2 21.5
. Motor vehicle tax 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.5 10.0 13.7
. Stamp duties 3.0 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.5 5.0 20.2 10.8
. Other 2.3 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 9.5 -0.6
- Non-tax revenue4 64.1 65.6 75.9 88.0 101.9 118.1 449.5 13.0
Total expenditure 351.9 401.4 453.1 512.7 581.4 660.6 2609.2 13.4
- Current expenditure 265.4 301.9 339.4 382.8 432.9 490.9 1947.9 13.1
. Govt. administration@ 31.1 36.2 42.1 49.0 57.0 66.3 250.7 16.3
. Defence 87.8 104.8 120.6 138.8 159.7 183.8 707.7 15.9
. Community services 8.2 10.0 11.7 13.6 15.9 18.5 69.7 17.6
. Social services 38.7 44.9 52.7 62.0 72.9 85.7 318.3 17.2
. Economic services 10.2 10.9 11.8 12.7 13.7 14.9 64.0 7.9
. Subsidies 7.3 9.6 10.6 11.6 12.7 13.9 58.4 13.6
. Interest payments 75.2 78.2 81.1 84.3 88.0 92.3 423.9 4.2
- Domestic 58.7 59.0 59.4 60.1 61.0 62.1 301.6 1.1
- Foreign 16.5 19.2 21.7 24.2 27.0 30.2 122.3 12.9
. Other 6.9 10.2 11.8 13.7 16.0 18.5 70.2 21.9
- Development 86.5 74.3 81.1 88.5 96.6 105.4 1.0 4.0
- Development6 86.5 99.5 113.7 129.9 148.5 169.7 661.3 14.4
Overall deficit7 107.9 27.6 27.9 30.4 35.3 43.0 164.2 -16.8
- Primary deficit 32.7 -50.6 -53.2 -53.9 -52.7 -49.3 -259.7 -208.6
- Interest payments 75.2 78.2 81.1 84.3 88.0 92.3 423.9 4.2
Financing: 107.9 27.6 27.9 30.4 35.3 43.0 127.0 -22.7
- Non-bank8 21.0 2.5 4.6 7.1 9.8 13.2 37.2 -9.9
- Bank 62.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0
- External 24.3 25.1 23.3 23.3 25.5 29.8 127.0 4.2
Memorandum items:
GDP (market prices)9 1342.0 1555.0 1776.0 2030.0 2320.0 2651.010332.0 14.6
Total revenue 18.2 24.0 23.9 23.8 23.5 23.3 23.7
Total taxes 13.4 19.8 19.7 19.4 19.1 18.8 19.3
- Direct taxes 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.0
. Income tax 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.8
. Other 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
- Indirect taxes 10.6 17.1 16.8 16.5 16.1 15.8 16.4
. Import duties 4.7 5.0 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.4
. Export duties 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
. Excise duties 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
. Value-added tax 1.8 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.5 7.7
. Surcharges 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
. Motor vehicle tax 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
. Stamp duties 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
. Other 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
- Non-tax revenue4 4.8 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.4
Total expenditure 26.2 25.8 25.5 25.3 25.1 24.9 25.3
- Current expenditure 19.8 19,4 19.1 18.9 18.7 18.5 18.9
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. Govt. administration@ 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.4
. Defence 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.8
. Community services 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
. Social services 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1
. Economic services 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
. Subsidies 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
. Interest payments 5.6 5.0 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.5 4.1
-.Domestic 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.9
-.Foreign 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2
. Other 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5
- Development5 6.4 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.0 4.3
- Development6 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4
Overall deficit7 8.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6
- Primary deficit 2.4 -3.3 -3.0 -2.7 -2.3 -1.9 -2.5
- Interest payments 5.6 5.0 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.5 4.1
Financing: 8.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6
- Non-bank8 1.6 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
- Bank 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- External 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2
Notes: Subscripts 1-9 as per Appendix 7.1.
+Sales tax on domestic production and imports. 
Sources: As per Appendix 7.1 and Appendix 7.3.
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Appendix 7.5 Value-added tax revenue under scenario 21 (current billion rupees)
1990-91 Projected3
HIES2 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
1. Food, beverages and tobacco 27.4
A. Food 24.0
Cereals 0.0
Baked and fried products 0.6
Pulses, split and whole 0.0
Milk and milk products 10.3
Edible oils and fats 2.9
Meat and fish 3.4
Poultry 0.9
Fruits and dry fruits 0.0
Vegetables 0.0
Condiments and spices 1.4
Sugar and sugar preparations 3.1
Ready-made food products 0.9
Miscellaneous food items 0.5
B. Tea, coffee and soft drinks 1.5
Tea 1.2
Coffee 0.0
Soft-drinks 0.3
C. Tobacco and chewing products 1.8
2. Fuel and power 2.3
Fire wood 0.0
Kerosene oil 0.0
Coal 0.0
Dung-cakes 0.0
Gas (piped & cylinder) 0.4
Electricity, including bulbs 1.6
Matchboxes 0.1
Other fuel and power items 0.2
3. Clothing and footwear 1.8
Clothing 0.0
Footwear 1.4
Other 0.3
4. Housing and rent 1.3
House rent 0.0
Imputed house rent 0.0
Other housing expenses 1.3
5. Medical care and health 0.0
Medicine purchases 0.0
Hospital, doctor fees 0.0
Other medical costs 0.0
6. Recreational, entertainment,
education and cultural services 0.3
Educational expenses 0.0
Recreational expenses 0.3
7. Transport and travelling 0.0
8. Furniture, furnishing and household 
equipment and household operation 1.6
Kitchen equipment 0.2
China ware 0.3
Furniture 0.4
Laundry equipment 0.1
Other 0.5
9. Durable goods 0.5
Radio, television, VCR, refrigerator ect. 
Recreation equipment 0.0
43.9 49.8 56.6 64.2 72.9
38.5 43.7 49.7 56.4 64.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
16.5 18.7 21.0 23.8 26.3
4.7 5.3 6.0 6.8 7.5
5.5 6.2 7.0 7.9 8.7
1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.5
5.0 5.6 6.3 7.1 7.9
1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
2.4 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.9
1.9 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.9
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
2.9 3.3 3.7 4.2 4.7
3.6 4.1 4.6 5.2 5.7
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
2.6 2.9 3.3 3.7 4.1
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
2.8 3.2 3.6 4.1 4.5
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.7
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8
2.1 2.3 2.6 3.0 3.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.1 2.3 2.6 3.0 3.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.5 2.9 3.2 3.6 4.0
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3
0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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T ransport vehicles 0.2
10. Other non-durable 1.4
11. Jewellery 7.1
12. Miscellaneous goods and services 10.9
Personal care articles and services 3.2
Personal transport 3.2
Housing cleaning items 1.4
Other items of personal care 3.0
13. Other consumption expenditure 2.8
14. Potential value-added tax revenue 57.2
15. Value-added tax revenue @80%4 45,8
Notes: As per Appendix 7.2.
Source: As per Appendix 7.2.
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
2.2 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.6
11.4 12.9 14.5 16.4 18.1
17.4 19.8 22.2 25.0 27.7
5.2 5.9 6.6 7.5 8.3
5.2 5.9 6.6 7.4 8.2
2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.4
4.9 5.5 6.2 7.0 7.8
4.5 5.1 5.8 6.5 7.2
91.7 104.1 117.5 133.0 148.9
73.3 83.3 94.0 106.4 119.1
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Appendix 7.6 Government revenue and expenditure projections under scenario 21 
1993-98 (current billion rupees)
Actuals2
1992-93 1993-94
Proiected 
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Total
1993-98
Gr. R ate3 
(%)
Total revenue 244.0 324.7 369.5 419.5 475.0 538.1 2126.8 17.1
Total taxes 179.9 259.1 293.6 331.5 373.1 420.0 1677.3 18.5
- Direct taxes 37.8 42.9 51.0 59.7 69.8 81.6 305.1 16.6
. Income tax 35.0 40,7 48.6 57.0 66.8 78.3 291.4 17.5
. Other 2.8 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.4 13.7 3.6
- Indirect taxes 142.1 216.2 242.6 271.8 303.3 338.3 1372.2 18.9
. Import duties 63.2 77.8 84.3 91.3 99.0 107.3 459.6 11.2
. Export duties 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
. Excise duties 35.5 40.4 45.7 51.8 59.8 67.7 265.4 13.7
. Value-added tax 23.7+ 73.3 83.3 94.0 106.4 119.1 476.1 38.1
. Surcharges 13.1 18.3 22.2 26.8 29.4 34.5 131.2 21.5
. Motor vehicle tax 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.5 10.0 13.7
. Stamp duties 3.0 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.5 5.0 20.2 10.8
Other 2.3 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 9.5 -0.6
- Non-tax revenue4 64.1 65.6 75.9 88.0 101.9 118.1 449.5 13.0
Total expenditure 351.9 407.6 467.1 536.0 616.3 709.8 2736.8 15.1
- Current expenditure 265.4 308.1 353.4 406.1 467.8 540.1 2075.5 15.3
. Govt: administration@31.1 36.2 42.1 49.0 57.0 66.3 250.7 16.3
. Defence 87.8 104.8 120.6 138.8 159.7 183.8 707.7 15.9
. Community services 8.2 10.0 11.7 13.6 15.9 18.5 69.7 17.6
. Social services 38.7 44.9 52.7 62.0 72.9 85.7 318.3 17.2
. Economic services 10.2 10.9 11.8 12.7 13.7 14.9 64.0 7.9
. Subsidies 7.3 9.6 10.6 11.6 12.7 13.9 58.4 13.6
. Interest payments 75.2 84.4 95.1 107.6 122.9 141.5 551.5 13.5
- Domestic 58.7 64.9 72.1 80.7 91.5 104.9 414.1 12.3
- Foreign 16.5 19.5 23.0 26.9 31.4 36.6 137.4 17.3
. Other 6.9 7.2 8.8 10.7 13.0 15.5 55.2 17.6
- Development3 86.5 74.3 81.1 88.5 96.6 105.4 445.9 4.0
- Development6 86.5 99.5 113.7 129.9 148.5 169.7 661.2 14.4
Overall deficit7 107.9 82.9 97.6 116.5 141.3 171.7 610.0 9.7
- Primary deficit 32.7 -1.5 2.5 8.9 18.4 30.2 58.5 -1.6
- Interest payments 75.2 84.4 95.1 107.6 122.9 141.5 551.5 13.5
Financing: 107.9 82.9 97.6 116.5 141.3 171.7 610.0 9.7
- Non-bank" 21.0 23.8 30.1 39.4 53.1 71.0 217.4 27.6
- Bank 62.6 31.1 35.5 40.6 46.4 53.0 206.6 -3.3
- External 24.3 28.0 32.0 36.5 41.8 47.7 186.0 14.4
Memorandum items: 
GDP (market prices)9 1342.0 1555.0 1776.0 2030.0 2320.0 2651.0 10332.0 14.6
Total revenue 18.2 20.9 20.8 20.7 20.5 20.3 20.6
Total taxes 13.4 16.7 16.5 16.3 16.1 15.8 16.2
- Direct taxes 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.0
. Income tax 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.8
. Other 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
- Indirect taxes 10.6 13.9 13.7 13.4 13.1 12.8 13.3
. Import duties 4.7 5.0 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.4
. Export duties 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
. Excise duties 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
. Value-added tax 1.8 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.6
. Surcharges 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
. Motor vehicle tax 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
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. Stamp duties 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
. Other 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
- Non-tax revenue4 4.8 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.4
Total expenditure 26.2 26.2 26.3 26.4 26.6 26.8 26.5
- Current expenditure 19.8 19.8 19.9 20.0 20.2 20.4 20.1
. Govt: admimstration@ 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.4
. Defence 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.8
. Community services 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
. Social services 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1
. Economic services 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
. Subsidies 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
. Interest payments 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
- Domestic 4.4 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.0
- Foreign 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3
. Other 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5
- Development5 6.4 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.0 4.0
- Development6 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4
Overall deficit7 8.0 5.3 5.5 5.7 6.1 6.5 5.9
- Primary deficit 2.4 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.1 0.6
- Interest payments 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
Financing: 8.0 5.3 5.5 5.7 6.1 6.4 5.9
- Non-bank* 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.6 2.1
- Bank 4.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
- External 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Notes: Subscripts 1 -9 as per Appendix 7.1.
+Sales tax on domestic production and imports. 
Sources: As per Appendix 7.1 and Appendix 7.5.
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Appendix 7.7 Value-added tax revenue under scenario 31 (current billion rupees)
19901-91 Projected'
HIES2 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
1. Food, beverages and tobacco 17.6 28.1 31.9 36.3 41.2 46.7
A. Food 10.9 17.4 19.8 22.4 25.5 28.9
Cereals 1.1 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.8
Baked and fried products 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Pulses, split and whole 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5
Milk and milk products 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.5
Edible oils and fats 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Meat and fish 3.4 5.5 6.2 7.0 7.9 8.7
Poultry 0.9 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3
Fruits and dry fruits 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6
Vegetables 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Condiments and spices 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.5
Sugar and sugar preparations 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0
Ready-made food products 0.9 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3
Miscellaneous food items 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
B. Tea, coffee and soft drinks 3.0 4.9 5.5 6.2 7.0 7.7
Tea 2.3 3.7 4.2 4.7 5.3 5.9
Coffee 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Soft-drinks 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8
C. Tobacco and chewing products 3.7 5.9 6.7 7.5 8.4 9.3
2. Fuel and power 2.2 3.6 4.1 4.6 5.2 5.7
Fire wood 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kerosene oil 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dung-cakes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gas (piped & cylinder) 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Electricity, including bulbs 1.6 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.7 4.1
Match boxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other fuel and power items 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
3. Clothing and footwear 2.5 3.9 4.5 5.0 5.7 6.3
Clothing 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.7
Footwear 1.4 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.7
Other 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8
4. Housing and rent 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
House rent 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Imputed house rent 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other housing expenses 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
5. Medical care and health 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Medicine purchases 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hospital, doctor fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other medical costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Recreational, entertainment, 
education and cultural services 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
Educational expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Recreational expenses 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
7. Transport and travelling 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
8. Furniture, furnishing and household 
equipment and household operation 2.1 3.4 3.9 4.4 4.9 5.5
Kitchen equipment 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
China ware 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7
Furniture 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
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Laundry equipment 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Other 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3
9. Durable goods 1.0 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.5
Radio, television, VCR, refrigerator0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
Recreation equipment 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Transport vehicles 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
10 Other non-durable 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.6
11 Jewellery 14.2 22.7 25.8 29.0 32.7 36.2
12 Miscellaneous goods and services 14.1 22.6 25.6 28.8 32.5 35.9
Personal care articles and services 3.2 5.2 5.9 6.6 7.5 8.3
Personal transport 6.5 10.3 11.7 13.2 14.9 16.4
Housing cleaning items 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.4
Other items of personal care 3.0 4.9 5.5 6.2 7.0 7.8
13. Other consumption expenditure 2.8 4.5 5.1 5.8 6.5 7.2
14 Potential value-added tax revenue5 8.3 93.4 106.1 119.5 135.2 150.6
15 Value-added tax revenue @80% 46.7 74.8 84.9 95.6 108.1 120.5
Notes: As per Appendix 7.3. 
Source: As per Appendix 7.3.
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Appendix 7.8 Government revenue and expenditure projections under scenario 31 
1993-98 (current billion rupees)
Actual2
1992-93 1993-94 1994-95
Projected
1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Total Gr. R ate3 
1993-98 (%)
Total revenue 244.0 326.2 371.1 421.1 476.7 539.5 2134.6 17.2
Total taxes 179.9 260.6 295.2 333.1 374.8 421.4 1685.1 18.6
- Direct taxes 37.8 42.9 51.0 59.7 69.8 81.6 305.1 16.6
. Income tax 35.0 40.7 48.6 57.0 66.8 78.3 291.4 17.5
. Other 2.8 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.4 13.7 3.6
- Indirect taxes 142.1 217.7 244.2 273.4 305.0 339.7 1380.0 19.0
. Import duties 63.2 77,8 84.3 91.3 99.0 107.3 459.6 11.2
. Export duties 0.0 4.7 5.2 5.7 6.3 7.0 28.8 0.0
. Excise duties 35.5 40.4 45.7 51.8 59.8 67.7 265.4 13.7
. Value-added tax 23.7+ 74.8 84.9 95.6 108.1 120.5 483.9 38.4
. Surcharges 13.1 18.3 22.2 26.8 29.4 34.5 131.2 21.5
. Motor vehicle tax 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.5 10.0 13.7
. Stamp duties 3.0 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.5 5.0 20.2 10.8
. Other 2.3 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 9.5 -0.6
- Non-tax revenue4 64.1 65.6 75.9 88.0 101.9 118.1 449.5 13.0
Total expenditure 351.9 407.4 466.7 535.3 615.3 708.5 2733.2 15.0
- Current expenditure 265.4 307.9 353.0 405.4 466.8 538.8 2071.9 15.2
. Govt. administration@31.1 36.2 42.1 49.0 57.0 66.3 250.7 16.3
. Defence 87.8 104.8 120.6 138.8 159.7 183.8 707.7 15.9
. Community services 8.2 10.0 11.7 13.6 15.9 18.5 69.7 17.6
. Social services 38.7 44.9 52.7 62.0 72.9 85.7 318.3 17.2
. Economic services 10.2 10.9 11.8 12.7 13.7 14.9 64.0 7.9
. Subsidies 7.3 9.6 10.6 11.6 12.7 13.9 58.4 13.6
. Interest payments 75.2 84.2 94.7 106.9 121.9 140.2 547.9 13.3
- Domestic 58.7 64.7 71.7 80.0 90.5 103.6 410.5 12.0
- Foreign 16.5 19.5 23.0 26.9 31.4 36.6 137.4 17.3
. Other 6.9 7.2 .8.8 10.7 13.0 15.5 55.2 17.6
- Development2 86.5 74.3 81.1 88.5 96.6 105.4 445.9 4.0
- Development6 86.5 99.5 113.7 129.9 148.5 169.7 661.2 14.4
Overall deficit7 107.9 81.2 95.6 114.2 138.6 169.0 598.6 9.4
- Primary deficit 32.7 -3.1 0.9 7.3 16.7 28.8 50.7 -2.5
- Interest payments 75.2 84.2 94.7 106.9 121.9 140.2 547.9 13.3
Financing: 107.9 81.2 95.6 114.2 138.6 169.0 598.6 9.4
- Non-bank" 21.0 22.1 28.1 37.1 50.4 68.3 206.0 26.6
- Bank 62.6 31.1 35.5 40.6 46.4 53.0 206.6 -3.3
- External 24.3 28.0 32.0 36.5 41.8 47.7 186.0 14.4
Memorandum items:
GDP (market prices)9 1342.0 1555.0 1776.0 2030.0 2320.0 2651.0 10332.0 14.6
Total revenue 18.2 21.0 20.9 20.7 20.5 20.4 20.7
Total taxes 13.4 16.8 16.6 16.4 16.2 15.9 16.3
- Direct taxes 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.0
. Income tax 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.8
. Other 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
- Indirect taxes 10.6 14.0 13.8 13.5 13.1 12.8 13.4
. Import duties 4.7 5.0 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.4
. Export duties 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
. Excise duties 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
. Value-added tax 1.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.7
. Surcharges 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
. Motor vehicle tax 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
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. Stamp duties 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
. Other 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
- Non-tax revenue" 4.8 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.4
Total expenditure 26.2 26.2 26.3 26.4 26.5 26.7 26.5
- Current expenditure 19.8 19.8 19.9 20.0 20.1 20.3 20.1
. Govt, administration 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.4
. Defence 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.8
. Community services 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
. Social services 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1
. Economic services 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
. Subsidies 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
. Interest payments 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
-.Domestic 4.4 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0
-. Foreign 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3
. Other 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
- Development5 6.4 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.0 4.3
- Development6 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4
Overall deficit7 8.0 5.2 5.4 5.6 6.0 6.4 5.8
- Primary deficit 2.4 -0.2 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.1 0.5
- Interest payments 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
Financing: 8.0 5.2 5.4 5.6 6.0 6.4 5.8
- Non-bank* 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.2 2.6 2.0
- Bank 4.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
- External 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Notes: Subscripts 1-9 as per Appendix 7.1.
+Sales tax on domestic production and imports. 
Sources: Appendix 2.3 and Appendix 7.6.
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Appendix 9.1 Percent distribution of general public: by type of monthly income 
and expenditure on food and other household expenditure items and 
by province
Overall Punjab Sindh NWFP1 Baluchistan
Total respondents 92 29 27 23 13
Percent IPO
1. Monthly income (Pakistan rupees)
100 100 100 100
- Less than 1000 4 - - 23
- 1001 - 5000 40 35 59 39 15
- 5001 - 10000 37 45 22 48 31
-10001 &. above 8 7 4 9 15
- No Response 1 1 10 15 4 16
2. Expenditure on food2
- Less than 25 6 3 7 4 8
- 25 - 39 13 14 15 9 15
- 40 - 54 41 38 44 52 46
- 55 - 64 23 24 22 31 23
- Above 64 17 21 11 4 8
3. Expenditure on house rent'
- Less than 10 51 52 48 39 77
- 11 - 20 37 38 26 57 23
- Above 20 12 10 26 4 .
4. Expenditure on utilities2
- Less than 10 42 41 30 57 46
- 11 - 20 49 52 59 35 46
- Above 20 9 7 11 9 8
5. Expenditure on transport2
- Less than 10 48 48 37 61 46
- 1 I - 20 47 45 56 35 54
- Above 20 5
6 Expenditure on children's education*
7 7 ; 4 -
- Less than 10 46 48 44 39 54
- n  - *20 49 45 48 57 46
- Above 20 5 7 7 4 .
7. Expenditure on other’ items*
- Less than 10 53 55 63 52 31
- 11 - 20 34 28 30 35 54
- Above 20 13 17 7 13 15
Notes: 'North West Frontier Province.
'Percent of total monthly income.
Includes expenditure on electricity, gas, kerosene oil. coal, wood and similar nature 
items.
Source: Field Survey undertaken during Januarv-April. 1994.
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